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Abstract
This thesis attempts to amorally defend certain 
conceptions of rationality, welfare and liberty and to 
reconcile them in the sense of showing that they need not 
clash in practice. This is motivated by the social 
scientific work (particularly in economics) that 
indicates that liberty and welfare are best promoted by 
the free market.
There is a cluster of reasons that this defence is 
needed: there is no clear account of liberty or what it 
entails; preference utilitarianism (as a theory of 
welfare) is often invalidly attacked, or misinterpreted 
in practice; some economist's conclusions that liberty 
and welfare do not diverge in the free market are often 
questioned because based on an instrumental rationality 
which is thought unrealistic or vacuous; the theories of 
liberty and welfare in this thesis also need the 
instrumental rationality assumption.
Chapter 1: An Austrian economic interpretation of the
instrumental rationality assumption of standard economics 
(that agents are self-interested utility-maximisers) can 
be defended as fruitful, compatible with moral values 
though implying none, and the fundamental tautology that 
standard economics presupposes.
Chapter 2: The preference-utilitarian conception of
welfare as achieving what is spontaneously desired
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(desired without the imposition of force or fraud), and 
maximising overall welfare, withstands criticism and is 
in practice compatible with the conceptions of liberty 
and rationality used in this thesis. In practice, 
preference utilitarianism entails side-constraint 
libertarianism, which the free market spontaneously 
provides.
Chapter 3: The voluntarist conception of social liberty
as the absence of costs imposed on people by people, and 
maximising overall liberty, withstands criticism and is 
in practice compatible with the conceptions of welfare 
and rationality used in this thesis. In practice, 
maximising voluntarist liberty entails side-constraint 
libertarianism, which the free market spontaneously 
provides.
Coda: A criticism of the presuppositional dismissal of
anarchy as a natural setting for liberty and pluralism.
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0 Thesis Introduction
0.1 What this thesis is about
This thesis is about defending certain conceptions of 
rationality, welfare, and liberty from mistaken 
criticisms and reconciling them in the sense of showing 
that they need not clash in practice. It is conceded 
that maximising both welfare and liberty will not be 
compatible in all logically possible cases; that does not 
affect the thesis that they are normally compatible.
This thesis is not about defending welfare or liberty as 
moral goals, let alone as ultimate moral goals.
The conception of rationality is an Austrian 
interpretation of standard economic instrumental 
rationality: agents are self-interested utility- 
max imisers.
It will be argued that this assumption is necessary for 
the conceptions of liberty and welfare defended here as 
well as being the fundamental tautology that standard 
economics (as a social science) implicitly relies on to 
link its results to liberty and welfare. The relevant 
social scientific literature is generally taken as 
background information. However, when dealing with the 
criticisms and alternative positions it will be used and
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cited in specific cases throughout the thesis where it 
would seem incomplete not to do so.
The conception of welfare is that used by preference 
utilitarians: people are better off to the extent that 
the world is as they spontaneously (without force or 
fraud being used to engineer their preferences) prefer it 
to be. But it is defended as a plausible conception of 
welfare and not on the basis that it is moral to maximise 
it.
It will be argued that preference utilitarianism in 
practice entails rule utilitarianism where that rule will 
be side-constraint libertarianism. A side-constraint 
approach here means not allowing that X be done to an 
individual even to attempt1 to consequentially prevent 
more examples of X's being done.
The conception of voluntaristic liberty as people not 
having costs imposed on them by other people will be 
argued to be a clear, consistent, and comprehensive 
interpretation of the common notion of social liberty (as 
not being interfered with, put upon, or constrained by 
others). Whether such liberty is morally desirable is 
not the issue. (The three conceptions being defended 
leave no room for a separate theory of individual 
autonomy beyond this notion of liberty as not having
1 As consequentialism is ultimately accepted in principle 
in this thesis this view differs from Nozick's conception 
of a 'side constraint' which is absolute in principle 
(Nozick 1974 p.30).
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costs imposed by others. There is no separate section 
looking at criticisms from alternative views of autonomy. 
Instead such criticisms are dealt with in all three 
chapters.)
It will be argued that maximising such liberty will in 
practice entail rule-libertarianism where that rule will 
be side-constraint libertarianism.
Thus maximising liberty and maximising welfare are 
reconciled in practice by both requiring side-constraint 
libertarianism. This double defence of consequentialism 
in principle only to abandon it in practice may look 
unnecessarily complicated. It will be argued that this 
is the only correct full response to the powerful 
criticism that there is something irrational about side- 
constraints that are absolute in principle: they are 
thereby potentially at odds with the very things they 
ostensibly seek to promote or protect.
I hope that this thesis clarifies and strengthens the 
arguments and intuitions of those economic liberals (and 
their sympathisers) in various schools of social science 
(not least the economic ones: the Public Choice School, 
the Chicago School, and the Austrian School) who tend to 
argue that liberty and welfare seem to go together. In 
particular I hope this assists the anarcho-capitalist
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work being done in these schools (especially as found in 
the writings of Murray Rothbard and David Friedman2).
0.2 Why are moral issues avoided?
Most people in modern western society, including moral 
and political philosophers, have moral and political 
views that either limit welfare promotion for libertarian 
reasons or override liberty because of welfare 
considerations. At the extremes of the two views we have 
natural-rights libertarians (such as Nozick and Rothbard) 
and utilitarians (such as Hare and Smart). Discussions 
of distributive justice also generally attempt to limit 
liberty by welfare or vice versa (with egalitarian 
considerations usually doing the same tacitly— though 
usually being pro-welfare).
So if it is possible to effectively defend the congruence 
of liberty and welfare in practice, then there is no 
practical need of an ultimate moral defence of either—  
for there are few left to criticise. A moral defence is 
required only to the extent that critics have moral ends 
that trump both human liberty and human welfare. Such 
critics are few and far between and will be overruled in 
practical political terms. Therefore, in this thesis on 
political philosophy, it is possible to avoid any defence
z Though Rothbard ultimately wants a natural rights 
defence and Friedman, apparently, a more utilitarian 
defence.
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of liberty or welfare, or any combination, as ultimate 
moral goals while still making a substantial claim.
0.3 An analogical defence of this approach
There are two undiscovered primitive tribes that live in 
the same region. One tribe thinks that eating any part 
of animals without hearts is immoral. The other tribe 
thinks that eating any part of animals without kidneys is 
immoral. They have heated debates about both the moral 
issues and the empirical facts of which animals have 
which organs. They feel moral contempt for each other 
and continually attack each other in attempts to enforce 
their moral views. Peaceful association is considerably 
disrupted.
An anthropologist with some knowledge of biology 
discovers them. He explains that all animals in fact
o
either have both a heart and kidneys or neither of them. 
This view has been widely tested by biologists and they 
also have plausible theoretical reasons for explaining 
that this will always be so (except in the case of 
genetically engineerable animals, we may suppose4).
J I adapt this example from V.W. Quine's essay "Two 
Dogmas of Empiricism" in From a Logical Point of View 
(Harvard University Press, 1980, p.21); I assume that it 
is true though the analogy does not, of course, depend on 
its truth.
4 This is intended to be analogous with the thought- 
experiment attacks on the compatibility of liberty and 
welfare.
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Therefore, he argues, the bitter disagreements and 
struggles can cease to the great benefit of all.
It would surely be irrelevant for the tribes to insist 
that the anthropologist say which side he is really on, 
and give his tacit moral arguments. He need not be on 
either side. And if he were then it would probably only 
cloud the issue of the important claim he is making for 
him to also bring in moral arguments.
0.4 A critical rationalist method
This thesis is written in a way that is intended to 
follow critical rationalist epistemology. This theory of 
knowledge is that developed primarily by Karl Popper5 and
• fiextended in scope by W.W. Bartley.
The fundamental idea is that all knowledge is 
conjectural. Because of the nature of universal theories 
we can never make them more probable by finding new 
examples that fit with what they predict. We can never 
give our theories firm foundations of any sort, whether 
inductive or a priori. But any single counter-example is 
sufficient to show that a theory is false. So the best 
instrumentally rational approach is to conjecture 
theories that are as bold as possible and then attempt to
5 Especially in Popper 1978 & 1979.
6 Especially in Bartley 1984.
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test them as rigorously as possible. In this way we can 
at least have theories that are as large in content as 
our tests will allow.
We can still be mistaken about such theories, and we 
probably are; for in an infinite universe it is 
statistically unlikely that we have stumbled on the 
truth. But given our apparent success in dealing with 
the world there seems no reason to suppose that we have 
totally failed to understand it. And by rejecting 
falsified theories we might be reaching ones with ever 
greater truth content. In any case, without this 
methodological approach we are left with no course of 
action that is not ultimately arbitrary.
In the philosophical realm criticism is what takes on the 
role of empirical tests. That this thesis is intended to 
follow the critical rationalist method is the reason that 
critics dominate the arguments in what follows. If I 
were merely to build a castle of consistent theory then 
that would probably leave these critics, and those with 
similar opinions, quite unmoved. In fact it seems that, 
for the epistemological reasons given, one is really 
obliged to take on prevalent criticisms. One can do this 
tacitly by writing with the known views of others in mind 
or by postulating possible criticisms. In some cases I 
have resorted to this latter method though only in self- 
criticism or at the suggestion of a reader of a draft. 
Usually, though, I have tried to explicitly tackle real 
critics in the literature. This has made it necessary to
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deal with a plethora of awkward points in a way that has 
caused the theory to develop and, I hope, show its 
strength.
Therefore, this thesis does not start with first 
principles and then attempt to build up to well justified 
conclusions.7 The approach of the three-part structure 
is to state the respective theses clearly and briefly and 
then attempt to defend and reconcile them in the light of 
major and typical criticisms and alternative conceptions. 
(It would probably be more confusing and repetitive to 
discuss each conception of the thesis in strict isolation 
and only then attempt to reconcile them, given that the 
philosophers and economists being examined tend to run 
together their discussions of the nature and practical 
consequences of rationality, welfare, and liberty.) The 
idea is to show that the initial thesis can withstand 
such criticisms and comparisons, and so it is an 
improvement on them which itself remains as yet 
unrefuted.
However, in all the writers chosen I am not attempting to 
give a comprehensive account of their views in the books 
and articles discussed. These are often subtler and more 
full of insights than my quotations might suggest. I 
have merely 'plundered' them for points that seem typical 
or powerful criticisms (or alternative points of view) in
1 Things might seem this way in the 'state of nature' 
development of the implications of liberty (in chapter
3) , but drawing out the implications of an idea is not to 
attempt to justify it.
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order to test the strength of the position taken in this 
thesis. If, in the process of extracting these points, I 
have occasionally misconstrued or over-simplified them 
then that is certainly not intentional. At times I have 
deliberately taken a fairly small or weakly expressed 
point and in response developed detailed arguments 
(possibly out of proportion to the significance the 
author intended for his point). While I think this is a 
useful and valid way to develop the argument I am sure 
that the critic could often have put up a more 
comprehensive case had he foreseen such an 'onslaught'.
This thesis is in the area of political (or social) 
philosophy. Problems that are meta-ethical, practical, 
epistemological, and metaphysical are included in 
proportion to how far they are relevant to the general 
political philosophical thrust of the thesis. So, for 
instance, there is a necessary discussion of weakness of 
the will, but it is not of a length and comprehensiveness 
that might be expected in a thesis on pure philosophy 
(where it might easily be the sole topic).
The breadth of the subject matter that has been involved, 
and the need to press on, has also inevitably resulted in 
some first approximations to solutions to important 
problems that certainly would have to be revised in the 
light of a more detailed approach and further criticism.
For a fuller and more convincing account of the critical- 
rationalist epistemology it would be necessary to read
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the writings of Popper and Bartley. This brief section 
will have to suffice here as an explanation of critical 
rationalism and the use to which it is put.
1. Austrian Economic Rationality
l.l Chapter thesis
An Austrian economic interpretation of the instrumental 
rationality assumption of standard economics (that agents 
are self-interested utility-maximisers) can be defended 
as fruitful, compatible with moral values though implying 
none, and the fundamental tautology that standard 
economics presupposes.
1.2 Chapter introduction
This chapter proceeds after this introduction with an 
account of the economic assumptions being defended and 
why they are being defended. Then there is an 
examination of Israel Kirzner's similar position. The 
chapter continues to the end by examining criticisms of, 
and alternative conceptions to, the various parts of the 
rationality assumption.
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1.3 Why defend 'Austrian' economic rationality?
The great schism in economics
This chapter does not defend Austrian economic 
rationality as normally used by Austrian economists. In 
particular Austrian economists do not use the concept of 
utility-maximisation. This chapter is better seen as an 
Austrian interpretation of the more mainstream economic 
rationality assumption that individuals are self- 
interested utility-maximisers.
This chapter (and in some ways the overall thesis) can be 
seen as an attempt to heal the schism in economics 
between the subjective, tautological approach and the 
objective, scientific (falsifiable) approach. The 
Austrian subjective view of value (building on Menger's 
theory of value) was developed into a theory of economics 
as being an entirely tautological theory of action. This 
probably finds its most extreme statement in Ludwig von
• , Q , #
Mises' Human Action. The more standard economic view 
has developed into making falsifiable predictions about 
economic phenomena whereby the truth of the assumptions 
(especially about economic agents) is (to say the least) 
relatively unimportant. This probably finds its most 
extreme statement in Milton Friedman's introductory essay 
in his Essays in Positive Economics.9
Mises 1966.
9 Friedman, M. 1953.
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As a consequence Austrian economics has largely fallen 
out of favour with most economists for not being 
scientific (falsifiable) while standard economics has 
fallen out of favour with many non-economists as being 
insufficiently linked with the real subjective aspects of 
human values, welfare and liberty. I am generally 
inclined to view Austrians as correct on a tautological 
core but thereafter I want falsifiable predictions. But 
I will not here be attempting the large project of 
adjudicating between (or, perhaps, marrying the best 
parts of each of) the two schools of economics in areas 
other than the rationality assumption.
The problem in more detail
Economics is the social science that has done the most to 
link the free market with liberty and welfare 
(particularly in the schools referred to in the 
introduction). But economics' fundamental assumption (as 
a social science) of instrumental rationality is 
sometimes held to be unrealistic or viciously vacuous 
(depending on how it is interpreted) and this therefore 
has a tendency to undermine its conclusions. Its 
conception of economic demand is also fundamental and 
sometimes seen as biasing economics' results in the 
direction of market conclusions (this is not so fiercely 
under attack at the moment though it is just as 
important, and relevant to the rest of the thesis, so it
17
is also defended briefly at the end of the chapter) . A 
version of the rationality assumption is also needed for 
the conceptions of welfare and liberty used in this 
thesis. So if the rationality assumption (and the 
concept of economic demand) can be defended, then this 
should go some way to defending the conclusions of 
economists along with the conceptions of liberty and 
welfare in this thesis.
The standard interpretation of instrumental rationality 
(as found in, say, Hirshleifer's Price Theory and 
Applications10, discussed later) has people as self- 
interestedly maximising (over time) their 'utility' as 
revealed by their preferences. This assumption is often 
held to be of dubious value because it is thought that 
people are not always self-interested, are not motivated 
(at least solely) by utility, do not maximise over time, 
and their preferences cannot be identified with their 
interests for a variety of reasons (including weakness of 
the will).
This chapter is not about defending this standard outlook 
directly. In particular it is readily conceded that 
people are not always self-interested in the sense of 
being egoistic, for it is denied that economics needs to 
assume this. It is also admitted that people can make 
mistakes as regards their long-term interests. But the 
empirical literature can in part be used to show that
lu Hirshleifer 1984.
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people are better off making and learning from their own 
mistakes than having others control them, and some 
philosophical arguments can contribute to showing that 
this is so as well.
Instead, a tautological Austrian (subjective) 
interpretation of the instrumental rationality assumption 
is defended. The objections to this can be broken down
and examined separately. The following are taken to be
the major objections to the idea that agents are self- 
interested utility-maximisers (critics will later be 
quoted and discussed in each case A) and economic demand:
1) A self and its interests: This assumption provides no 
good account of the self and its interests: the self is
malleable rather than fixed, and one can be mistaken
about one's interests.
2) Self-interest: People are not merely self-interested 
for they often consider the interests of others, notably 
in moral decisions.
3) Utility: Utility does not make sense as a single 
motive or goal, or even as one of many.
4) Utility-maximisation: People do not maximise anything 
in particular, let alone utility.
Critics of utility-maximisation are left to the next 
chapter to avoid repetition.
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5) Economic demand: People cannot always afford what they 
'demand' (in a more ordinary sense of the word) . In 
particular, those important demands that are known as 
needs are not, as such, taken account of by this 
conception. This conception is thus inherently pro­
market and anti-welfare.
The first chapter deals with these criticisms in turn.
It should help to immediately give a brief account of 
each of these terms as they will be defended, though 
their full force should become clearer as the discussion 
of the critics proceeds.
1) A self and its interests: Any single entity can be 
seen as a self. The term need not imply anything about 
the nature of persons or of personal identity. Any 
entity that has conscious desires has interests in the 
sense intended.
2) Self-interest: The self-interest assumption is not to 
be contrasted with altruism (with which it is compatible) 
but with being an automaton or the puppet of the will of 
others. Agents, qua agents, necessarily follow their own 
consciously felt interests.
3) Utility: An utterly general feeling of satisfaction 
(or dissatisfaction in the case of disutility).
4) Utility-maximisation: Agents always aim at the goal 
the thought of which gives them the greatest utility (or
20
least disutility) at the time of aiming at it. Utility- 
maximisation is what motivates people; it is not their 
goal for they can seek ends the attainment of which do 
not cause them any psychological state once reached (such 
as posthumous fame).
5) Economic Demand: The willingness and ability to pay a 
price for something has no moral import and is not 
misleadingly pro-market.
Thus I am more or less defending the Austrian (or
subjective) approach to rationality that is expounded,
ip •for instance, by Israel Kirzner. * According to this 
view it is tautological that agents are instrumentally 
rational in the sense of purposeful maximisers. I prefer 
to gloss instrumental rationality explicitly as self- 
interested utility-maximisation instead of keeping the 
discussion more generally related to purposeful 
maximisation as (I will show) Kirzner does.
It might seem to even many economists that I am defending 
a straw man. The literal truth of the rationality 
assumption is often thought to be unimportant for the 
general business of doing economics. Milton Friedman is
an extreme example of this position. He has argued that
. . ITtestable predictions are all that really matter. And
Gary Becker has argued that with no rationality
Kirzner 1976.
13 Friedman 1953.
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assumption there would, with a high probability, still be 
downward sloping demand curves due to limited income.14 
And it might be questioned whether the work of the 
economists whose work I am wanting to defend can be 
interpreted using the tautological Austrian conception of 
instrumental rationality.
But from a purely economic viewpoint, it seems that a 
defence is necessary of instrumental rationality (self- 
interested utility-maximisation) as a descriptive account 
of what agents are subjectively trying to do efficiently. 
For if agents are not trying to be instrumentally 
rational then it is hard to make any real sense of their 
behaviour. So the prescriptive accounts of instrumental 
rationality (of what people really need to do to achieve 
certain ends— as given by rational choice theory, 
discussed later, as well as by economists in their 
advisory role) must carry very little weight. And so 
will all the results based on the additional rule-of- 
thumb assumptions (such as firms being profit- 
maximisers15 and individuals maximising preference 
satisfaction over time) that implicitly build on the 
subjective instrumental rationality of agents.
14 Becker 1971.
15 If it is not true that firms tend to maximise their 
profits because that tends to benefit the interests of 
the people involved, then the assumption that they do 
becomes mysterious in a way that seems to throw doubt on 
any economic conclusions that are supposed to follow from 
the assumption.
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This is not a defence of a priori Austrian economics as 
an alternative to the more mainstream varieties. The 
point is that the mainstream varieties cannot entirely 
abandon the core tautological subjective aspect of their 
science without themselves becoming mere predictions 
about patterns of behaviour that are impossible to relate 
to real human desires, welfare and liberty.
To recap, if this interpretation of the rationality 
assumption is false, and economics has no use at all for 
it, then this causes four major problems for this thesis:
1) The defence of welfare as having more of what we 
spontaneously consciously value is undermined.
2) The view of being free as other people not causing us 
costs (as opposed to benefits)— these being ultimately 
personal and subjective— is undermined.
3) Even if economics can still show that we get more of 
what we want and are less imposed on with the free market 
and voluntary behaviour, that does not show that 
'welfare' and 'liberty' as others might interpret these 
notions are increased thereby.
4) Economics needs to show that it can make sense of 
altruism as a subset of self-interest for a convincing 
and comprehensive extension of economic analysis into 
realms where altruism exists (the family, charity, 
friendship, love, ideology).
23
In other words, if people are not rational in the sense 
defended then both this thesis and standard economics 
would seem to be (at best) logically consistent but not 
very substantial.
In the next section this approach is compared with that 
of a modern Austrian economist, Israel Kirzner, who also 
argues that economics needs the subjective interpretation 
of rationality. This is quoted at some length in order 
to back up the claim that an Austrian interpretation of 
economic rationality is worth defending and to show the 
differences between Kirzner's interpretation and that 
taken in this thesis.
1.4 A comparison with Kirzner's defence
Israel Kirzner has recently written a brief but useful
historical survey of the topic under discussion.16 He
tells us that:
the self-interest assumption in economic theory has 
aroused passionate debate again and again in the 
history of the discipline. The passions were first 
ignited in reaction to classical economics, which 
appeared to assume not only a world of self- 
interested persons, but one in which they were 
intent on nothing else except material 
satisfaction.
This is the classical Homo oeconomicus.
lb Kirzner 1990 pp. 27-40.
17 Ibid. p.27.
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For Kirzner (and for this thesis) the opposite of being
motivated by self-interest (in the Austrian sense) would
not be being altruistic but being an automaton or a will-
less puppet of the interests of others. So the
assumption still has a very real and important content:
It is one's own purposes which inspire one's actions 
and excite one's alertness. One's purposes may be 
altruistic or otherwise; one's interest in achieving 
one's (possibly altruistic) goals switches on his or 
her alertness to opportunities for advancing those 
goals.18
But it seems that the critics dealt with later in this 
chapter show that more needs to be said to explain how 
altruism can be genuine while being one of "one's own 
purposes".
Today "microeconomics has once again assumed the
controlling paradigmatic role in economic theory."
Emphasising the contributions that the 'rationality'
assumption can make:
microeconomics has proceeded to 'invade' the 
territory of the other social sciences, placing ever 
more weight on the constrained maximisation 
behaviour which the 'rationality' assumption sees as 
so central.19
And Kirzner feels that, due to this new imperialism of 
economics, the old criticisms have resurfaced, and he 
gives his own examples in the literature (which I shall 
not repeat here).
In the face of such criticism economists have 
traditionally taken one of two defences, of which one is
18 Ibid. p.39.
19 Ibid. p.38.
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"to argue that the rationality assumption ... is never 
meant as more than a useful first approximation.1 
(Kirzner cites Fritz Machlup21 as "probably the most 
sophisticated and careful restatement of this line of 
defence."22)
But as a result critics of economics:
have accused economists of ignoring, at least in 
their policy recommendations, their own fine-print 
lip-service to the limited actual relevance of their 
models. ... economists have permitted their models 
to run away with them, so that they are simply 
unable to shake off their adherence to these suspect 
assumptions.2 3
By contrast, "the second of the two traditional defenses 
of economics has been to argue for a highly refined 
version of the assumption of economic man."24 In this 
version:
economic man does not need to be materialistic, or 
selfish; he does not even have to be efficient in 
any objective sense. He merely has to pursue goals 
purposefully, in the light of his own perceptions of 
relevant possibilities and constraints. Ever since, 
in 1932, Lionel Robbins built on the ideas of Philip 
Wicksteed in the U.K. and a number of Austrian 
economists of the 20s and early 30s to formulate 
this rarefied depiction of the economising agent, 
economists have felt justified in brushing aside 
much of the standard criticism.
2TT Ibid. p.31.
21 In "The Universal Bogey: Economic Man", Peston, M. and 
Corry, B. (eds) 1972 Essays in Honour of Lord Robbins 
(London: Weidenfield and Nicholson).
22 Kirzner 1990 p.40, footnote 3.
23 Ibid. p.31.
24 Ibid. p.32.
25 Ibid. p.32.
26
But various critics (some dealt with later) regard this 
as reducing the utility theory to a tautology and 
obscuring the difference between actions done for 
pleasure and those done for moral reasons.
Kirzner fully endorses the:
Mises-Robbins defence of the role of the 
'rationality' assumption, which emphasizes the 
complete generality of the utility towards which 
individuals are assumed to be purposefully aiming.
Here I must partly disagree with Kirzner (for the same
reason that I do with Mises); for a more "highly refined
version of ... economic man" seems to require the
distinction between utility as a motive force and
whatever happens to be the goal that we are thereby
motivated to aim at. If we do not make this vital
distinction then we are open to the criticism that, as we
have goals other than mere personal satisfaction, the
assumption is at best a rough approximation and all
conclusions based on it are thereby suspect: exactly the
sort of criticism that Kirzner wants to avoid.
Neither can I agree with Kirzner that "the core of
7 7economic theory is the theory of markets"* The core 
seems to be the rationality assumption itself for it is 
needed to make sense of markets and it can be used for 
analysing non-market choices.
Ibid. p.34.
27 Ibid. p.33.
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But I largely agree with Kirzner that:
the standard rebuttals offered against the Mises- 
Robbins defense, denouncing it as turning the micro- 
theory of the decision into a tissue of tautologies, 
incapable of explaining important obvious 
distinctions between classes of decisions under a 
variety of circumstances, totally miss the mark.
This is because the function of the microeconomic 
theory of the decision is precisely that of 
providing the tautologous framework required for the 
subsequent theory of the market process.
And I defend this point in response to various critics
dealt with throughout this chapter.
Throughout his article, Kirzner avoids giving a clear
account of "rationality" (keeping it in warning quotation
marks). But he was more explicit in his The Economic
Point of View where he writes, for instance:
Rationality in human behaviour consists ... in the 
consistent pursuit of one's own purposes; in 
selecting the means that appear best adapted to the 
achievement of one's goals; in refraining from 
courses of action that might frustrate their 
achievement or promise only the attainment of less 
valued, at the expense of more highly prized, 
objectives.29
And this statement seems to be roughly translatable into 
the account of rationality in this thesis as self- 
interested utility-maximisation. It is defending this 
more precise account that I think needs doing and which 
this chapter attempts.
This thesis may also have a broader account than Kirzner 
has in mind as I do not agree with the possible
Ibid. p.35.
29 Kirzner 1976 p.165.
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qualification of the role of rationality when he writes 
"to the extent that "rationality" plays a role in human
. TO . . . .decisions ... " or that "to reject the scientific
demonstration of the power of such systematic learning
patterns, on the grounds of occasional or frequent human 
"irrationality," ... " .31 If agents, qua agents, are
bound to be rational then there seems no room for such
"irrationality".
Kirzner rightly admits that:
it has turned out to be those economists (associated 
very often with the University of Chicago) who have 
been understood to be the most enthusiastic 
supporters of free markets (as a consequence of 
their economics) whose economics appear most heavily 
indebted to the narrowest formulations of the 
'rationality' assumption.3
But he feels that "the revival of the Austrian tradition
has enabled us to extend the classic Mises-Robbins
defense with renewed vigour"33 in a way that complements
this work. I agree, but, again, put the emphasis on the
greater realism and strength of the rationality
assumption itself (which these economists can now use to
better underpin their results) rather than Kirzner's
'rationality' which he insists on embedding in market
processes as "the controlling principle [of] goal
motivated discovery".34
30 Kirzner 1990 p.36.
31 Ibid. p.36.
32 Ibid. p.38.
33 Ibid. p.39.
34 Ibid. p.39.
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The interpretation of subjective economic rationality in
this thesis is even closer to that of Ludwig von Mises'
who focuses on modern subjectivist economics explicitly
as a general theory of choice rather than merely being
about markets:
The transformation of thought which the classical 
economists had initiated was brought to its 
consummation only by modern subjectivist economics, 
which converted the theory of market prices into a 
general theory of human choice. 5
Another important difference from the standard Austrian 
economic approach is that here interpersonal comparisons 
of utility are allowed as a social welfare criterion and 
as a social liberty criterion. This is necessary for the 
theories of welfare and liberty and will not be discussed 
in this chapter.
In the rest of this chapter the philosophers and 
economists chosen are critics of (or offer accounts 
incompatible with) various parts of the rationality 
assumption as distinguished in this introduction.
Because the defence of the idea of self-interested 
utility-maximisation is not only from an economic 
viewpoint criticisms entirely other than those aimed 
explicitly at the economic view are often considered (not 
least in the next section). Their relevance to this 
chapter and the overall thesis should be apparent 
(especially where their accounts involve views
Mises 1963 p.3.
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incompatible with welfare and liberty as used in this 
thesis).
1.5 The self and its interests
This section considers criticisms of the formal natures 
of the 'self' and the 'interests' that economics 
requires. Two philosophical critics, Harry Frankfurt and 
Gary Watson, are considered. Frankfurt offers an 
incompatible conception of free will. Watson offers an 
incompatible distinction between desiring and valuing.
As with all other sections, these are considered with an 
eye to the overall thesis. (The social and historical 
nature of desire formation, which might also have been 
discussed here, is left to the next chapter where it is 
discussed in relation to preference utilitarianism.)
Economists do not need a sophisticated account of the 
self in the sense of what is to be person as such (or a 
particular person). Some philosophers (such those 
discussed next) think there is a problem with the nature 
of the self in this sense. The idea has its modern 
origins— though it goes back much further— in the 
Cartesian dualism of the mind and the body. Descartes 
introduced this distinction because he thought that there 
was something certain about one's experiences (at least 
that one is having them and cannot be deluded about the 
nature of them) in a way that the physical world is not
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certain. Despite having gone on to supposedly prove the 
non-delusional nature of our clear and distinct 
experiences (with help from the idea of a perfect being 
who is no deceiver) he was still left with the dualism of 
immaterial mind and material body. The self is the mind 
that just happens to occupy this particular body but 
which, apparently, could in principle move to a different 
habitat. This idea remains popular in attenuated form, 
and causes the identification of the personality (one's 
behavioural dispositions and conscious states) with the 
self (what one really is) .
'Self' does not need to be used to mean the personality. 
English does not demand this usage, and it is at odds 
with modern science. One can speak of the self of an 
inanimate object as the same sort of self as that of a 
human being: 'self' can simply be used to mean 'thing'
or 'entity' ("the chair itself was missing"). We humans 
are genetic entities that happen to have (usually) a 
consciousness that includes interests (or values or 
desires36). If one claims that Mr Smith himself has an 
interest in economics then one need mean no more than 
that physical entity itself, who happens to be the Homo 
sapiens we label Mr Smith, often desires to understand 
economic phenomena. But if Mr Smith himself lost his 
interest in economics then we need not speak of a change
Jb No important distinction need be made between these, 
as what we value we desire (and vice versa) in some sense 
(this will be argued in more detail in reply to Watson), 
and the common contrast between interests and desires can 
be seen as really between the long-run and short-run or 
between being informed and uninformed.
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in his identity. Mr Smith is the same physical self who 
simply happens to have lost a particular interest. I do 
think that this is the solution to the problem of 
personal identity, but whether or not that is accepted 
the physical conception of the self will do for economics 
to identify the particular agent.37
So the economic use of the 'self' in 'self-interest' can 
be seen as an innocuous reference to an entity without 
any implication as to the nature of that entity. When 
'interest' is added to 'self' we are simply informed that 
we are dealing with the idea of an entity that has 
conscious interests; there is no implication about the 
nature or structure of the self or the values. These 
interests can be understood as the objective interests of 
the conscious entity in the sense that these are the 
interests that are actually felt (consciously), rather 
than the interests that would or ought to be felt given 
more information or greater intellectual insight into how 
the world is.
37 It might be objected that the body's cells are 
replaced throughout one's life, so that there is not even 
a permanent physical self. But people are not as 
physically different as the body's replacement of cells 
might lead one to think. The genetic structure remains 
and one's brain is not renewed at all (though a tiny 
fraction of brain cells die every day). In any case, the 
continuing physical process is an adequate 'self' for our 
purposes.
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Critics
The above account is incompatible with that of various 
philosophers. We deal with two such critics who are 
typical, and rigorous in their types of criticism: Harry
O O T Q
G. Frankfurt and Gary Watson. Both of these argue 
for a position that is incompatible with the economic 
assumption that human beings can sensibly be treated as 
selves who are simply attempting to follow their own 
interests out of their own free will.
If their criticisms are sound then paternalism (at least) 
seems to follow if one is to protect human beings who are 
not fully persons, or who are confused about their own 
interests, or who are not always capable of free choice. 
So these critics merit a serious response from the point 
of view of the thesis being defended. In the discussion 
various points concerning welfare, liberty and the free- 
market will also arise to the extent that they are 
relevant.
What follows might seem to imply that there is a 
sophisticated alternative account of moral phenomenology 
implicit in the rationality assumption being defended. 
That is not the case. It is simply necessary to develop 
a more sophisticated defence of the basic assumption when
J0 Frankfurt 1982.
39 Watson 1982.
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critics take sophisticated positions that are 
incompatible with it.
Frankfurt on free will and persons
Frankfurt holds that an essential difference between 
persons and other creatures is to be found in the 
structure of the will. He defines "first-order desires" 
as "simply desires to do or not to do one thing or 
another".40 He attempts to show that a creature is not a 
person unless it is capable of having "second-order 
volitions".41 This means the ability to reflect on one's 
desires critically such that one can come to desire to 
make some desire into the thing that one wills. What one 
"wills" is the "effective desire" that one acts on or 
would act on in the appropriate circumstances, unless 
that desire changed. Creatures without second-order 
volitions are called "wantons": "the essential 
characteristic of a wanton is that he does not care about
II  A  O  , ,
his will. This includes all non-human animals, very
young children, and perhaps some adults. Apparently, 
even adult humans may be to some extent wanton for they 
can often lack second-order volitions concerning certain 
matters. A wanton "may possess and employ rational 
faculties of a high order."43
4u Frankfurt 1982 p.83.
41 Ibid. p.86.
42 Ibid. p.86.
43 Ibid. p.87.
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Narcotics addicts
Frankfurt then gives us the example of two narcotics 
addicts. He supposes that one is an "unwilling" addict: 
he has first-order desires to both give up and to take 
narcotics (both paths have their attractions), plus a 
second-order "volition" to give up— but his addiction is 
too strong for this desire and so the desire to take the 
drugs becomes his first-order volition. The other addict 
is supposed to have the same conflicting first-order 
desires but one simply proves stronger than the other 
without a second-order volition of any kind. Frankfurt 
says of this latter addict that "he has no identity apart 
from his first-order desires".44
This example seems unfortunate. It looks tendentious in 
so far as Frankfurt has chosen an emotive subject where 
he demotes the drug-user to a possible non-person 
(wanton) status. It seems that we might switch the 
situation around by supposing that one drug user could 
have the second-order volition to enjoy his drugs while 
the other one merely enjoyed them because his first-order 
volition was stronger. (Frankfurt later deals with this 
example, as we shall see.)
44 Ibid. p.88.
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Frankfurt says that the (second-order) "unwilling" addict
makes one of the first order desires "more truly his own"
such that he:
may meaningfully make the analytically puzzling 
statements that [1] the force moving him to take the 
drug is a force other than his own [emphasis added], 
and that [2] it is not of his own free will but 
rather [3] against his will that this force moves 
him to take it.45
Taken literally, Frankfurt is quite right that these 
statements are meaningful, for we can understand them and 
they are apparently false. With 1 it is clearly this 
addict's first-order volition that makes him take the 
drugs. Ex hypothesi there is no force "other than his 
own". With 2 Frankfurt introduces the notion of "free 
will" without any indication that he has a Pickwickian 
sense in mind. In the ordinary use of 'free will' it is 
clear that this is a case of someone's exercising free 
will, for he is not being forced by another. With 3 it 
follows from Frankfurt's quite ordinary definition of 
"will" as "effective desire" that the narcotics user 
takes the drugs as a result of his will. (On the other 
hand, if Frankfurt meant "meaningfully" in some 
metaphorical sense then his meaning remains too obscure 
to reply to.)
So one can allow Frankfurt's two-level structure (and I 
do) without accepting his view of free will. He rejects 
the more ordinary sense of 'free will' without showing 
what is wrong with it or that his is superior.
4b Ibid. p.88.
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Frankfurt goes on to link his view of personhood with 
freedom of the will and to distinguish this from freedom 
of action:
Now freedom of action is (roughly, at least) the 
freedom to do what one wants to do. Analogously, 
then, the statement that a person enjoys freedom of 
the will means (also roughly) that he is free to 
want what he wants to want ... to have the will he 
wants.
And the congruence between his first- and second-order 
volitions must not be "only a happy chance" but real 
choices.47
One can accept that one has freedom of action when one's 
actions are unconstrained. But it would be a better 
analogy to say that one has freedom of the will to the 
extent that there is no external agent who is dictating 
or constraining one's effective desires. As long as 
someone's will is as it is as a result of his being the 
creature that he is then we can say that his will is 
free. If someone had something such as electrodes in his 
brain that could be stimulated by someone else to create 
effective desires, then he would thus far be the puppet 
of the other agent rather than an autonomous or free one 
himself. Such a set up is possible but only usual with 
animals in the scientist's laboratory.
This account has the virtue of allowing a compatibilist 
solution to the traditional free-will-versus-determinism
4b Ibid. p.90.
47 Ibid. p.90.
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debate. One acts as a result of free will as long as 
one's will is unconstrained by others. But one's will is 
naturally constrained by the nature of the creature that 
one is. Without this constraint one's actions would be 
entirely unpredictable rather than free. The school of 
thought that demands a kind of free will that escapes 
both determinism and mere randomness has never given an 
intelligible account of a third option. It follows from 
this compatibilist position that animals (not wired for 
behavioural control) also have free will to the extent 
that they make choices rather than follow mere instinct. 
So free will seems only to require choice, and human 
beings always have to choose their movements except for 
certain automatic ones (such as the heart beat) and 
reflex responses.
So what is the idea that Frankfurt is getting at? He 
tells us that freedom of will consists in a person's 
"securing the conformity of his will and his second-order 
volitions."48 It seems true that 1) there are often 
external physical barriers to what we want to do that 
limit us, and hence we are less free (in one sense of 
'free'). It also seems true that 2) there are 
psychological (and physical) barriers within ourselves 
that limit us, and hence we are analogously less free 
than we might be. But to lack the ability to change our 
effective desires (or personality) is not to lack free 
will. The glutton who cannot make himself desire fasting
4y Ibid. p.90.
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has a completely free will— for no one is controlling his 
will but himself (what he is)— but he does not have 
complete freedom of desire (any more than he has complete 
freedom of factual beliefs or moral ones) because he is 
limited by his nature (what he is) .
At any particular moment we find our desires, beliefs and 
values by introspection. If one finds that one has a 
desire to change one's effective desire and that one 
cannot, then one has come up against a constraint on what 
one is (even if it is only an immediate constraint that 
might eventually be somehow overcome). One's will can be 
free in the sense of 'free from external control' but it 
could never be free in the sense of 'free of any 
constraint whatsoever'. To be a particular thing is to 
be a constrained thing. One is bound to have constraints 
on what one is or one would not be anything at all. An
unbounded object made of no particular stuff in no 
particular shape could not exist. Any real object—  
including an agent— is logically bound to have limits 
both physical and psychological (stones are severely 
limited psychologically; humans less so).
Frankfurt's account then goes on to rule out higher order
A Q"volitions" than the second level by "commitment" at 
that level. But (as Gary Watson observes, in the next 
article to be criticised) it is not clear why such 
commitment could not take place at the first level
Ibid p.91.
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instead. And Frankfurt admits that second-order 
volitions can be capricious, so the value of having his 
"free will" is unclear.
There does seem to be something in the idea that self­
reflection makes for personhood. But all a person's 
desires are constrained to some extent. Those who have 
the will they desire to have are more or less lucky for 
often they are more or less bound to have it (in the case 
of sexual preferences, for instance) but they are not 
obviously thereby to be thought of as limited in some 
undesirable way. But Frankfurt neglects such examples 
and picks on a drug user again.
The third addict is a willing one who would take steps to 
re-acquire the addiction if it should fade. Frankfurt 
makes this supposition to show that this addict would be 
morally responsible for affirming it with a second-order 
volition. But the addict is held to lack free will, 
nevertheless, for he would not be in a position to stop 
even if he wanted to.
On the contrary, as has been shown, this addict does have 
free will, for he is not externally constrained. This 
would be so even if the addict were as addicted to his 
drug as everyone is born addicted to air, food, and 
warmth. It must be wrong to say that we lack free will 
because we need air in order to live, though this seems
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to be what Frankfurt would have to say to be 
consistent.
Frankfurt seems to have confused free will (a will that 
is not controlled by another agent's will) with the 
ability to choose one's motivating desires. Even if we 
could simply feel any effective desire that we chose to 
we would still be left with an unchosen desire at a 
higher level— the desire that made us choose. "Free 
will" in Frankfurt's sense would seem to require an 
impossible infinite regress. As mentioned already, to 
put a stop on the second level by use of "commitment" 
seems arbitrary, for this could happen at the first level 
or any after the second. What Frankfurt seems to be 
trying to do is to find a way to avoid a person's being 
ultimately a 'slave' to some unchosen desire. But it is 
impossible to avoid ultimately unchosen desires: some 
desires must spontaneously arise in us or we would be 
without initial motivation to make any choice at all.
So what are we left with? Frankfurt's insights are 1) 
the ability to reflect upon one's desires is part of what
^  For the more general purpose in this thesis of 
reconciling liberty and welfare it ought to be noted that 
the strength of drug addiction that is here being 
supposed by Frankfurt is apparently imaginary. Even if 
we take a drug as addictive as heroin we find the 
following admission in a Department of Health and Social 
Security information booklet: "After several weeks on 
high doses sudden withdrawal results in a variable degree 
of discomfort generally comparable to a bout of 
influenza." (Drug Misuse, ISDD, 1985.) Giving up 
narcotics seems made difficult more by the user's circle 
of friends and daily habits than by the addictive quality 
of the drugs themselves.
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we seem to mean by a 'person'; and 2) we sometimes find 
that we desire other effective desires than those we 
have. Do these insights undermine the economic 
conception of the self and its interests in any way?
1) When the economist uses his conception of a self with 
interests he can usually be interpreted as meaning a 
person in so far as he is analysing human behaviour.
But, as explained, if this looks problematical then he 
can equally well be interpreted as meaning any entity 
with interests or desires. No theory of personhood is 
implied.
2) The other economic assumption here is that of selves 
following what appear to be in their interests. This has 
not been undermined by anything in Frankfurt's argument. 
But this raises the topic of 'weakness of the will' that 
has been hovering around Frankfurt's position, and it now 
seems appropriate to discuss it explicitly.
On weakness of will
This topic is relevant to all three chapters. A view 
will be argued for here and then applied to later 
examples where further discussion seems desirable.
Relatively recently R. M. Hare51 has argued for the 
impossibility of weakness of will (at least in moral
51 Hare 1952 and 1963.
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cases) and thereby started a spate of new thinking on the 
subject. Long before this Socrates held weakness of will 
to be impossible. For this reason problems concerning 
this topic are sometimes known as 'the Socratic 
Paradoxes'. As Charlton shows,52 'weakness of will' can 
be broken down into various problems. This will not be 
done here. Instead there will here be an attempt to 
solve the general problem that people sometimes seem to 
act other than the way they think best. But this is 
distinguished from the problem of whether it is possible 
to do what one believes to be immoral.53 The solution 
suggested here is explained in terms of Frankfurt's idea 
of levels of desire. For reasons of space it will not be 
explicitly contrasted with other accounts.
The non-believer in weakness of will should see the issue 
as follows: though it might be the case that we would 
like to have desires other than the ones that we really 
do, we realise that we have to make the best of our 
existing desires. A smoker might like not to desire 
smoking so much, but given that he does desire it so much 
he regards himself as better off by smoking than by not 
smoking. He might want to cultivate a desire to stop 
because, for instance, he wants to live a little longer. 
But if he cannot cultivate the desire to stop then he is 
unlikely to thank anyone who attempts to deprive him of 
what he still feels to be, on balance, worthwhile.
bz Charlton 1988.
53 This is discussed in relation to Taylor 1982 in the 
next chapter.
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The real point being made here is that we cannot do what 
we think at the time is not in our interests. 
Introspection ought to show that this is simply 
psychologically impossible, but the point is really 
logical given the assumption of a unitary conscious self 
(i.e. without 'hidden' desires54) which Frankfurt does 
not criticise. It would mean feeling that what one is 
doing is both desirable (or preferable) on balance and 
undesirable (or not preferable) on balance. We might 
sometimes feel obliged to say that we are doing something 
we do not really desire to do— but this admission must be 
mistaken, for we must desire it or we would not be doing 
it. The admission is really a sop to our critics or an 
inaccurate way of expressing the feeling that we would be 
better off without the desire.
It might be asked why I desire not to have a certain 
desire other than because in some way or to some degree I 
do not desire the desired object. It might be felt, for 
instance, that it is odd but intuitively true that a 
confirmed smoker might be glad if a world-wide permanent 
tobacco blight meant that he could never smoke again. He 
might feel that his 'true' desires were now better met.
54 By "unitary conscious self" I mean to include a self 
that is aware of conflicting desires, of whatever origin. 
I am merely ruling out such examples of split 
consciousness as can occur when the mid-brain is cut, or 
'unconscious' desires exist (if they really can). Those 
who accept weakness of will do not usually use these as 
explanations.
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It is fine to say that I desire not to have a certain 
desire because in some way or to some degree I do not 
desire the desired object. Decisions are often (always?) 
made on the balance of costs and benefits. We perceive 
that some goal has undesirable aspects but think that 
these are outweighed by the desirable ones. What happens 
in particular where we desire not to desire X is that we 
have two quite consistent feelings (these need not be put 
into words):
1) We feel that it is better on balance to give into 
desire X given that we do have the desire to such a 
degree (it would be too costly not to give into the 
desire).
2) We feel that giving into desire X will have 
consequences that we desire less than our ability to 
desire X (in fact we need not at all desire the ability 
to desire X).
A test for sincerity here would be whether we would take 
some relatively cheap way of destroying the desire if 
that were to become possible.
For instance:
1) A woman strongly desires chocolate and feels that life 
without it is too miserable to forgo it.
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2) She knows that chocolate makes her fat and feels that 
being fat is worse than losing her desire for chocolate. 
(She does not feel that under the actual circumstances 
being fat is worse than giving up chocolate or she would 
give it up).
A test would be whether she would take a pill to lose her 
desire for chocolate if an inexpensive one became readily 
available.
Could the smoker consistently welcome the tobacco blight 
that stopped his smoking? Of course he could sometimes 
feel that way, such as immediately after smoking to 
satiation or often after the bight had occurred. But 
while his strong desire exists and is felt he will not 
(on balance) be glad to be deprived of his tobacco. The 
smoker's so-called 'true' desires are really his desires 
about his desires.
What we cannot consistently do is sincerely feel that 
something is on balance undesirable and yet still desire 
it. When we think we are doing this we are conflating 
our effective (or strongest) desire (our will) with our 
desire about our effective desire. Once these different 
desires are disentangled the apparent contradiction (that 
is the philosophical problem) disappears.
The fact that people can be unhappy with their desires 
may be a serious practical problem for them— they will 
continue to be unhappy unless they can change those
47
desires or come to approve of them. It is a mistake to 
take this practical problem for a philosophical one.
Once one sees that the problem is practical one can go 
about trying to solve it (for instance, by trying to find 
better reasons for changing, or attempting slow change, 
or contracting into a penalty system).
Of course it is logically possible that forcing adults 
into 'good' personal habits will give them (and possibly 
other people) reason to thank us in the long run. But 
that is an entirely separate empirical thesis that is not 
related to the claim that people suffer from genuine 
'weakness of will' such that they think X is best while 
doing Y instead. On the issue of the separate empirical 
claim I can only here refer to the disastrous history of 
prohibitions of many voluntary activities, not least 
those related to drugs, sex, and free speech, some of 
which are discussed in the literature cited in the 
bibliography.55
Perhaps Frankfurt feels that it is desirable (as his 
piece seems to hint) to override the free will (or 
autonomy) of human beings in the name of "free will". He 
sees an absence of free will in quasi-persons ("wantons") 
simply because they cannot (or do not understand what it 
means to) cultivate certain effective desires other than 
those that they currently have (or that cultivated people
^  Should an observer at least care less about desires 
that the individual does not like having? Not if he is 
concerned with the person's welfare in the sense of real 
want-satisfaction as discussed in the next chapter.
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feel that they ought to have?). But if that is what 
Frankfurt wants he needs to give better and more direct 
arguments.
It is usually other people who appear to need to be 
protected from themselves (and if it is desirable in 
one's own case then one can, as suggested earlier, 
contract into constraints without interfering with other 
people). I suggest this appearance is commonly based on 
two mistakes: the conceptual confusion that causes us to 
think that people can be unwilling victims of their own 
desires; the failure to investigate the reality of well- 
considered choice in those activities that are too easily 
dismissed as "wanton" (or some such pejorative). These 
things combine to create such an intolerance of 
(typically minority) activities that people can, like 
Frankfurt, even question whether these human beings are 
fully persons.
Watson on desires and values
Watson wants to make a distinction between wanting and
valuing such that actions are unfree where the agent is:
unable to get what he most wants, or values, and 
this inability is due to his own 'motivational 
system'. In this case the obstruction to the action 
that he most wants to do is his own will.5
This account is thus similar to that of Frankfurt's,
except that motivation is supposed to differ because of
56 Watson 1982 p.97.
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competing sources of desire rather than merely different 
levels of desire.
Watson outlines the Humean view that reason is purely the 
instrument of the passions that calculates how to feed 
them, and contrasts this with the Platonic view that 
reason can itself determine what has value— where reason 
itself is a source of motivation (generating desires for 
'the good'). Watson sees this latter position as being 
that of seeing a conceptual distinction between desiring 
a state of affairs and thinking it to be of value.
Valuing "is essentially related to thinking or judging
good."57 Wants that are values are rational and provide
reasons for action:
The contrast is with desires, whose objects may not 
be thought good and which are thus, ... blind and 
irrational ... mute on the question of what is 
good.
What is desirable (naturally pleasurable) contrasts with 
what is valuable (rationally best). These are 
independent sources of motivation, because what you 
desire to do you do not necessarily have a reason to do.
This distinction seems mistaken. Valuing and desiring do 
seem to be identical in just the way that R.B. Perry has 
it (as quoted by Watson ). But there is a real 
distinction in phenomena, and it is this that Watson is
b/ Ibid. p.99.
58 Ibid. p.99.
59 Ibid. p.100 footnote 5.
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mislabeling as a distinction between desire and value. 
This distinction is between those things we desire 
without verbal reflection and those things we desire that 
we have verbally reflected on. Such is the power of 
language that it can look as though we have two radically 
different sources of motivation. This is not so. A 
reason does not have to be put into words and examined to 
be a reason. If a creature has an idea why it wants to 
do a thing rather than not do it then it has a reason for 
doing it. Ideas or thoughts or propositions do not have 
to be verbal in form. The hungry dog believes that the 
substance before it is edible and so it has a reason to 
eat it, and people often have the same belief without 
putting it into words.
However, valuing and desiring are not always 
linguistically interchangeable. Additional words are 
sometimes required to make the substantive equivalence 
clear. For instance, it sounds odd to say that valuing 
some object of natural beauty (such as the lake district) 
is the same as desiring it (and desiring it now). When 
we say we value it we must mean that we desire that it be 
preserved, or that we desire that we (or others) can see 
it sometimes, or some such desire. The desire is 
implicit in the claim to value. (We are not necessarily 
effectively motivated by any particular desire or value, 
as the price of acting on it might be too high.)
Of course, one can reason about a thing to different 
degrees in the sense that one can simply consider more
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ideas and criticisms about some matter. But here one is 
doing more reasoning rather than simply reasoning as 
opposed to not reasoning. The fact that rigorous 
reasoning often requires the use of language as a tool is 
what might make it look as though only verbal thought is 
rational. But the cat that is examining a hole in the 
floor is using its reason on its various senses (sight, 
smell, hearing) to test the idea that there may be 
something worth catching inside it. When it concludes 
that there is no evidence it departs. (Animals certainly 
use logic to achieve their ends. No choice can be made 
without the use of logic. Neither humans nor animals 
usually find it necessary— or even possible— to make that 
logic verbally explicit. But without tacit modus ponens, 
or modus tollens— the use of if-then structures of 
thought in some form— an agent, qua agent, could not move 
at all.)
How are valuing and desiring the same? Here is the 
general answer. Watson is right that valuing "is 
essentially related to thinking or judging good." He is 
also right to think that desires may not be thought good. 
But "good" and "valuable" and "desirable" are here more 
or less synonymous— or at least Watson is not using any 
real distinction between them. Watson is, rather, using 
the terms at different levels (in the manner of 
Frankfurt, but unwittingly) such that he is misled into 
thinking that they show different sources of motivation. 
The grain of truth is the same as Frankfurt's: we do not 
necessarily value some values, or desire some desires, or
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think it good that we think something good. Using 
different terms in each phrase can cause confusion but it 
cannot mark a real distinction in terms of source of 
motivation. The source of motivation is the individual's 
desire or value.
So a desire or value is always— contra Watson— a prima 
facie reason for action. But there is an equivocation on 
the use of 'reason'. A reason can be a motivation, or 
it can be an argument. All desires or values are reasons 
for action only in the appetitive sense. They are things 
that we find that we simply want, or would want in 
appropriate circumstances. Some of these will be natural 
and some will be fabricated to some extent by argument. 
But values and desires are always found (even when we 
find that we have brought them into existence by argument 
or by cultivation) and not chosen. The thing that we can 
choose to do is examine these reasons; to argue about 
them. So when we are 'reasoning about our reasons' we 
are using 'reason' in two radically different senses.
This expression can be translated into 'intellectually 
examining our desires (or values)'. The fact that 
'reason' is used for both ideas might be one of the 
sources of confusion.
Watson's account is then linked to the idea that people 
are not always free agents:
The problem of free action arises because what one
desires may not be what one values, and what one
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most values may not be what one is finally moved to 
get.60
We are given the two ways in principle that desire and 
evaluation may diverge: 1) one can desire something and 
assign no value whatever to it; or 2) one's desire for a 
valued object may exceed the extent to which one values 
it.
1) The first way is supposed less usual but examples 
exist:
a woman who has the sudden urge to drown her bawling 
child in the bath; or ... a squash player who, while 
suffering ignominious defeat, desires to smash his 
opponent in the face with the racquet.*1
They are supposed to desire these things but never to
value them. Watson insists:
It is not that they assign to these actions an 
initial value which is then outweighed by other 
considerations. These activities are not even 
represented by a positive entry, however small, on 
the initial 'desirability matrix'.62
The argument is very mistaken here. Watson seems to be 
doing little more than denying an obvious truth, and then 
denying an obviously valid criticism. To have an urge or 
desire is precisely to value (in some way) the thing one 
feels the urge or desire for. These are (though 
sometimes with different phrasing necessary) two ways of 
saying the same thing. But for Watson only a persistent
b0 Ibid. p.100.
61 Ibid. p.101.
62 Ibid. p.101.
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value that has been reasoned about is a "value"— as he 
explains in a fuller account we come to later (both
Watson and Frankfurt seem to need an account of objective
values, but they do not give any) . And he goes beyond 
even this here for the squash player's desire is not 
allowed to register on the "'desirability matrix'" at 
all. It is not clear how the scare quotation marks can 
save him from plain absurdity.
2) This "estrangement" from a desire can also supposedly 
involve a persistent and pervasive one: "a man who thinks
• . . .  • fi T •his sexual inclinations are the work of the devil" will
positively disvalue them. But, again, can meta-desires
really split desires from values? Watson tries to drive
the wedge in with a claim that:
the man who is estranged from his sexual 
inclinations does not acknowledge even a prima-facie 
reason for sexual activity; that he is sexually 
inclined toward certain activities is not even a 
consideration.64
"Reason" is again being used in the sense of a value that 
we have arrived at verbally. This may be a consistent 
way of talking about things but it is confusing. For in 
plain language it is absurd to say that someone is 
inclined to do something yet does not have even a prima 
facie reason to do it. If he can see no reason whatever 
to do it then he can hardly desire it. Desire is at 
least a prima facie reason to do a thing. Frankfurt's
Ibid. p.101.
64 Ibid. p.101.
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second-level position on this situation demands no such 
twisting of the language into absurdity: the man simply 
has a desire he desires not to have.
Watson then gives some examples of desires that are
supposed to be not appetitive or passionate but which can
be independent of evaluation. The disinclination to move
away from one's family is supposed to be able to be due
to "acculturation" rather than "a current judgement ...
reflecting perhaps an assessment of one's 'duties' and
interests." Or one might be "habituated" to think that
divorce is wrong "even though one sees no justification
for maintaining one's marriage." These attitudes are
supposed examples of acculturation and exist:
independently of the agent's judgement ... 
acculturated desires are irrational (better non­
rat ional) in the same sense as appetitive and 
passionate desires.
This looks like the (Hayekian66) idea that people follow 
traditions like automata. But most people clearly 
perceive certain advantages in traditions if only in 
terms of the benefits granted to those who keep them and 
the costs imposed on those who break them. It is true 
that most people do not go in for radical philosophical 
criticism of all customs or habits they practise; they 
often give very little consideration to some of these, 
its being sufficient that they are content with them and
Ibid. p.105.
66 The best criticism I know of Hayek for doing this is 
in "Spontaneous Order and Traditionalism in Hayek", David 
Ramsay Steele (unpublished).
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see (on occasional reflection) no advantage to mending 
(at a cost and some risk) what does not seem broken. But 
it is almost never true that people have not considered 
alternatives (at least Hobson's choice of taking it or 
leaving it) in the slightest.
It seems an unstoppable function of the brain to suggest 
different possibilities to some extent; it seems to be 
the very process of being conscious. In fact it looks as 
though the genetic advantage of consciousness is just 
that it allows us (and indeed obliges us: we cannot be 
automata even if we want to) to try out different 
possibilities in our imaginations so that our theories 
can suffer and perish instead of ourselves.67
I must agree that to the extent that we have a tradition 
or habit of dogmatism we are more limited (less free in a 
personal intellectual sense) than where criticism is 
fostered. But it seems unduly pessimistic to view 
traditions and habits as by their very natures 
constraining people. Hayek seems to err in the opposite 
direction here in his theory of spontaneous order where 
criticism is seen as a threat to the liberty that only 
traditions and customs make possible.68 But traditions 
and habits are more like standard solutions to problems 
and opportunities that we might well find useful but can 
ultimately reject if something better occurs to us.
This is well known as a standard theme of Karl 
Popper's epistemology, for instance in his 1978 and 1979.
68 See particularly Hayek 1948 p.26.
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Watson seems, in effect, to be taking a stand for the
worth of fairly radical criticism of the things we
desire. This is a value that we might expect in a
philosopher. Yet it is as though he prefers not to
advocate the extremely critical life candidly, but
instead to stipulatively define values that have not been
scrutinised as not values at all. He writes that:
an agent's values consist in those principles and 
ends which he— in a cool and non-self-deceptive 
moment— articulates as definitive of the good, 
fulfilling, and defensible life.
A free agent is one who weighs up alternatives on the
basis of his values and then makes judgements "all things
70 • • .considered". An agent's "intentional" actions are 
"free" actions when his "valuation system" is in accord 
with his "motivational system".71
Such an account neglects that it does not always pay to 
consider many things rigorously. Such economy is perhaps 
the genetic and social evolutionary basis for habit and 
custom. We cannot ever consider all things fully.
Watson seems to have the gist of the truth about the 
nature of free will (or agency) in the idea that an agent 
must "assign values to alternative states of affairs, 
that is, rank them in terms of worth."72 Again, in 
wanting ranking on the basis of what it is worth
69 Watson 1982 p.105.
70 Ibid. p.105.
71 Ibid. p.106.
72 Ibid. p.105.
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desiring, Watson is implicitly seeking for objective 
values, but he gives no substantial account with which to 
argue. And ranking need not be very detailed or long­
term. The agent usually realises that certain levels of 
calculation are simply too fastidious under the 
circumstances and so to be avoided. Yet there will 
always be a real choice in cases of free will even if it 
is in the minimal sense of seeing a Hobson's choice of 
taking or leaving an option (which a purely instinctive 
response does not allow).
"All things considered"73 on other occasions it is often 
seen to be a disvalue (which is a type of value) to 
consider all things. Research costs have to stop 
somewhere in any case, and this point is bound to be 
somewhat arbitrary: simply where the chooser guesses that 
action is better than further enquiry. Some alternatives 
must be ranked as among the infinite other possibilities 
that are not worth further consideration, or we should 
never get around to acting (or even to thinking) . So for 
a free agent there is always some, at least implicit, 
assignation of value to alternative states of affairs— it 
simply falls short of Watson's impossible "all things 
considered."
Watson has some valid criticisms concerning the fact that 
Frankfurt's two-level system cannot account for free will 
(as was acknowledged in the Frankfurt section) . But his
Ibid. p.105.
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own account abandons the insight, that there are levels 
of desires, in favour of a distinction that makes 
"values" a subset of "desires" (though not of 'effective 
desires', or 'will'). His account of free agency is thus 
even more confusing.
Kleptomania and free will
It might illuminate things to look at the issue that
Watson raises at the start of his piece; this is the
criticism of Berlin's that if you believe that someone is
causally determined to choose as he does then:
what reasons can you in principle, adduce for 
attributing responsibility or applying moral rules 
to him . .. which you would not think it reasonable 
to apply in the case of compulsive choosers—  
kleptomaniacs, dipsomaniacs, and the like?74
Watson answers Berlin with the idea that "compulsive 
choosers" have desires and emotions "more or less 
radically independent of [their] evaluational systems".75 
So, as with Frankfurt, it looks as though we are not 
dealing with properly functioning persons. In fact all 
human beings are held to be free agents only in some 
respects, for their appetites and passions are sometimes 
in conflict with and overrule their practical judgements. 
Presumably those who see what people's 'real' values are 
have moral grounds for coercing them in terms of their 
own values alone; the coercer would not even be imposing
4^ Berlin 1984 pp. xx-xxi.
75 Watson 1982 p.110.
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his values on those he would be controlling. And who is 
better placed to decide what a person's 'real' values are 
than those who examine values for a living? This idea of 
the value of the philosopher-king is the aspect of 
Platonism that Watson keeps conspicuously implicit.
A better answer to Berlin would be the following. There 
are no "kleptomaniacs, dipsomaniacs, and the like" in the 
sense of people's not being in conscious, chosen, control 
of their own actions. The writings of the psychiatrist 
Thomas Szasz are an especially good attack on the mental 
illness industry. His position is that there is no mind 
to be ill and so mental illness cannot exist (though 
physical brain disorders are possible). Many so-called 
mental illnesses are merely morally dubious attempts to 
medicalise and stigmatise certain types of behaviour, 
ideas or emotions (each of which it would be a category 
mistake to label as being 'ill').76
A person who finds stealing highly attractive is no more 
ill than a person born with a large nose. Both of these 
people might themselves wish to alter these aspects of 
their lives. The man with the large nose might pay for 
an operation. The man who enjoys stealing might pay for 
aversion therapy. But until the thief finds that the 
thought of theft is less attractive than the thought of 
restraint, he will choose to do the theft. He might (but 
certainly need not) find the desire to steal is a
76 See especially Szasz 1972.
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nuisance, but it would be more unpleasant to stop doing 
this thing he enjoys. "Kleptomaniacs" often claim to get 
satisfaction from theft77— they do not take a 
homonculus's eye view and watch in horror as they see 
themselves stealing.
It might still be thought that there are some obvious 
cases where people are not acting out of free will. It 
is not possible to tackle a definitive list but the 
following might seem to be some typical examples: acts 
done in circumstances of diminished responsibility due to 
perception- or emotion-altering drugs, or the 
consequences of love potions or post-hypnotic 
suggestions.
Acts done in circumstances of diminished responsibility 
are still done out of free will in the sense being 
defended here. Free will does not decline simply because 
strange circumstances make us act abnormally.
Perception- or emotion-altering drugs do not make people 
act without their following what they see to be their 
interests. They might even kill a friend owing to a 
misperception about who he is or what they are doing. 
True, they would then not have wittingly killed him out 
of their free will, but they were acting on their free 
will and simply making a mistake (one does not need to be 
drugged to make such mistakes: the woman who backs her
n  Charlton 1988 p.159
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car over her child is freely backing up the car and 
merely not realising the tragic effect).
If someone gives us drugs, love potions, or post-hypnotic 
suggestions that we do not agree to take then they do 
thereby force feelings on us against our will. But we 
thereafter act on the basis of these things out of free 
will (though in ways for which we probably ought not to 
be held fully culpable).
There is an ambiguity about 'diminished responsibility' 
in these cases. The person who cannot function normally 
and spontaneously may have diminished responsibility in a 
factual sense. But perhaps only if he did not 
deliberately initiate or risk this diminished condition 
is his moral responsibility for the consequences 
diminished. In either case, however, he is acting in 
pursuit of his perceived interests, which is to act out 
of free will.
1.6 Self-interest & altruism
This section considers the formal compatibility of self- 
interest and altruism in Austrian economics. Hobbes, 
Edgeworth, Becker and Sen are given as examples of the 
common failure to see the compatibility. The formal 
compatibility is explained and applied to Hobbes. The 
nature and relevance of moralising is discussed with 
respect to the views of Kant, Hume, and Butler. Then
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Sen, Machan and Broad are shown to be in error for 
explicitly failing to see this.
It is important to bear in mind in what follows that the 
compatibility of the subjective, Austrian economic, sense 
of self-interest and altruism is intended to be a purely 
logical point about agents' choices. The critics 
discussed often fall into error by interpreting the issue 
as necessarily about human nature.
Many early economists (and proto-economists) and most 
modern economists have assumed that men are egoistic and 
so have ruled out altruism. If they use the term 
"self-interest" they mean only egoism. These are taken 
to be, at least implicitly, against the Austrian economic 
idea that economics can use an assumption of self- 
interest that merely means interests of the self and 
which coherently embraces both egoism and altruism 
without thereby being vacuous.
For instance, in The Leviathan Hobbes assumes egoism.
All apparent acts of altruism are explained as disguised 
self-seeking. Hobbes found the idea of a person's going 
against his own interests to be an implausible view of 
human motivation (for logical reasons discussed later). 
When a clergyman asked why Hobbes had given alms to a
Though some of the best economists of their time did 
not make this assumption: Hume, Smith, Wicksteed, and 
Marshall.
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beggar Hobbes replied that it was to relieve his own
7Q
distress at seeing the beggar's distress. *
Edgeworth states that "the first principle of Economics
is that every agent is activated only by self- 
oninterest."ow Though he later states that in reality "man
a i .is an impure egoist".OA So the assumption is merely a
generally useful one for Edgeworth.
Gary Becker is noted for rigorously and consistently 
applying basic economic assumptions to areas normally
• • • , Q O  #considered outside the field of economics. He admits
of the existence of altruism. But even he assumes that
this must be a separate motive (with others) from the
self-interest as used by economics:
Self-interest is assumed to dominate all other 
motives, with a permanent place also assigned to 
benevolence to children ... .83
So Becker follows Edgeworth's 100 years older opinion in
finding the self-interest assumption extremely fruitful
Q A
though not completely true. H
This anecdote is in John Aubrey's Brief Lives.
80 Mathematical Psychics (London, 1881) p.16.
81 Ibid. p.104.
82 See especially Becker 1976. As a consequence of such 
economic work this Professor of Economics at Chicago has
now also be made a Professor of Sociology.
83 Becker 1978.
84 Interestingly, Becker goes on to give an economic 
analysis of altruism. He argues that it increases 
genetic reproduction in various ways, and hence it is 
really a sort of genetic egoism. In this Becker is going
some way to answering the central problem of
sociobiology— as posed by its namer, Edmund Wilson— : How 
can altruism evolve by natural selection? But Becker is
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Amartya Sen unhappily states (in Sen 1979, see the later 
discussion) that a self-interest assumption rules out 
"commitment" (or it is vacuously true) . And as he feels 
that people obviously do have commitment he rejects the 
motivational exclusiveness of the self-interest 
assumption. Sen holds that economics must be 
supplemented with a richer view of human nature that 
allows room for ethics in economic analysis.
So (as Kirzner also observed using other examples85) it 
looks logically necessary to many economists and their 
critics that the economic assumption of self-interest and 
altruism cannot be compatible. But this is not so.
Let us separate the two false views on altruism:
(1) There is the philosophical thesis (as held by Hobbes) 
that people are necessarily egoists and hence never 
altruists. The argument runs: one would not be 
charitable unless one got satisfaction thereby, so 
apparently charitable people give up nothing for they are 
following their self-interest as selfishly as anyone 
else.
obviously using egoism to undermine the reality of the 
'altruism'.
85 Kirzner 1976 & 1990.
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(2) There is a more popular thesis that the economic 
assumption of self-interest must be false (or vacuous) 
because people are often obviously altruistic.86
Why are these two views false?
'Altruism' means 'other-regardingness' or 'other­
interestedness' in the sense of seeing another as an end 
in himself. 'Self-interest' is popularly used to mean 
purely self-regarding or self-interested and so 
incompatible with altruism. But being self-interested 
can be interpreted in the Austrian economic sense as 
merely following whatever interests one has oneself 
(rather than being an automaton or puppet of another's 
will). And in this sense 'self-interest' does not have 
to be understood as excluding altruism, for altruism then 
means taking others' interests as among one's own 
interests.
This position can be set out as follows:
Self-interest: in the broad Austrian economic sense, all 
interests are interests of the self. We cannot have 
purely selfless interests for we must feel an interest 
that is ours to the extent that we are proper agents.
ab Or as these two views are expressed by Alasdair 
MacIntyre in "Egoism and Altruism": "philosophers have 
oscillated between these two positions: the Hobbesian 
doctrine of altruism as either a disguise or a substitute 
for self-seeking and the assertion of an original spring 
of altruistic benevolence as an ultimate and unexplained 
property of human nature." Edwards 1967.
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But such interests of the self can still be intelligibly 
divided into:
Egoism: an interest in one's own ends and in other people 
or things (if at all) as mere means to one's own ends.
Altruism: an interest in other people (or even things) as 
ends in themselves.
Take Hobbes action of giving alms to a beggar as an 
example for analysis. He claimed that he only gave to 
relieve his own distress. That Hobbes took any interest 
in the beggar means that the interests of Hobbes' 
included the circumstances of the beggar. Thus his 
action was self-interested in the broad Austrian sense.
We can go on to ask whether Hobbes was being egoistic or 
altruistic.
If Hobbes were merely upset at the ugly sight of the 
beggar and would rather that the beggar were out of 
sight, then we can say that his behaviour was egoistic, 
for he did not view the beggar as a valuable thing in 
himself but as a nuisance. This is a natural 
interpretation to put on Hobbes' explanation of his 
behaviour. But if Hobbes really was taking pity on the 
beggar as an end in himself (and would wish him to be 
better off whether or not Hobbes knew about it) then his 
behaviour was altruistic.
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In both cases we have self-interest in that Hobbes 
himself has the beggar as one of his interests. In 
reality it might well have been that Hobbes both found 
the beggar a nuisance and had some sympathy with him. So 
his gift would be motivated by disgust and pity. Neither 
feeling would be more real than the other in the sense 
that the disgust showed him not to be really altruistic 
at all, or the pity showed him not to be really egoistic 
at all. Yet both his egoistic interests and his 
altruistic interests are objectively his self-perceived 
interests.
There is nothing categorically wrong with using 'self- 
interest' in a sense that excludes altruism and means 
what is usually called 'egoism' or 'selfishness'. The 
point is that it is not necessary to use 'self-interest' 
in this way, and at times it will cause confusion— as 
when criticising the Austrian economists' use of the 
term.
However, it is difficult for some people to accept that 
altruism can be innocuously seen as part of self- 
interest. Part of the problem relates to a conception 
of morality that is rather prevalent, but which is here 
dissented from. This will be explained before looking at 
some critics.
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The structure of a moral sentiment
Morality is correctly seen as having to be impartial in 
some sense. Yet it seems that morality has to be held as 
a personal value and thus also partial in some other 
sense or there would be no motivational explanation.
Kant reacted to the threat to morality that the 
Hobbesian-type of self-interest argument (at 1 earlier) 
seemed to pose by trying to make morality a purely
• Q 7logical affair. He held that a moral act is moral only 
to the extent that it is done out of a sense of the
O Q
universalizability00 of the act. A will is good only to 
the extent that it wills an action on the grounds that 
all can without contradiction will it. There must be no 
personal desire involved. Thus Kant correctly perceived 
that morality was impartial in some way, but he opted for 
a pure impartiality that leaves no apparent room for 
motivation.
Hume probably was, finally, a compatibilist concerning 
self-interest and altruism. In The Treatise he denied 
the possibility of "the love of mankind, merely as
Q Q f
such.11 In The Enquiry he conceded that "a tendency to
. • QOpublic good" could be a spring of action. But the
8y Paton 1978.
88 Though this term was coined by R.M. Hare.
89 Hume 1968 III (i) 2.
90 Hume 1972.
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feeling of paradox is not fully resolved (as it is 
perhaps in Butler, below). Hume writes that we feel 
"some sentiment of blame or approbation, whence we 
pronounce the action criminal or virtuous.1191 And this 
seems to view moralising as (1) the personal emotional 
evaluation of behaviour (2) irrespective of the interests 
of particular agents— thus catching both (1) the partial 
and (2) the impartial aspects of moralising.
In more detail:
2) We here have the impartiality in that the evaluation 
is not specific to the agent and his immediate and 
personal goals. For the agent has to be able to say that 
he would affirm the evaluation even where he (and those 
individuals he is personally interested in) were not 
involved. But the group of persons among whom he is 
impartial in his judgement might be fewer than that of 
all human beings. It is not thereby non-moral. It is 
impartial within the universe of some group that matters
Q 9
to him. * The group might also be more than that of all 
human beings and include animals (as in some religions) 
and plant life, or even inanimate matter.93
yi Hume 1968 (i) 1.
QO , , #
It might even be only himself that is valued morally, 
perhaps because he feels that all people should neglect 
others (moral egoism), or because he feels that he has 
qualities that simply happen to put him above others, but 
he would respect anyone who were to come to have these 
qualities.
Q O  . . .  .
17 J It is even morally coherent to discriminate against 
human beings as being immoral or worth less than other 
species, or some abstract goal.
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1) And yet we have partiality in another way. For the 
very fact that the individual selects a certain general 
group or type of behaviour as being of worth shows that 
he is partial to that. This partiality is normally 
overlooked, or felt to make a moral view somehow less 
moral— because people often feel that moral views must be 
somehow completely impartial. But without this 
partiality we have no motivation.94
Thus every moral feeling is group- and behaviour-partial 
but also individual-impartial. Each value one has is a 
personal value, including one's moral values. I am self- 
interested in that I am bound to want what I value, but 
some of the things I value are morally valued. Where I 
have a moral value I am impartial in valuing (or 
disvaluing) some kind of behaviour within some group— but
Q  C
I must be partial to the behaviour and the group.
Perhaps this is not precise enough to fully capture the
. . Q fi . .nature of moralising u but it is more accurate than most 
views, and should be adequate for the task in hand.
y4 How the individual becomes partial to certain groups 
or types of behaviour is another problem.
Q It might be thought that an attempt to respect, say, 
justice as such would mean that I could not discriminate 
between my group and other groups. But justice is a 
formal concept— like desert and impartiality. One needs 
goals and groups— and that entails discrimination— before 
one can use the formal concept. Perhaps this is obscured 
by the popular feeling that the group in moral matters 
ought to always include all human beings— but that 
discriminates against non-humans. And if all animals 
were included that would still discriminate against non­
animals, and so on.
Q ft . . . .About which more will be said in the second chapter.
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Bishop Butler's response to Hobbes seems more or less the 
correct one.97 He agreed that all interests must be 
interests of the self but denied that this entails that 
we are self-interested in any narrow sense; that we must
be interested in the self alone. He held that Hobbes had
QQ
overlooked the real distinction we have in our goals. °
To recap: people often contrast self-interest with 
altruism (thereby equating self-interest with egoism). 
They fail to see clearly that to the extent that people 
are acting as agents, they must be acting on interests of 
their own— that they personally feel (that, given the
. . . . QQalternatives, it most satisfies  ^them to pursue). But 
the agent can still be either interested in himself 
(egoism) or in others (altruism).
Sen on rational fools
In his "Rational Fools"100 Sen appears to conflate the 
Hobbesian assumption of egoistic self-interest (for he 
mentions Butler's attack on this) with the revealed 
preference theory whereby "if you are observed to choose
97 Butler 1736.
98 Though in Butlerian terminology, only actions done out 
of self-love (the desire for one's own happiness) are 
sensibly called 'interested'; actions done for any other 
motives are 'disinterested'.
99 Utility (satisfaction) maximisation as a necessary 
motive is explained in more detail in the next two 
sections.
100 Sen 1979.
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x rejecting y, you are declared to have 'revealed' a
i n ipreference for x over y.i»-LWj-
Sen does not consider that this theory need not be
interpreted egoistically. He objects that:
no matter whether you are a single-minded egoist or 
a raving altruist or a class conscious militant, you 
will appear to be maximising your own utility in 
this enchanted world of definitions.102
and that:
a person's choices are considered 'rational' on this 
approach ... if all his choices can be explained as 
^hg choosing of 'most preferred' alternatives .. .
Sen apparently believes that we sometimes do what we do 
not (under the circumstances) most prefer to do. He 
suggests an alternative approach that takes account of 
commitment (which includes morality "in a very broad 
sense"104):
One way of defining commitment is in terms of a 
person choosing an act that he believes will yield a 
lower level of personal welfare to him than an 
alternative that is also available to him.10
Well that sounds acceptable at first, for it has been 
argued that we do sometimes forgo personal welfare to 
help others for their sakes. But Sen continues:
1U1 Ibid. pp.91-92
102 Ibid. p.92.
103 Ibid. p.92.
104 Ibid. p.97.
105 Ibid. p.95.
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commitment does involve, in a very real sense, 
counterpreferential choice, destroying the crucial 
assumption that the chosen alternative must be 
better than (or at least as good as) the others for 
the person choosing it106
How can we make a "counterpreferential choice"? How can 
we choose to do what we do not in some sense prefer to 
do? Must not the chosen alternative be better for us in 
some sense? Otherwise where is the personal motivation?
Sen goes further and approvingly quotes a character whose
, , . . 1 f)7says of his action: "I had no motive and no interest,|J-
Sen seems to have replaced an "enchanted world of
definitions" (where all actions can be seen as in some
sense self-interested) with a world without any motives
at all. He feels he has to do this because he cannot
allow sympathy to be part of "commitment":
It can be argued that behaviour based on sympathy is 
in an important sense egoistic, for one is oneself 
pleased at^g^hers' pleasure and pained at others' 
pain ....
He apparently wants to make sense of a pure impartiality 
that entirely escapes sympathy. But "commitment" 
(morality, as analysed above) is being impartial in some 
way within the group to which one is partial, or 
sympathetic. One cannot have a commitment that escapes 
"sympathy" or personal sentiment in some sense.
iub Ibid. p.96.
107 Ibid. p.97.
108 Ibid. p.95.
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Sen does not entertain an Austrian-type interpretation of 
self-interest because he accepts the mistaken conception 
of morality discussed earlier. He hankers after a 'pure' 
impartiality in morality that is impossible because, like 
Kant's system, it leaves no room for the necessary 
sentimental motive.
So Sen's views on tautological definitions in economics 
only partly repeat what Butler wrote of Hobbes. For Sen 
apparently overlooks Butler's insight that Hobbes' 
tautological position on motivation was essentially 
correct but still left room for real altruistic goals.
Machan on self-interest
Tibor R. Machan is an interesting critic of the Austrian
interpretation of the self-interest assumption in 
1 OQ .economics. He is sympathetic to the free-market
results of mainstream economics, and he is sympathetic to 
the idea that people should be positively egoistic (he is 
a libertarian influenced by Ayn Rand). He is familiar 
with the latest Public Choice School suggestion that it 
is sensible to include ideological factors to explain 
politicians' behaviour. Yet he thinks the economic 
assumption of self-interest cannot include altruism. He 
knows that the "economic imperialists" are happy with 
self-interest embracing morality, but he is not. That a
-*-uy Economic Affairs, vol.8 #2.
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libertarian philosopher cannot accept this seems to show 
how necessary is the defence of this broader conception 
of economic self-interest.
The sticking point for Machan is the idea that a mere
definition can be so pervasive. As Machan puts it:
Any factor or model that explains anything whatever- 
-e.g., self-defeating as well as self-serving 
conduct— explains nothing much at all. If economic 
man explains the bank-robber as well as the banker, 
what can be learned from such an explanation? In no 
science would this kind of approach be admitted, the 
melting of ice explained by the same factor as the 
freezing of water— private interest!
In order to avoid this vacuousness the ideological 
variable has to be seen as adding a dimension—  
namely, what kind of conduct human beings take to be 
proper, what they see as binding on them quite apart 
from what they prefer.
The idea that there could be "conduct human beings take 
to be proper . . . quite apart from what they prefer" has 
been dealt with in reply to Sen and earlier critics.110 
Here the charge of vacuousness is given more 
consideration.
Is the self-interest assumption tautologous? It depends 
on how it is interpreted. If it is taken to mean that 
people are motivated by self-interest then it is not 
strictly tautologous. We can make sense of a person's 
behaving (in the sense of moving) in a non-self- 
interested way, and thus we can conceive of 
falsifications. For instance, if people's bodies were 
controlled by the minds of others they would not be
110 But see also, In the reply to Charles Taylor in the 
next chapter, "The way morals are categorical".
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pursuing their own self-perceived interests; nor would 
they if their bodies spontaneously behaved in ways they 
could not consciously control (as happens to some extent 
with epileptic fits, twitching nerves, jerks during 
sleep111). Sustained constructive examples ought to 
sound far-fetched. The assumption that people are 
motivated by self-interest is supposed to be a fairly 
obvious truth, but it is not a strict tautology.
But if the assumption is the Austrian economic one that
all actions are self-interested then it is tautologous. 
For any action to be an action it must mean that an 
individual is moving his body as a result of his self­
perceived interests. If the body were moving
automatically or as a result of another's will then the
individual himself would not be acting. But this
tautology is not viciously vacuous or any kind of a 
threat to the scientific nature of economics. On the 
contrary it is, apparently, an enlightening tautology 
that allows fruitful economic analysis to proceed. So 
the idea that people are motivated by self-interest can 
be seen as a rule of thumb that is based on the Austrian 
economic tautology about agents.
The fact that an individual is assumed to be self- 
interested does not in itself tell us anything about the 
particular values and beliefs of the individual. The 
hard work of explaining what is going on in some economic
111 I guess that sleepwalking is a more or less conscious 
activity albeit in an unusual mental state.
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situation is often in making shrewd guesses and testing 
them. Having a theoretical framework is not the same as 
already having an explanation. If an engineer is called 
in to discover why a bridge fell down then he will 
already have the theoretical tools for the job, but he 
will hardly have the specific explanation. Only in an 
innocuous sense are the theoretical tools of the 
economist and engineer 'vacuous', because the work of 
filling in the details of any real problem has not yet 
been done.
As Kirzner writes:
The description of all human action [emphasis added] 
as rational constitutes a proposition that is, in 
fact, incapable of being falsified by any 
experience, yet does, nevertheless, convey highly 
valuable information.11
But it ought to be emphasised that this assumption is not
specific to any notion of economic man. There is no
substantive theory of human nature here. This notion of
self-interested motivation is naturally applicable to all
creatures capable of action. A Venusian would be
included if it were a genuine choosing agent.
Broad on human motives
Broad is right to attack psychological egoism (as held by
Hobbes) as a false theory of human motivation in his
. 1 1 1  , ,
"Egoism as a theory of human motives". He is wrong in
llz Kirzner 1976 p.172.
113 Broad 1971.
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failing to see that altruism must still be self- 
interested in the sense under discussion. Like Sen, he 
appears to opt for altruism without the necessary self- 
referential motive for he also seems to mistakenly think 
that Butler refuted Hobbes on this issue.
Broad admits that the desire of a mother for the good of 
her child "is self-referential, because the fact that it 
is her child and not another's acts as a powerful motive- 
stimulant."114 This is fine as far as it goes. Broad is 
right in seeing that such altruism refers back to the 
self. He is wrong only in failing to see that all 
altruism refers back to the self in a similar sense.
Consider Broad's example:
a person who deliberately chooses to devote his life 
to working among lepers, in the full knowledge that 
he will almost certainly contract leprosy and die in 
a particularly loathsome way.
It can immediately be conceded that the real motive can 
be that the man simply wants to help the lepers. And it 
can be agreed that this is an other-regarding motive (he 
values the lepers for their own sakes). But— to use 
Broad's terminology against him— we can say that the
lepers are indeed acting as an "egoistic motive-
• 1 1 fi • •stimulus". Broad tries to rule this out by
stipulating that the lepers are not the man's "relatives
114 Ibid. p.252.
115 Ibid. p.256.
116 Ibid. p.256.
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nor his friends nor his benefactors nor members of any
, , , 117
community or institution to which he belongs." But it
seems that the man must view them as members of his 
(moral) community in some sense— even if this only means 
the community of mankind— or he would not so act.
Some people are so constituted that they care as much 
about strangers as most people do only about their 
immediate family. Unless this individual has such a 
feeling he would not act as described. So the best 
answer to Broad seems to be to extend his own notion of 
the "egoistic motive-stimulus" to cover his otherwise 
motiveless altruistic actions. The man is motivated by 
finding the thought of helping the lepers for their own 
sakes more satisfying to him than not helping them— or he 
would not do it. Such self-referential motivation is a 
necessary part of being altruistic.
1.7 Utility
This section explains the subjective economic conception 
of utility and defends it from a typical modern 
economist, Hirshleifer, and some basic misunderstandings.
The nature and criticisms of utility and utility- 
maximisation arise in detail in the discussion of
117 Ibid. p.257.
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preference utilitarianism in the next chapter. To avoid 
repetition there follows only a brief account of both.
In economics 'utility' was standardly used to mean the 
satisfaction that people get from things. 'Utility' in 
that sense is now often seen as, at best, useful rather 
than true. Many economists became particularly worried 
that utility is not empirically detectable. But they 
thought that if someone gets more satisfaction from one 
thing rather than another we can say that he prefers it; 
so it is possible to reword the expression in terms of 
preferences, which are empirically revealed by a person's 
choices. This is supposed by many to be an advance such 
that the original sense of utility can be more or less 
abandoned.
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Hirshleifer on utility
For instance, J. Hirshleifer (in his Price Theory and
• • l i f t *  . . .  • .Applications ) is aware of the criticisms of utility 
and dismisses "Bentham's" idea claiming that "what modern 
economists call 'utility' reflects nothing more than rank
h i  1 q
ordering of preference.
This seems to be a mistake. The difficulty of measuring 
a thing is not a sufficient reason for denying the sense 
of talking about it. And it seems clear that if one 
prefers A to B to C then these things are decreasingly 
satisfying. What is more, one can often say, with great 
certainty and intuitive good sense, that one prefers A 
much more than B but prefers B only a little more than C. 
Without the cardinal notion of utility we are left 
without the notion of conscious creatures. A machine 
might have a hierarchy of preference-like goals, but we 
do not feel that these are like a person's goals 
precisely because they lack this conscious aspect that 
utility represents. Thus the idea of allowing economics 
only behaviourally exhibited preferences not only makes 
it impossible to discuss the maximising of human 
satisfaction (with respect to work in economics), but it 
seems to fail to clearly distinguish conscious creatures 
from automata.
-L-Ly Hirshleifer 1984.
119 Ibid. p.61.
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When Hirshleifer continues his account of economics it is
clear that the notion of utility as really being
satisfaction is implicitly needed for economic analysis
to have any practical significance for us. For instance,
when he draws utility functions he writes:
The assertion that people experience diminishing 
marginal utility, as consumption income rises, is an 
empirical one. ... It corresponds to our commonsense 
notion that more income makes us happier, but we
usually get more of a thrill from our first million
than our tenth.120
Other objections
There are more-philosophical objections to utility. Some 
of these objections are responses to the glosses that 
utilitarians have put on the term. Classically the 
utilitarians have interpreted 'utility' as happiness or 
pleasure. But these interpretations are too narrow. 
Without saying exactly what 'happiness' is, it seems to 
be a general state that is not achieved by just any gain 
of a desired thing. And 'pleasure' usually connotes a 
much more specific state of mind relating to the 
fulfillment of bodily desires rather than intellectual or 
moral goals.
'Utility' is better understood as satisfaction of a broad 
and nebulous sort. All sorts of things can be satisfying 
in different ways, but in some sense we must be motivated 
by what satisfies us.
i2u Ibid. p.64.
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Can one speak consistently of someone's being motivated 
by disutility? Would he give himself physical and 
emotional discomfort with no other object than so doing? 
It would seem unavoidable to conclude that, by 
definition, such a person just found utility 
(satisfaction) in giving himself pain. To seek pain is 
not to be motivated by disutility. Being motivated by 
disutility (being satisfied with being dissatisfied) must 
be inconsistent.
That one can find utility in 'horrible' ways may seem to 
undermine the obvious desirability of utility that makes 
it attractive to utilitarians (discussed in the next 
chapter) . But it might still be argued that more harm 
than good seems to result when people try to interfere 
with 'perverse' or 'perverted' objects of utility. Or so 
the advocates of promoting utility should argue— for the 
utility of economics is here supposed identical with the 
utility of the utilitarians.
1.8 Utility maximisation
This section explains an Austrian interpretation of 
agents as utility maximisers.
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It is a logically separable part of the rationality 
assumption being discussed that people attempt to 
maximise their utility.
It can be admitted that different things satisfy us at 
different times. And these things give us different 
types of satisfying feelings. But when we are deciding 
whether to opt for one thing rather than another we 
naturally weigh up which is more satisfying at that time. 
We find that different satisfactions are usually quite 
commensurable. We are only incapable of making positive 
choices when the decision is too finely balanced or the 
outcome is too unpredictable.
This theory is not absolutely unfalsifiable. It is not 
empirical in the usual shared external sense, but it is 
'introspectively empirical'. Introspection shows that 
this weighing up process is continual. We do not flip 
from one activity to another without having decided that 
it would be more satisfying (in the broadest sense) to 
change to the second, in fact more satisfying than 
anything else we can think of at the time. There does 
not seem to be a single sort of ultimately desirable 
sensation that has a homogeneous quality that can be 
compared, but as we compare possible choices we cannot 
help but take what feels in some way to be the most 
satisfying (or least dissatisfying) option at the time. 
This is not to say that we are necessarily attempting to 
maximise such satisfaction over some time period, though
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that might be a good rule-of-thumb assumption for 
interpreting behaviour.
This leaves the charge that it is more or less a mere 
tautology that agents are motivated by utility- 
maximisation. But, as with the idea that self-interest 
can embrace egoism and altruism, this is, apparently, an 
unobvious tautology and one required by the fruitful 
science of economics.
1.9 Economic demand
This section briefly defends the economic conception of 
effective demand as value-free and without viable rivals.
This is included as a coda to the chapter. The idea of 
economic demand is not currently criticised as often and 
as comprehensively as the idea of economic rationality—  
though it is just as fundamental to most economic 
analysis. Perhaps this is because this idea is not taken 
at all seriously by those who have already rejected 
economic rationality. Here there is simply an 
explanation and brief defence of the idea partly for the 
sake of completeness and partly because it will arise to 
some extent in the following chapter. What follows is 
really only a version of the defence of market pricing 
that is sometimes known as the "economic calculation
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191argument" that can be found in Mises' Socialism.
In standard economic theory the demand for a good is 
defined in terms of effective demand: as indicating that 
the consumer is willing and able to meet the price.
This might look like a tendentious definition of 'demand' 
that only makes sense in a free market— but that is 
false. Strictly, the 'price' need not be cash. The 
price might be another good (and so barter takes place), 
or a crime (the price for theft is the effort and risks 
involved), or violence (people can pay for a different
4
political system by having a revolution).
Where resources are scarce people are bound to want (or 
idly wish for) more things than exist— or resources would 
ipso facto not be scarce. But this knowledge is not 
useful when it comes to deciding which ends, among 
competing ends, to produce. The understanding of 
'demand' as willingness and ability to 'pay' (in some 
way) does provide us with a mechanism for dealing with 
the problem, though this is not to say that it is 
perfect.
None of this itself undermines the notion of 'needs' (a 
welfare hierarchy of wants). From a benevolent point of 
view these things are important. So could some hierarchy 
of 'needs' be defined as the 'real' or 'proper' demand
lzl Mises 1981.
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that supply can be judged as meeting or failing to meet? 
This would be very difficult. For one thing, the present 
standard definition of 'demand' (even if restricted to 
effective money demand) does not preclude criticism of 
the results in welfare terms. So any replacement would 
have to show itself to be more useful. But whilst the 
standard definition is precise and easily monitored in 
real situations (we can simply see what people buy) , the 
'needs' definition would be vague and slippery for 
several reasons:
1) Individual people have different hierarchies, with 
different weightings, for even the most basic goods, such 
as security, health, and longevity. A comprehensive non­
price ranking system that can determine where people put 
their ever-changing individual preferences is unknown.
2) If the price of one basic good drops sufficiently 
relative to another, then people would usually rather 
have more of it at the expense of the other. But without 
prices how could we even tell that relative resource 
costs had changed let alone how much re-allocation to 
make?
3) Infinite non-specific resources could theoretically be 
allocated to any of these basic categories. Ever more 
could be done to make one live that little bit longer (by 
researching for new drugs perhaps) or be that little bit 
more secure (by employing extra police) . But we have to 
stop devoting resources to one of these things at some
89
point or we will suffer a greater loss with the other.
The price mechanism is the only known system for 
determining what pattern of such basic resources is 
generally preferred.
4) The price system co-ordinates all the polycentric (or 
anarchistic) changes in demand due to the changes in 
individual circumstances— including price changes 
themselves— that are undetectable by any known single 
central mechanism.
Generally, it is the standard economic use of 'effective 
demand' that makes sense of the price system. And the 
price system provides the best known method of 
determining economic (as opposed to technical) 
efficiency. How with a moneyless approach is one to 
choose between another hospital and another school? 
Between more kidney machines and more computers? Between 
more cakes and more salami? We cannot abolish economic 
scarcity. Choices have to be made. This is a fact of 
life and it does not look as though it could change (for 
more resources create new demands). On these questions a 
society of benevolent altruists would be unable to answer 
on the basis of needs alone. Prices, as made sense of by 
effective demand, are necessary for the calculation.
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2. Preference Utilitarian Welfare
2.1 Chapter thesis
The preference-utilitarian conception of welfare as 
achieving what is spontaneously desired (desired without 
the imposition of force or fraud) , and maximising overall 
welfare, withstands criticism and is in practice compatible 
with the conceptions of liberty and rationality used in 
this thesis. In practice, preference utilitarianism 
entails side-constraint libertarianism, which the free 
market spontaneously provides.
2.2 Chapter introduction
This chapter will first explain the relationship of 
preference utilitarianism to the subjective rationality of 
the previous chapter. Then the general conception of 
welfare and its relation to liberty and the market is 
outlined. There is a brief account and defence of 
interpersonal comparisons of utility. The chapter 
continues by looking at discussions about utilitarianism 
(that overall utility in some sense and in some way ought 
to be maximised) and what it entails in practice. Detailed 
discussion of welfare economics, as normally written about, 
has been largely avoided, as that usually involves what is 
incompatible with this thesis: either simply presupposing 
that coercive redistribution can increase welfare and then
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trying to give mathematical analyses of the best 
theoretical rules for such redistribution, or dismissing 
interpersonal comparisons entirely in favour of a Paretian 
approach.
The criticisms of preference utilitarianism are divided 
into four broad sections and put in a logical order: 
clarifying preference utilitarianism; general criticisms of 
preference utilitarianism; practical and economic 
implications; the compatibility of preference 
utilitarianism and individual rights. There will be some 
slight overlap of subject matter where the critics in 
question attempt to apply their general points, though this 
has been largely avoided unless some new point has been 
raised.
In much of what follows it might look as though 
utilitarianism is being morally defended. That is not the 
intention. It might seem to be so simply because many of 
the arguments used to defend utilitarianism as a plausible 
view of welfare (and compatible with liberty and the 
market) just happen to be arguments that a moral defender 
could also use.
Throughout the terms 'welfare', 'utilitarianism' and 
'preference utilitarianism' are generally used synonymously 
(to mean preference utilitarianism) unless the context 
clearly distinguishes them. And such expressions as 
'promoting utility' are often used as a shorthand for such, 
more correct but more cumbersome, expressions as 'promoting
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goals in proportion to the degree of utility felt about 
them'.
2.3 The relation to rationality
The previous chapter defended utility-maximisation as a 
theory of individual motivation. This chapter defends 
(among other things) the idea of using the extent to which 
people achieve their spontaneous goals (those arising 
without fraud or force being used on them) as an account of 
welfare. So this theory is utilitarian in a broad sense, 
but the discussion concerns this as a plausible view of 
welfare and the consequences of implementing it rather than 
being a moral defence (for one can argue about what welfare 
is and how it is maximised without drawing moral 
conclusions).
There is an obvious connection between utility-maximisation 
as a theory of motivation and as an account of welfare. As 
a result some arguments in the previous chapter are 
relevant to this chapter, but repetition has been avoided 
as much as possible.
2.4 Welfare, liberty and the market
The general conception of welfare and its relation to 
liberty and the free market needs to be outlined. People 
are here held to be generally better off (to have improved
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welfare) to the extent that they have more of what they 
spontaneously want. The promotion of this version of 
welfare is sometimes known as preference utilitarianism.
In the free market the average person has more of what he 
wants than in any other known system. This is because the 
free market produces more goods and services while 
maximising the liberty to enjoy them (some of the 
literature on the empirical and theoretical evidence that 
goes beyond the limits of this thesis can be found in the 
bibliography). Liberty will be discussed in detail in the 
next chapter. It is sufficient here that negative liberty- 
-not being interfered with— is understood.
In some unusual circumstances welfare and liberty (as these 
are understood in this thesis) will not be compatible. In 
some such cases promoting welfare might seem morally 
preferable to most people (for instance, where a minute 
loss in liberty would mean a great gain in welfare) ; in 
other cases promoting liberty might seems morally 
preferable to most people (for instance, where the gain in 
welfare would be due to the mere whim of the mob at the 
expense of the individual's liberty) . But this is not 
important to this thesis, for it is not being argued that 
either liberty or welfare is a good at all (let alone that 
one is always preferable) merely that they are almost 
entirely compatible in practice.
This point needs emphasis. This thesis is not an argument 
for the complete compatibility of important values (the
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naive belief against which Isaiah Berlin has wisely warned 
in his Two Concepts of Liberty1) , or for a strict hierarchy 
of ultimate values (that, say, only after liberty is 
respected should welfare be sought, or vice versa), or for 
moral monism (that, say, either welfare or liberty is the 
sole ultimate moral goal). This thesis is merely an 
argument that the most plausible views of liberty and 
welfare entail each other in almost all their practical 
applications.
However, part of the overlap of welfare and liberty is for 
conceptual reasons. For if people have more welfare to the 
extent that they have more of what they spontaneously want 
(as will be defended in this chapter) , then welfare is 
conceptually tied to liberty of desire: fraudulently 
created desires (say, by bogus advertising) or forcibly 
created desires (say, by compulsory drug-taking) are ruled 
out. And if people have liberty to the extent that they do 
not have costs imposed on them by others (as will be 
defended in the next chapter) , then if something is not 
spontaneously desired it cannot be an imposition to take 
it, so by definition liberty is desired. And this means 
that more liberty in itself is a source of welfare.
Many objections to the conceptions of liberty and welfare 
(as defined in this thesis) and to their compatibility are 
philosophical or merely presuppositional, and hence require 
philosophical analysis to expose them and refute them.
1 Berlin 1984.
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Various criticisms and alternative conceptions of welfare 
will be dealt with in this chapter. This should elucidate 
the nature and strength of the conception of welfare and 
some of its relationships to liberty and the market. The 
final section focuses on some critics who (from a welfarist 
viewpoint) specifically reject the idea that there can be a 
congruency of welfare and individual property rights or 
individual rights generally.
2.5 Interpersonal comparisons of utility
Here there is a brief account and defence of interpersonal 
comparisons of welfare. This defence is necessary to be 
able to argue in this chapter that welfare considerations 
do not entail illiberal interventionist policies and to 
make sense of the theory of liberty maximisation in the 
following chapter.
This section is not as long as its apparent importance 
might indicate that it should be. This is so for two main 
reasons. (1) As was argued at the end of the last chapter, 
it is not practical to compare strengths of utility as a 
motive directly and in detail and so to construct anything 
like social welfare functions. But general arguments can 
show that certain social rules are likely to promote 
overall want satisfaction. (2) As these rules are those 
respecting liberty and the free market what follows can be 
read as a hypothetical argument: granted interpersonal
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utility comparisons and utilitarianism, liberty and the 
free market follow. (The more welfare-oriented can read 
this the other way round: granted free market 
libertarianism, welfare will be maximised. This might 
sound less likely, but it is how many welfarists known to 
me seem to have come to embrace libertarianism.)
That another is getting any satisfaction from his activity 
is sometimes hard to understand. Other people's tastes can 
be so strange to us that we doubt whether they really 
desire some of the things they get up to. One good 
indication that they do is seeing that these people seem to 
enjoy some of the same things as much as we do, but that 
they are prepared to spend time, and perhaps money, on 
things which seem strange to us. Generally it is the fact 
of someone's parting with his own money that convinces us 
of the reality and intensity of his desire. If this 
mechanism is disrupted then we make poor guesses at their 
interests, for 'one man's meat is another man's poison'.
It ought first to be noted that standard economic theory 
does allow intrapersonal comparisons of utility. A person 
who is prepared to suffer the bother of moving his desk to 
change the view from his window is probably doing an 
intrapersonal comparison of utility: he thinks he will feel 
more satisfied with the new view than he does with the 
present one (even after the subtraction of disutility for 
the bother of moving).
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Standard economic theory seems to allow that interpersonal 
comparisons of utility (for welfare discussions) may be 
possible in a loose, informal way but not with the 
definiteness that it allows in Pareto comparisons (where 
overall utility is deemed to have increased if at least one 
person is better off and none is worse off). But it is 
accepted by most people that interpersonal comparisons of 
utility are possible to some degree. A clear case of 
external utility comparison between persons is where A 
values x, and B is indifferent about x. It follows that A
values x more than B does. It then seems a small step to
comparing a case where A strongly values x and B has only a 
marginal preference for x. And so forth.
Whether utility is literally the same 'stuff' is 
unimportant in practice except in delicate cases. We 
rarely doubt that one person gets more disutility from a 
broken leg (in this case because of the pain, but I am not 
equating pain with disutility) than someone else does from
a small scratch on the knee— in the normal case.
To save a friend from breaking his leg we would usually 
consider it a small price to sustain a scratch ourselves. 
Though standard economics with its Pareto criterion cannot 
make sense of interpersonally maximising utility, it can 
still make sense of my choosing to sustain a scratch to 
prevent a friend's breaking his leg— I simply prefer that
A macho Rugby player might have great utility due to 
pride at having broken his leg once (though thereafter 
diminishing marginal utility might set in rapidly); a 
beautiful model might have great disutility because she now 
has a tiny scar on her previously perfect legs.
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to the alternative. But I would be making such an 
interpersonal comparison of utility— so such comparisons 
seem to make some intuitive sense. And economics needs 
this sense to some extent if it is to determine what 
maximises utility in the manner of preference 
utilitarianism (discussed and defended in this chapter).
It also needs it to maximise liberty— understood as 
minimising the imposition of costs (as discussed and 
defended in the next chapter).
But what are we to say about a person who would suffer a
broken leg himself in order to save someone from a scratch 
(or to inflict a small scratch on him)? He is probably (it 
depends on whether he cares about how the other person
feels about the scratch) still making an interpersonal
comparison of utility. He simply gets more utility by 
changing the other's degree of utility than he does by 
purely self-referential acts (i.e. acts not involving this 
other). Such things are not unusual with great lovers (or 
with great haters). Assuming normal supply and demand 
curves we would expect the lover to, for instance, 'buy' 
less utility for his beloved if the price went up to, say, 
two broken legs to prevent a scratch (and the same, mutatis 
mutandis, for the hater). Thus the two utilities (though 
guessed in the case of the other party's) are still 
compared by the agent.
Nor can we seriously doubt that the average richer person 
gets less utility from an extra unit of income than does
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the average poorer one (so income and wealth redistribution 
might look welfare-enhancing at first glance).
Making utility comparisons more precise does become 
progressively harder, but that problem is a separate issue. 
The point is that we cannot help making some interpersonal 
comparisons of utility. We do it all the time. If we did 
not then we would never forgo any benefit to ourselves on 
the grounds that others would appreciate it more— we would 
not help people for their own sake for we would only be 
sure that we were losing but not know that they were 
gaining.
Provided that we can make some obvious comparisons, then we 
can often see whether utility or welfare generally goes up 
or down with some practices rather than others even when 
there are some losers (as is normally the case).
Criticisms
In the rest of this chapter it might seem that occasionally 
the criticisms are wrongly taken to apply to preference 
utilitarianism (as defended here and by R.M. Hare) rather 
than some more hedonistic sort of utilitarianism. But in 
the collection of essays mainly cited, the editors, Sen 
and Williams, themselves claim (in their introductory 
chapter):
3 Sen & Williams 1982.
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It is such a reference to desires which— particularly 
when they are assimilated to interests— underlies the 
intuitive justification of utilitarianism .... There 
is nothing peculiar about Hare's characterisation of 
utility as such, and in this respect he has provided 
new arguments for defending an old tradition rather 
than reformulating the content of utilitarianism.
So it seems that Sen and Williams, at least, take
themselves to be attacking a general position that includes
preference utilitarianism, so they are taken at their word.
Critics will be dealt with only insofar as they seem to be
at odds with Hare's conception of preference utilitarianism
and with its compatibility with liberty and the free
market.
Many of the points made about utilitarianism are merely 'in 
principle': this expression often being used to indicate 
what is logically possible or what seems likely given 
popular assumptions. As a result many of the criticisms of 
these points will comprise little more than showing that 
logical-possibility arguments can often be stood on their 
heads or some general antithetical theories used to attack 
the popular assumptions. These replies are not intended to 
be conclusive. This is a philosophical ground-clearing 
exercise attempting to make the thesis clearer and more 
plausible at the abstract level, so that the relevant 
social scientific evidence can obtain a fairer hearing.
4 Ibid. p.11.
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2.6 Clarifying preference utilitarianism
Hare does not satisfactorily explain or defend preference 
utilitarianism in some difficult areas in his contribution 
to Utilitarianism and Beyond.5 In this section we look at 
these as a way of clarifying preference utilitarianism. 
These concern the idea of having interests outside our 
experience, whether preference utilitarianism ultimately 
collapses into mental-state utilitarianism, this thesis' 
libertarian interpretation of the structure of Hare's moral 
theory, and 'utility monster' criticisms.
Interests at a distance
Hare writes that it is:
prudent ... to seek the satisfaction of desires which 
are important to me, even if I am not going to know 
whether they have been satisfied or not.
He gives the examples of wanting above all that one's
children do not starve after one's death, and that:
a dying man's interests are harmed if promises are 
made to him and then broken, and . . . mine are harmed 
if people are cheating on me without my knowing it."7
One way in which it is prudent to aim at what we cannot 
know about is that we will be frustrated here and now if we 
cannot. If you value, above all, leaving your children
5 Ibid.
6 Hare 1982 p.37.
7 Ibid. p.37.
102
provided for after your own death then you will feel 
unsatisfied if you cannot now make the arrangements. But 
this is not the most important point here.
More important is seeing that a person's real interests 
(the interests he actually has) are harmed if what he wants 
fails to come about, whether he knows it or not. As Hare 
sees, the opposite of what he is interested in is against 
his interests in a fairly clear sense. Though, as Hare 
insists, to make sense of this we might sometimes need to 
use superior knowledge to tidy up inconsistent interests 
and put them in order of intensity. (Hare in fact writes 
of respecting "perfectly prudent"8 desires and there is 
some doubt as to how far he wants to respect real desires 
and how far he wants to respect something more ideal. But 
the defence of real preference satisfaction is left to the 
discussion of others who clearly wish to go further.)
Why should we respect others' interests? Hare says it is 
because we should like them to respect ours. This is his 
Kantian (universalisability) conception of morality. But 
more can be said to criticise this position. And more 
needs to be said to amorally defend it as a plausible 
criterion of welfare.
It might be thought that at least when someone is dead 
there is no valuer and so that person cannot have his 
interests harmed; how can there be a value without an
'8 Ibid. p.28.
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existing valuer? But being somewhere else spatially seems 
analogous to being somewhere else temporally. If we can 
allow damage to the interests of a valuer who is not 
present at some place to observe it then it seems we must 
allow damage to the interests of valuer who is not present 
at some time to observe it. We can care about some things 
that will happen outside our own timespan as much as about 
some things that will occur outside our spatial region.
From a preference utilitarian viewpoint all goals are 
ranked in terms of welfare according to the strength of 
desire for them— not because of the psychological state 
their realisation brings about (except in so far as that is 
included in a goal).
Preference utilitarians cannot here identify 'interest' 
with 'utility' without getting into paradoxical situations. 
But it does not sound too odd to speak of something's being 
against the interests of a dead person if we gloss 
'interests' as 'values': one's values can be said to be 
eternal, as one's factual theories are: a proposition about 
what the world ought to be like or what it is like does not 
require the continuing existence of its original holder.
But it must be false to speak of someone's getting 
unwitting utility or of the dead's getting utility.
Brainwashed preferences?
So preference utilitarianism is apparently very unlike a 
hedonistic utilitarian view whereby people's interests are 
simply ways in which they achieve utility. With hedonistic
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utilitarianism we should, if we could, brainwash people so 
that they would have interests that they would find more 
enjoyable. Preference utilitarianism requires that only 
the individual himself decides what he prefers to have.
And it is often or usually the satisfaction of some 
external end that he aims at— not some psychological state.
However, it might seem that we could still, in principle, 
brainwash people against their wills to give them 
preferences that could be more easily satisfied. For if 
maximising preference-satisfaction is the welfare criterion 
then it seems that we should brainwash people so that they 
have more or stronger preferences that can be more easily 
satisfied: that would consequentially result in more 
preference satisfaction than merely satisfying existing 
preferences. So perhaps preference utilitarianism is not 
ultimately distinguishable from the more hedonistic 
varieties. Hare is tacitly appealing to a popular liberal 
conception of welfare that is narrower than the logical 
limits of preference utilitarianism.
I am not sure about the validity of this criticism as a 
theoretical point. But as no one currently wants his wants 
engineered without his permission such brainwashing cannot 
get started because satisfying the subsequent wants would 
not be allowed to count as better that not engineering them 
in the first place. And, in any case, the idea of such 
brainwashing is quite fanciful. So preference 
utilitarianism is not self-undermining in practice, and it
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is only as a practical criterion of welfare that it is 
being defended.
We might defend this position by observing that our desires 
are not as arbitrary as they might seem. We are 
complicated individuals knowing ourselves best, and we 
cannot in fact have our motivations manipulated at will by 
others (or even by ourselves) . Such manipulation of 
people's desires, supposing it were possible (as do some 
philosophers dealt with later, such as Elster), would 
obviously have great dangers. If it really were possible 
then it would probably be safest for people to choose how 
they wished their own motives altered. They might well 
take advantage of this facility to some extent; for people 
do now sometimes object to their own desires (such as the 
desire to smoke) and try to cultivate different ones. But 
this is compatible with preference utilitarianism as 
respecting the individual's preferences at all stages.
Let me reiterate the nature of preference utilitarianism 
defended here. Hare (and other preference utilitarians) 
can see that they accept goals that cannot be made sense of 
in terms of promoting only end-states of utility, and yet 
they are still utilitarians in a sense. For it is still 
possible to attempt to maximise those goals that people 
have the greatest spontaneous utility-as-a-motive to 
pursue. People do not want to be given any particular 
psychological state irrespective of their spontaneous goals 
(and so will not agree to that as a good conception of 
their welfare) . But they do want to be given the things
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they aim at in proportion to the strength of the desire 
that they have for them (and so will agree to that as a 
good conception of their welfare). That strength of desire 
is simply utility as a spontaneously occurring motive (as 
discussed in the first chapter).
This means that though we cannot interfere with people's 
actual values we can still attempt to maximise goals by 
reference to interpersonal comparisons of the strength of 
utility-as-a-motive. If I find the thought of X more 
satisfying than you do, then it seems that, other things 
being equal, I ought to have X. This is aiming at giving 
people as a whole more of what they really value without 
being limited by the Pareto criterion.
Hare's theory interpreted
Hare makes a good point concerning the fantastic nature of 
the idea of "fanatics of ... heroic stature" who might, 
from a utilitarian viewpoint, justify extreme oppression of 
gentler persons. He correctly sees that the critical force 
of such an example "depends on appealing to the ordinary 
man's judgement about a case with which ... his intuitions 
were not designed to deal."9 This distinction between 
intuitive and considered moral responses goes a long way 
towards explaining what is wrong with many of the fantasy- 
criticisms of utilitarianism, in a way that is particularly 
relevant to this thesis (this criticism of fantasy-
9 Ibid. p.30.
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criticisms is also used in reply to David Friedman in the 
next chapter) . It cannot be a good criticism of 
utilitarianism as a practical criterion of welfare that we 
do not have utilitarian intuitions about certain bizarre 
thought experiments.
Hare gives the example of the Nazis' desire "not to have
i n .  . •Jews around". He is surely right that the Nazis could
not be, in reality, fanatical enough to make that the real
. . . .  1 1 .utilitarian policy. •L Hare's response to the example is
somewhat hasty as regards possible 'utility monster' 
criticisms of preference utilitarianism (discussed next) 
and its implications (discussed in the section on practical 
and economic implications). But first we should clarify 
the structure of Hare's moral theory and what this thesis 
makes of it.
Hare distinguishes two levels of utilitarian rules. The 
highly specific rules that are possible only given highly
10 Ibid p.30.
11 Though if it were utilitarian I should abandon the 
utilitarian solution in favour of respecting individual 
liberty, while Hare should (to be consistent) agree "not to 
have Jews around". Where there is a clash between 
preference utilitarianism and liberty my intuitions vary 
according to the case. In the case of the thought- 
experiment concerning a multitude of fanatical Nazis 
against even a single Jew it seems that Hare (along with 
hedonistic utilitarians, of course) must (in principle— I 
do not think he would in fact) opt for killing the Jew. I 
would want instead to say that in this (merely logically 
possible) clash of liberty and welfare I prefer liberty, or 
possibly that I now question the welfare criterion (is it 
even in the Nazis' interests to have such feelings?) . But 
this logically possible breakdown of congruence between 
preference utilitarianism and liberty does not affect this 
thesis, which only requires the practical congruence of the 
two.
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informed and critical thinking, and the general rules that 
are necessary for everyday use. Both are ultimately act 
utilitarian because the observance of such rules is the 
best act to promote utility. That act and rule 
utilitarianism ultimately collapse is important for this 
thesis in this chapter and as a structure and argument that 
can be applied to libertarianism in the next. So the 
arguments and implications will be given now.
Rule-utilitarianism has the idea that the best way to 
maximise utility is to follow rules that are the best in 
the long-run, for without such rules there would be mere 
chaos. Act-utilitarianism has the idea that it is best to 
do whatever act we now calculate will maximise utility, for 
if we are hidebound by rules we shall fail to maximise 
utility. The distinction seems to collapse in light of the 
observation that if any rules are best for utility in the 
long-run (and we know them) then the best act to do now 
must be to obey them. And if there is any way of telling 
that a rule should sometimes be waived (and we know it) 
then that information can be put into a new rule.
The position taken in this thesis is that, except in 
unusual cases, the best utilitarian act is to follow the 
utilitarian rule of not interfering with individual liberty 
(even to attempt to increase liberty thereby). And, 
analogously, the best liberty-maximising act is to follow 
the libertarian rule of not interfering with individual 
liberty (even to attempt to increase liberty thereby). 
Neither of these propositions can be defended in
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comprehensive practical detail. They are simply explained 
and argued to be coherent and plausible positions by taking 
on critics who have incompatible positions.
Preference utilitarianism and 'utility monsters'
Hare's problem concerning the fanatical Nazis is a version 
of the 'utility monsters' criticism of utilitarianism.
This is, more or less, the idea that utilitarianism entails 
that those with less powerful emotions should be used by 
those with very powerful emotions ('utility monsters').
More needs to be said on the possible applications to 
preference utilitarianism (though the following arguments 
seem to apply to utilitarianism generally).
Preference utilitarianism is the view that stronger 
preferences should trump weaker ones. If this were 
enforced then this might still seem to entail (in practice) 
tyranny by utility monsters. Any uncontrollably passionate 
and immature brutes would get their way in preference to 
the stoical, gentle, and civilised. As most of us would 
not like the idea of having to pander to such creatures it 
seems we could not accept preference utilitarianism as a 
criterion of welfare.
To see the mistake here it might help to look at the 
extreme consequences first. Utility monsters would 
increasingly spontaneously arise (for social and, 
eventually, genetic reasons) if they were always pandered 
to. But a society with such creatures would not have more
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preferences satisfied when all become like this (as they 
would be bound to: each must cultivate such a personality 
or lose to those who do) . There would be extreme 
frustration as one brute tries to 'out-want' another brute 
in order to get his way. And the break-down of commerce 
and social dealings that ensue (as people try to get things 
without working for them, or seeking the consent of others) 
would cause more frustration still. Given that outcome, it 
is surely not utilitarian to always give into 'utility 
monsters'. But, much more than this, it seems that any 
pandering to such a creature will immediately, partially 
undermine the productive system of incentives that exists 
in a system of respect for private property. So 
utilitarianism will not in practice require that the very 
passionate should get their own way.12
So, just how far should we give into strong preferences?
If some particular example would lead to such devastating 
escalation if made a rule then it ought not to be given its 
full weight. This has to be a matter of some speculation, 
possibly entailing the use of the legal concept of the 
'reasonable man'. This seems the correct theoretical 
answer, though it cannot be denied that it might be 
contentious in practice (at least in marginal cases).
But what, for the sake of argument, if such frustration 
were not the outcome of the rise in powerful passions? We
12 A similar type of problem occurs with the theory of 
liberty as the absence of imposed costs and is discussed in 
the next chapter.
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would then have only satisfied utility monsters (which, 
according to preference utilitarianism, means more 
welfare). The previous problem was concerned with the 
practical problem (for a preference utilitarian) of 
whether, and how far, to give into unusually strong 
preferences now. This new problem is another mere fantasy 
criticism. What the economic system could be like, what 
such creatures would be like, and whether this outcome 
would be desirable or undesirable, is very hard to judge.
It might be that we would want to reject the preference 
utilitarian conception of welfare if it really would lead 
to such an outcome. But even if we would, that does not 
seem to be a good reason to abandon it now, especially if 
there is nothing better to be had.
2.7 General criticisms of utilitarianism
This section deals primarily with the defence of preference 
utilitarianism as a plausible theory of welfare. A variety 
of general criticisms are included but these are 
necessarily far from exhaustive given the large literature. 
Taylor attacks the idea of utility as a motive for persons. 
Sen and Williams focus on utilitarianism's informational 
constraints. Scanlon argues for a rationalist contractual 
view of morality. Hampshire thinks that utilitarianism has 
no room for conventions. Elster holds that the social 
construction of wants makes mere want-satisfaction a 
dubious criterion of welfare. Rawls argues against 
utilitarianism's sacrifice of the individual and its single
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conception of the good but also against 'morally arbitrary' 
unplanned distributions of goods.
Taylor on evaluations of desire
For Taylor the idea of a person is bound up with the 
distinction between what he calls weak and strong 
evaluation of desires. Persons have to be able to evaluate 
desires in a strong sense. This is supposed in particular 
to rule out the view that utility ought, or even can, be 
the motive of persons.
The weak sense of evaluation is where desires are weighed 
against each other to maximise satisfaction. The strong 
sense is where desires are qualitively classified. In the 
weak sense if something is desired then it is held good.
In the strong sense what is desired is not necessarily 
good. Weak desires are supposed only contingently 
incompatible: one happens to be stronger than the other, 
but it could have been the other way round. By contrast, a 
cowardly act might be shunned not because it makes any 
other desired act impossible, but simply because it is 
base. When we use the contrastive language of evaluation 
the weighing of desires against each other is not supposed 
to make sense.
Taylor must be mistaken. The cowardly act does make 
another desire impossible— the desire not to be a coward. 
And if the cowardly act would save one's life one might do
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it, though one might not do the cowardly act if it merely 
saved one embarrassment. So these 'qualitively' classified 
desires seem to get more 'points' rather than being 
strictly incomparable.
Taylor concedes that there can be incompatibility if we 
also value courageous actions. This incompatibility is 
supposed to be necessary. It is not contingent that one 
cannot flee and remain a valuer of the courageous life. 
However, this incompatibility is only necessary when using 
language that contrasts ways of life: noble versus base, 
profound versus superficial, higher versus lower.
But surely the merely 'quantitive' desires can be given a 
logically equivalent formulation. If I value red wine and 
not white then in appropriate circumstances it is not 
contingent that I choose red wine if there is the offer of 
both. I might choose the white for special reasons (maybe 
because I see the red is running out and I want to be a 
good host) but then, as before, I might have special 
reasons for not doing the brave act (because it clashes 
with the value of staying alive). Of course I could so 
value bravery that I would always choose the brave act no 
matter what, but I could also so value red wine that I 
would always choose it no matter what (though both seem 
unlikely).
Utilitarianism is the moral system that is particularly 
attacked from Taylor's position. Utilitarianism is 
supposed to be flatly incompatible with strong evaluative
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language. This seems rather like supposing that 
utilitarianism is incompatible with laws. Some laws can 
make for a valuable stability that enhances utility; so can 
the promotion of certain values such as bravery and 
honesty. It is simply that the welfare worth of both a law 
and a value will be contingent from a utilitarian 
viewpoint.
Taylor links his quality-versus-quantity distinction to a
conception of the self:
we are not beings whose only authentic evaluations are 
non-qualitative as the utilitarian tradition suggests; 
... if evaluation of desires is essential to our 
notion of the self, it is strong and not just weak 
evaluation which is in question.13
The first thing to reply is that the utilitarian (or the 
preference utilitarian, at least) can allow people all the 
"qualitative" evaluations that Taylor wants. One can find 
utility in all sorts of desires, including desires to live 
according to certain standards because one believes them to 
be good. It is a mistake to think that maximising utility 
means focusing on utility in a way that necessarily 
excludes a desire for "strong evaluations". People do not 
consciously focus on desirability and then manipulate the 
world to maximise it whatever the consequences. They focus 
on ends that they find desirable and these can include ways 
of living.
13 Taylor, C. 1982 p.116.
115
There seems to be a stronger claim in Taylor's idea that 
strong evaluations are necessary for a creature to be a 
"self" or person. These strong evaluations seem to be 
predominantly moral ones. It does seem that all human 
beings have a natural inclination to hold moral values.
But suppose that an intelligent and reflective man simply 
lacked sentiments about how people generally (whoever they 
are) ought to behave. This looks more like a person 
without a morality than a non-person.
Seeing /way morals are categorical is important for 
understanding the mistake in Taylor's position. Moral 
views necessarily override other views. Morals are trumps 
in the sense that we cannot knowingly do what we think (at 
that moment) is immoral; this would mean doing an act that 
we viewed as being categorically undesirable. In this way 
moral values are mistaken for "incommensurables" when 
compared with other desires. The moral and non-moral 
desires are compared by desirability, but the moral are 
bound to win for they are categorically (absolutely, 
unconditionally) desirable or undesirable when they are 
held (though they are subjective and may cease to be held). 
Strictly, Taylor is wrong to say that one is not calculated 
to be more desirable. The calculation is there but it is 
very quick. As soon as we feel that something is immoral 
we feel that we ought not to do it no matter what the value 
of the other non-moral desire (even the desire to save
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one's own life) . This is a controversial position14 so 
some elaboration seems desirable.
The way morals are categorical
In more detail, here are two arguments for the categorical 
(or absolute) nature of moral values; one is logical the 
other is psychological. It seems easier to focus on 
actions called 'immoral' because 'moral' is often used to 
mean merely permissible rather than compulsory.
Logically, what is immoral is what we feel no one ought to 
do whatever the circumstances (it is a sentiment about a 
type of behaviour) . One cannot at the same time (at least, 
not without confusion) think that one ought to do what no 
one ought to do. A prudential belief cannot trump the 
moral belief as the moral belief is necessarily prudential. 
The definition of what is moral cannot explain what is 
moral if it uses a distinctively moral 'ought'. It does 
not. It uses the prudential 'ought' but uses it 
categorically. If murder is thought to be wrong then it 
cannot be prudent to be a murderer whatever the other 
rewards. Morals must be obeyed whatever the price or they 
are not really held. If they were not obeyed then they 
would not be categorical, and all ethicians seem to agree 
that morals are categorical whatever else they are.
14 Though Hare argues along the same lines in Hare 1963.
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Psychologically, can you recall doing anything that felt 
clearly immoral at the time you did it? Do not conflate 
this with knowing that others (maybe everyone you knew) 
thought it immoral, or that you feared the punishment, or 
felt shame at the possibility of being caught, or that you 
felt you had done wrong even immediately afterwards (morals 
are in flux as are our beliefs and tastes), or that you 
would not have wanted to argue that you had been moral. A 
major source of confusion is where our 'official' moral 
views differ from our real moral views. This seems to 
occur because morals are usually held ceteris paribus (at 
least tacitly so). Strange circumstances (including very 
trivial infractions and very great rewards) give rise to 
genuinely different moral intuitions that are only 
superficially examples of inconsistency.
That morals are trumps may make it look as though we are 
dealing with something qualitively different: trumps are 
not apparently weighed against other non-trump cards for 
they automatically beat it. But one can view the lowest 
trump as effectively one point higher than any ordinary 
card; and one can view a minimal moral desire as just a 
point or two ahead of non-moral desires. Moral desires 
have to have certain logical features (which include making 
them trumps) to be moral desires, but they are ultimately 
desires nevertheless. We feel more utility and disutility 
at the thought, respectively, of moral and immoral actions
1 Rthan we do at the thought of non-moral actions.
^  Perhaps Taylor feels that moral desires are special 
because when they come into conflict with our other desires 
they force a sacrifice. But our non-moral desires often
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Taylor claims that the strong evaluator does not have to 
feel the difference in value between alternatives because
he can "articulate superiority just because he has a
* 1 6 • • language of contrastive characterisation." But is it not
"contrastive characterisation" to say that one option feels
more desirable than another? It is merely more articulate
to be able to say in what way something is desirable: noble
rather than base (or sweet rather than sour? Why are such
mundane contrasts missed unless Taylor has moral contrasts
in mind?).
We are told that not only mere desires but kinds of life 
are evaluated by the strong evaluator. But how can he do 
the evaluation except by how far he feels desire for the 
(promotion of) kinds of life? He cannot leave desires 
behind. We can still make sense of Taylor's idea of 
"shallow"17 people as those who do not consider the value 
of different types of life; who do not criticise these 
things deeply. So perhaps "strong evaluations" refer to 
deep reflections (as with Watson, in the first chapter) 
rather than merely moral reflection.
Taylor then says of the position that he is really 
attacking:
conflict with each other, and the sacrifice for following 
any desire is the next best alternative forgone: the 
opportunity cost.
16 Taylor, C. 1982 p.117.
17 Ibid. p.117.
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The complete utilitarian would be an impossibly 
shallow character, and we can gauge how much self- 
declared utilitarians really live their ideology by 
what importance they attribute to depth. 8
If it is deep criticism of ways of living that Taylor 
values, then it is not clear why utilitarians should shun 
this. Such philosophising can be satisfying in itself, and 
it can also enable one to reach conclusions that make for a 
more satisfying world.
Taylor outlines the idea that people are to some extent 
responsible for their evaluations by a radical choice that 
is not based on reasons. He rejects the possibility of a 
radical choice of strong evaluations though he accepts that 
of a radical choice between them. He cites Sartre's 
example of the young man torn between fighting for his 
country and staying with his ailing mother.
He is surely right that there would not be a dilemma if we 
could merely radically choose our values for then we could 
simply declare one of the values inoperative. And if these 
values really were incommensurable then the young man could 
only make a radical choice between them— going one way 
without a feeling or argument that it is better. But can 
they really be incommensurable? Introspection seems to 
show that we must attempt to weigh how we feel about the 
two options. Our feeling of satisfaction is the common 
measure. Just because we cannot decide clearly which is 
the heavier does not refute this. It is merely that our
18 Ibid. p.117.
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satisfaction is sometimes (especially in novel 
circumstances) a criterion that is vague or slippery when 
no alternative feels obviously better. We may then be torn 
between them, but we still feel that they are more 
satisfying than any other goals.
We can agree that Taylor's evaluations are articulations of 
what is sensed to be worthy, and so forth. And we can 
agree that this sense is always open to examination to see 
whether we have our evaluations right, for they are
. . . .  IQ"initially inchoate, or confused, or badly formulated."
But Taylor is wrong to draw a clear distinction between 
these values and our sensory observations, and claim that
seeing "this table as brown, or this line of mountains as
. • • . * 9 0  •jagged, is a simple description. Values vary in
sharpness just as do (external) observations. I can be
sure that murder is wrong; I can be uncertain whether what
I see is a shadow or a cat. Perhaps values are "more open
to challenge"21 (it may depend on the value and the person)
but the difference between them and simple descriptions is
exaggerated by Taylor. As Popper's epistemology shows,
all observations are theory-laden (rather than
unambiguously factual) and this seems to apply to both
introspective observations (including those of simple
desires) and extrospective ones.
19 Ibid. pp.122-123.
20 Ibid. p.122.
21 Ibid. p.124.
22 Popper 1978 & 1979.
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Taylor has now supposedly led us to see that our deepest 
evaluations are the least clear but the "closest to what I 
am as a subject, in the sense that shorn of them I would 
break down as a person ... M.23 But— apart from the 
contrary idea that deep values can be clear and shallow 
ones can be vague— why should we be identified with our 
evaluations any more than with our observations? Ideas—  
whether values or theories— are merely tentatively held 
things in the brains of the genetic creatures that science 
now shows us that we are. Taylor seems to be even failing 
to distinguish between what it means to be a person as such 
and the values that a particular person has (his 
'personality', if you will). It seems quite mistaken to 
hold that there are "inchoate evaluations ... essential to 
our identity."24 At best a person might need to have some 
"deep evaluations" to be a person. But if particular 
evaluations alone identify a person then two people would 
change into each other if they were to come to completely 
exchange each other's opinions.
In so far as Taylor feels that "shallow" people ought to be 
controlled by "deep" ones (and, to be fair, this attitude 
is not obviously implicit) then the same criticisms seem to 
apply as those leveled at Frankfurt and Watson (in the 
previous chapter).
23 Taylor, C. 1982 p.124.
24 Ibid. p.126.
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Sen and Williams on informational constraints
Sen and Williams state that utilitarianism imposes "severe 
informational constraints."25 What information is 
neglected? By definition only the information that nobody 
gets any welfare gain or loss from: the information that 
nobody cares about. If anybody cares about it then it must 
be included in the utilitarian calculation. If nobody 
cares about it then why does it matter? What exactly is 
supposed to be neglected and why is it important? Sen and 
Williams restate this criticism in various forms but none 
seems clear.
Merely looking at overall welfare is supposed to take "a 
remarkably narrow view of being a person1,26 Why? Because 
"utilitarianism sees persons as locations of their 
respective utilities.1,27 It does no such thing. To value 
someone's welfare is not to say that he is identical with 
where his welfare is located, nor to say what it means to 
be a person.
Sen and Williams write:
persons do not count as individuals in ...
[utilitarian calculation] any more than petrol tanks 
do in the analysis of the national consumption of 
petroleum.28
25 Sen and Williams 1982 p.4.
26 Ibid. p.4.
27 Ibid. p.4.
28 Ibid. p.4.
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But if an individual were not capable of being better or 
worse off in terms of welfare (in the broad sense used 
here) it is not clear why he ought to count: it would not 
matter to him what happened to him. And to assign equal 
weight to the welfare of persons, other things being equal, 
(as utilitarianism does) seems to be one way to respect all 
persons equally. Not to do this seems to be to neglect 
some persons to the benefit of others— and sometimes to the 
benefit of the person who wants to see his views imposed 
without reference to equal respect for the concerns of 
individuals.
The petrol-tank analogy is quite inappropriate. Petrol 
tanks are mere instruments of storage for the use of 
people. People do not store welfare for others but have it 
themselves. And utilitarianism gives each individual equal 
respect as a person capable of welfare.
Utilitarianism is depicted as a combination of "welfarism, 
sum-ranking and consequentialism". It is claimed that even 
the combination of welfarism and sum-ranking means that 
"persons as persons have dropped fully out of the
9 Qassessment of states of affairs." ^
Sen and Williams seem to imply that there is something 
wrong here. It is not clear what. The ten commandments 
proscribe and prescribe certain activities without 
reference to "persons as persons"— at least they don't
^  Ibid. p.5.
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mention anyone by name (except God, perhaps) or tell us 
anything about them "as persons." Is there something wrong 
with this "impersonality"? It seems that all moral rules 
have an impersonal (or impartial) aspect. In fact it is 
sometimes held that a moral rule is more moral to the 
extent that it is more impartial: extending beyond the 
family, the nation, the race, perhaps even the species.
A big difference between utilitarianism and some 
deontological moral rules is that utilitarianism takes 
account of more facts about the welfare of persons.
Popular deontological rules tend to protect welfare to some
extent, but to the extent that they are inflexible they 
must neglect some of the welfare of people. It is such 
deontological rules that must impose "severe informational
O f ) ,  ,
constraints" u if one is concerned with welfare.
For the utilitarian-judgement of actions it is held (by Sen
and Williams) to be sufficient, but implied to be
unsatisfactory, that "the impersonal sum of utilities is 
known."31
This is merely like saying that with a deontological rule 
it is sufficient to know only which of two alternatives 
observes the rule to know which is better. In both cases 
the only way we find out which really upholds our values is 
by investigation. It is enough to be truthfully informed
30 Ibid. p.4.
31 Ibid. p.5.
125
which outcome measures up to our criteria in order to judge 
it, but we are unlikely to accept it in either case without 
some observational testing.
The "drastic obliteration of usable information" is 
supposed to result in the "neglect of a person's 
attachments and ties."32
How can this be? A person's attachments and ties will be 
taken into account by preference utilitarianism in 
proportion to the importance that the person himself places 
on them. How could preference utilitarianism neglect them? 
True, it does not grant intrinsic and sacred value to 
attachments and ties, but why should it? Sen and Williams 
complain that utilitarianism regards "attachments, ties, 
aims, plans, agency, etc. ... as worthless in themselves 
and valuable only to the extent of their effects on 
utility."33 But if no value is placed on a thing then how 
can it have a value? Things do not have worth in 
themselves; utility is a measure of how much worth is 
placed on them by individuals. (I am not, of course, 
suggesting by any of this defence that it is therefore 
desirable to expect people to put less weight on personal 
ties. That is made unnecessary by the 'private vice; 
public virtue' conclusions of the economists being 
defended.)
32 Ibid. p.5.
33 Ibid. p.5.
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Sen and Williams assert that even if it is a necessary 
condition for something to be valuable that it be desired 
it still does not follow that one ought to equate "the 
importance of a thing with the extent of the desire for it 
or with the pleasure generated by it (i.e. utility being
the measure of importance)."34
We have to equate the importance of a thing with someone's 
desire (or potential desire) for it (or value of it: there 
seems no important distinction here) , or we are back with 
the paradox of values existing without any valuers ever
holding them. And the only alternative to an impartial
weighing of desire is a partial one. Whose desires should 
we be partial to and why— given that overall welfare will 
fall as a result of partiality? They do not say.
They see as a deeper objection that "something can be 
valuable even if it is not desired by anyone"35 at the 
time. But it is quite compatible with utilitarianism that 
there are things that are (at least potentially) valuable 
(things that would satisfy more spontaneous desires) though 
they are not yet desired. The value of these things is due 
to the increase in satisfaction of desire that they would 
bring about.
34 Ibid. p.6.
35 Ibid. p.6.
36 But see the discussion of potential desires replying to 
Elster (later), which Sen and Williams have in mind here.
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We are also told that:
a utilitarian society is not simply a society which 
happens to satisfy utilitarian requirements, but a 
society which is run in accordance with these 
requirements.37
This echoes an earlier remark that utilitarianism is:
also a criterion of public action. It therefore must 
assume a public agent, some supreme body which chooses 
general states of affairs for society as a whole.
On page 3 Sen and Williams conceded that some utilitarians 
"see no need to assume a public agency", but it is not 
clear that they really accept this possibility, so it seems 
worth clarifying the point: there is no reason that 
utilitarianism logically entails that societies must be 
controlled as a whole, let alone by a "public" agent or 
body (where "public" is probably intended as a euphemism 
for 'state'). If anarchy is better at achieving welfare 
than any known alternative then utilitarianism demands it. 
Utilitarianism cannot rule out anarchy on purely logical 
grounds.39
37 Ibid. p.15.
38 Ibid. p.2.
39 More on the inadequate dismissal of anarchy (but mainly 
with respect to liberty and pluralism) can be found in the 
coda at the end of the thesis.
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Scanlon and contractualism
T. M. Scanlon offers us a form of morality that he calls
"contractualism", where:
to believe that a principle is morally correct is to 
believe that it is one which all could reasonably 
agree to and none could reasonably reject.
He holds that the worst-off in a utilitarian scheme could
"reasonably" reject their miserable lot in favour of more
equality. So, unlike utilitarianism, contractualism is
supposed to be non-aggregative.41
This 'rationalist' notion of morality does not capture the 
logical structure of sentiments that characterise 
moralising: feeling partial towards the impartial 
application of some rule about some group (as was explained 
in the section on self-interest and altruism). This 
sentiment does not entail any view on the possibility of 
persuading others in any way. It may be true that people 
who hold moral views feel that others ought to agree with 
them (they may also feel that others ought to agree with 
their views on diet, art, and the nature of liberty) , but 
they need not have any view about the possibility of 
persuading others. Some might well try persuasion and find 
that they cannot talk others into their moral outlooks, but 
they do not thereby need to question their own or others' 
reasonableness.
Scanlon 1982 p.122.
41 Ibid. p.123.
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There is a danger that Scanlon's view will lead to 
intolerance of others on the grounds that they are 
'irrational'.42 These other people's views might then be 
ignored and perhaps the people might be coerced 
(paternalistically or otherwise). So, not only is 
Scanlon's conception of morality mistaken but the notion of 
what can be "reasonably" agreed to can result in vague and 
dangerous intolerance posing as rationalism.
What of Scanlon's application of his principle? In what 
way could the worst-off people "reasonably reject" their 
lot even if it meant lower welfare overall? It is 
certainly "reasonable" (to be expected) that they would 
complain, but in what way is it is "reasonable" to give in 
to them? It looks as though the worst-off are simply 
failing to take an impartial view of welfare for egoistic 
reasons. I cannot see how that makes it "reasonable" to 
give in to them.
In any case, how badly off are the worst-off under 
utilitarianism? If I am right then utilitarianism requires 
the free market and that results in the rich becoming 
richer and the poor catching up (though never reaching 
equality). Can it be advisable to disrupt this process? 
What is the worth of a forced egalitarianism that has the 
result of impoverishing everyone. The utilitarian anti-
People are much less likely to doubt their own 
'rationality'. One is reminded of the Yorkshireman's 
observation to his wife: 'All the world's mad except me and 
thee— and sometimes I'm not so sure about thee.'
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egalitarian case cannot be put comprehensively in this 
thesis (but for some arguments see the later replies to 
Hare and Elster) . The point is that this possibility is 
ignored without Scanlon's arguing or citing anything to 
defend his background assumptions.
Perhaps in the back of Scanlon's mind is the idea that 
utilitarianism can lead to the immiseration of people that 
could be alleviated without great cost to some others.
This may be based on a conceptual error: is he tacitly 
confusing the distribution of wealth with that of utility? 
For if any loss in utility of those with most would result 
(overall and in the long run) in a more than proportionate 
gain to those with least then utilitarianism would sanction 
any wealth redistribution necessary. If no greater gain 
would occur then it is hard to see why there ought to be 
redistribution unless equality is an end in itself. But 
Scanlon gives us no good argument for that thesis.
Hampshire on convention
Hampshire sees moral claims as ’’natural" when they are 
defended by reference to the "universal needs of human 
beings and to their reasonable calculations"; they are 
"conventional" when they are defended by reference to "the 
description of a desired and respected way of life, in 
which these moral claims have been an element thought 
essential ...". He holds that ideally utility and justice 
should converge but feels that:
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The one unnatural, and impossible, cry is the 
consequentialist's 'Away with conventions: anything 
goes provided that it does not interfere with welfare 
or with principles of justice.'
There are next to no universal needs of human beings.
Needs are relative to wants and human beings do not, qua 
human beings, necessarily want anything in particular. It 
is true that the overwhelming majority are likely to want 
space, heat, food, and air (though the suicide does not) . 
And after these four near-universals our tastes begin to 
diverge rapidly. Eventually we reach areas that are grey 
as regards the nature-convention categorisation and then 
see that the distinction is itself a convention: everything 
man does is natural in some sense for he is a natural 
object, and everything he does is conventional in some 
sense for he could choose to forgo it.
Even if we grant Hampshire his distinction it is not clear 
that the consequentialist need have an "unnatural and 
impossible cry". In as far as conventions contribute to 
welfare or cannot easily be changed the consequentialist 
will, respectively, not be against them or will be cautious 
as regards changing them.
Perhaps there is an insight in the idea that some 
conventions might be as good as other quite different ones 
as regards the welfare of the people that have them. But 
preference utilitarianism can happily acknowledge this.
Hampshire 1982 p. 156.
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Elster on sour grapes
Elster asks why want-satisfaction ought to be the criterion 
of desirable social states given that some wants "may be 
shaped by a process that preemts the choice". In 
particular he questions the value of satisfying wants where 
"people tend to adjust their aspirations to their 
possibilities"44 supposedly as in Aesop's fable of the fox 
that could not reach the grapes, so he declared that they 
were sour.
A case taken to be relevant to this idea of "adaptive 
preference"45 is the industrial revolution: could it have 
made people worse off if aspirations overtook material 
gains? If so the cardinal utilitarian is supposed to 
prefer the pre-industrial state, but Elster feels that this 
would be an unacceptable infringement of autonomy.
Ultimately all wants must be "shaped by a process that 
preemts the choice": we cannot choose the creature that we 
are and the world that we are born into; what we are and 
what we meet determines the wants we have. Such 
determinism does not rule out deliberation (or even the 
deliberate cultivation of some wants), but we deliberate as 
we must. So any kind of want must ultimately be based on 
unchosen factors. We cannot have any ultimately freely 
chosen wants.
44 Elster 1982 p.219.
45 Ibid. p.219.
133
Similarly, people are almost inevitably (in practice) going 
to have to "adjust their aspirations to their 
possibilities" (though it is logically possible that 
someone could always get exactly what he wants). The world 
is rarely exactly as we would like it to be, so we are 
forced to make the best of things.
But none of this means that we are likely to readily forget 
what we would have preferred or easily change our attitudes 
to it, as Elster seems to think. We might add a line to 
Aesop's fable with which I suspect Aesop— though perhaps 
not Elster— would agree: "The fox was walking away 
muttering that the grapes were sour and inedible, when 
suddenly the grapes fell to the ground. Immediately, he 
rushed back and devoured them."
If the industrial revolution permanently resulted in 
leaving people with less welfare than before (for any 
reason) then it might46 have been good from a preference 
utilitarian point of view to have stopped it if possible.47
46 It might simultaneously be the case that: 1. the 
industrial revolution left people worse off than they (i.e. 
their great-grandparents, or whoever) were before, and 2. 
any re-arranging of society so that the industrial 
revolution were prevented from being a possible line of 
development would have left people even worse off.
47 There seems a problem with the fact that some— almost 
all?— of the later people might not have existed but for 
any interference: if preference utilitarianism would 
sanction this type of 'creation' of people, then how could 
it stop the slide into the wholesale kind found in Huxley's 
Brave New World? Perhaps it is preference utilitarian that 
we should not deliberately create people against the 
spontaneous wishes of the existing people, but we must take 
account of the fact that some people are bound to be 
'spontaneously' engendered. Even if preference
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The assumption of a malign industrial revolution seems far-
A Q , .
fetched. ° Being far-fetched, as Hare might observe, the 
assumption probably helps to confuse our intuitions. And 
perhaps this is compounded by thoughts on the difficulty of 
seeing how this could have been foreseeable, how it could 
have been stopped without doing more harm than good, why we 
could not more easily choose to dismantle any of the 
'damaging' technological changes and learn that 'less is 
more', or why the minority who think this way cannot set up 
an Amish-style community.
It is hard to see why freedom (considered collectively, as 
Elster does, or individually) should be respected in 
circumstances where we can be certain that it really would 
leave people worse off by their own standards. People 
usually value freedom because it helps them to achieve 
their ends, and they would not have their interests harmed 
by interference if it really did help (though it could not 
help insofar as they have a desire to achieve some end 
without help).
utilitarianism breaks down in this fantasy case, it is not 
clear that this need damn it as a useful criterion of 
welfare in ordinary circumstances.
48 It reminds me of an antithetical, real, anecdote: a 
housewife interviewed in the USSR claimed to pity the poor 
westerners whose abundant goods meant that they never 
experienced the great joy of occasionally attaining some 
hard-to-get commodity like butter or meat— except that she 
wittingly undermined this claim with a final, "Lucky 
devils!"
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Let me give another far-fetched example to show that 
preference utilitarianism would not be obviously 
unacceptable as a view of welfare even if it were to clash 
with liberty (not that I think it does in practice) .
If I could really know that you were about to blow yourself 
up as a result of some great experiment (that another would 
do safely) , then I should, say, drug you, if needful to 
stop you, only if I also knew that you would wish that if 
only you knew the truth (this being preference utilitarian 
by respecting your stronger spontaneous desire to carry on 
living) . And more or less the same should, mutatis 
mutandis, apply to the whole human species if it were on 
course to blow itself up.49
If you or the human species would not wish this, then it 
would not be the utilitarian thing to do. If you or'the 
human species prefer 'noble and heroic' liberty, then it is 
not preference utilitarian to stop you. But if you do not, 
and would wish to be stopped, then it is only I who would 
value the destruction as 'noble and heroic'.
Trq--------------;---------- ;--------
There is a disanalogy between you and the many 
individuals in the human species, especially over 
generations (as discussed in an earlier note) . But I guess 
that preference utilitarianism would not in practice 
sanction interference with people now to increase welfare 
among later people, and I am only finally defending 
preference utilitarianism as a plausible view of welfare, 
and its compatibility with liberty, in practice.
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Rawls on "justice" and utilitarianism
Much has been written on Rawls' theory of "justice".50 
Rather than examine Rawls' paper in Utilitarianism and 
Beyond, Rawls' position in his Theory of Justice51 will be 
sketched and then briefly responded to concentrating on the 
areas that are relevant to general criticisms of 
utilitarianism.
Rawls offers us a thought experiment (the "original 
position"52) in which individuals who are self-interested 
and generally knowledgeable, but deprived of knowledge of 
their own attributes and their place in society, have to 
decide on distributive principles. This set up is supposed 
to ensure that "fair" principles of "justice" are derived, 
as there is no arbitrary discrimination possible.
"Rational choice" is supposed to ensure a concern with the 
worst off (we want to make them as well off as possible for 
we might be them). Rawls feels that sacrificing some to 
maximise aggregate welfare (the supposedly objectionable 
aspect of utilitarianism) is avoided in this "original 
position". It is supposed to yield the principles of 
justice that we already hold deeply— those of social 
democracy (more or less). Rawls' notion of primary goods 
(of which all will want as much as possible) is supposed to
50 It seems unnecessarily confusing to use the legal term 
'justice' to mean something other than the legal sense 
unless one is a natural lawyer— which Rawls is not— but 
that is a side-issue here.
51 Rawls 1972.
52 Ibid. pp. 17-22.
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depend on a conception of a person that is compatible with 
there being many rational conceptions of the good—  
supposedly unlike utilitarianism.53
Utilitarianism does not in principle entail the 'sacrifice' 
of the individual, to which Rawls explicitly objects. That 
is only required if overall welfare increases thereby 
(which this thesis denies occurs in practice). Now Rawls 
is trying to argue at a very basic level, prior to our 
adoption of assumptions about what property rules ought to 
exist. But he does, as a matter of fact (by logical 
implication), advocate sacrifice of the individual— despite 
his protestations to the contrary— in so far as he allows 
for the involuntary use of the more-able by the less-able.
This view is disguised as merely choosing rules for the 
fair allocation of resources. But if X and Y trade 
without imposing a cost on Z (see the third chapter for 
more detail on "imposing a cost") and they are then forced 
to give a share to Z, then their interests are sacrificed 
to Z's (whether this is morally desirable is a separate 
issue). Rawls does defend such scenarios, so he is guilty 
of the very charge (sacrifice of the individual) that he 
wrongly levels at utilitarianism.
What outcome should Rawls' thought-experiment yield? If 
the people in the original position knew their economics 
(as Rawls assumes they do) they would surely opt for
53 Ibid. p.24f.
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market-anarchy as the best way of getting more of what they 
value without risking having their interests sacrificed to 
others or suffering a terrible fate if they are at the 
bottom of the social system. Of course this is a 
contentious and contingent point, but it ought not to be 
any more contentious than Rawls' implicit assumption that 
we can know a priori that we need politics (his assumption 
is examined in more detail in the coda on anarchy, liberty 
and pluralism).
Does preference utilitarianism necessarily have a single 
conception of the good, as Rawls states? It might seem to 
be definitionally true that even preference utilitarians 
hold satisfying preferences in proportion to the strength 
of utility(-as-a-spontaneous-motive) to be the good. But 
this is not so.
Preference utilitarianism can consistently be interpreted 
as a modus vivendi (as it must be if chosen by egoists) . 
Given that people are bound to clash as regards what they 
think is valuable (goods) they may agree to give equal 
weight to the values (or welfare) of each person. This 
does not mean that they must think the values of others' 
matters as much as their own. It is sufficient that they 
think that according equal value to individuals' values is 
likely to achieve a more pleasant world than fighting it 
out. They will maximise their chances for achieving their 
ends in this way. It is enlightened self-interest (in the 
egoistic sense). Thus preference utilitarianism does not 
have to be a theory of the good. It is not that there then
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needs to be a single more fundamental theory of the good; 
everyone can have their own views on what is valuable. 
(Though positive moral approval is likely to make for a 
more stable system in practice.)
Rawls' fundamental intuition is that f,a society" that is 
not ordered by moral principles allows advantages of person 
and position that are "arbitrary from a moral point of 
view."54 But these things are not morally arbitrary given 
that welfare and liberty matter morally (not that it is 
here argued that they do) if the economists this thesis 
seeks to defend are right. For if we look at the results 
of interfering with personal and positional advantages that 
were acquired without imposing costs on others then we see 
that both welfare and liberty are lowered by forcibly 
interfering with them (however "just" one's motives). It 
should be noted that this differs from Nozick's point on 
this issue where he attacks Rawls' for having too thin a 
concept of what constitutes a person.5* The point here is 
that economics indicates that welfare and liberty will 
suffer overall and to almost everyone from such 
interferences even with a "thin" concept of persons.
54 Rawls 1972 p.72.
55 Nozick 1974 p.213.
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2.8 Practical & economic implications
This section mainly tackles the idea that if preference 
utilitarianism is accepted it leads (at least implicitly) 
to all kinds of state-interventions. This includes: Hare's 
background assumptions on discrimination, obeying 
government instructions, voting, equality, and integrity; 
Harsanyi on "preference autonomy" and "anti-social 
preferences"; Mirlees on redistribution of income; Hahn on 
problems for utilitarian "public policy".
Hare on discrimination, electricity and voting
It was agreed that Hare is right that the Nazis could not 
be, in reality, fanatical enough to make it utilitarian 
"not to have Jews around". But in his 'liberalism' Hare 
overlooks the mere wish not to mix with certain types of 
people. This must in practice be tolerated by 
utilitarians. For the desires of aggressive anti­
racialists (or compulsory-integrationists of any sort) are 
also unlikely to outweigh the desires of people who merely 
wish to live in peaceful ways that exclude certain types of 
people.
Compulsory integration is at least as destructive of 
welfare as is compulsory segregation. We can make a useful 
distinction here between racism and racialism. Racism in 
practice (the aggressive imposition of one's racial 
preferences on others) must be stopped in the interests of
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human welfare; racialism in practice (the peaceful personal 
discrimination on grounds of race— in marriage or in 
employment, for instance) must be tolerated in the 
interests of human welfare. The black American economist, 
Thomas Sowell, has argued especially well against various 
anti-discrimination policies on welfare grounds.56 (What 
exactly constitutes 'peaceful personal discrimination' and 
what 'aggressive imposition' should become clearer after 
the development of the theory of liberty in the next 
chapter.)
Hare also attempts to show how to derive the correct 
utilitarian rules for some well known problem cases. From 
the viewpoint of this thesis he fails. On the issues of 
consuming electricity contrary to the government's 
instructions and not voting, Hare says that it cannot be 
correct to allow each individual to calculate that his 
behaviour will make no difference to the others but benefit 
him because:
it would be impolitic, in moral education, to bring up 
people to behave like this . . . nearly everyone would 
consume electricity under those conditions, and hardly 
anybody would vote.
Here what is of interest is a major presuppositional error 
from the point of view of this thesis. Hare is supposing 
that the background assumptions about the political facts 
are uncontentious and that only utilitarianism's correct 
applications require to be sorted out. But if electricity
56 Sowell 1981 and 1983.
57 Hare 1982 pp.36-37.
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is in short supply thanks to a state monopoly then there 
seems no good reason that libertarians or welfarists who 
recognise the inefficiency of a coercively maintained 
monopoly should curtail their consumption (they might even 
care to take the supererogatory act of consuming extra 
electricity if that will hasten the deregulation of the 
industry).
Similarly, if politics is an unnecessary evil, it might be 
better not to vote. Most people stand more chance of being 
run over on the way to the polling station than they have 
of influencing the election (and even if someone's vote 
were decisive he would only get a very crude and mixed 
package of policies). Statistically, it is not worth 
anyone's voting for the purpose of changing things. And it 
might help to undermine the legitimacy of the political 
system if a large percentage of people decline to vote 
(though this could lead to something worse if this were not 
done, and seen to be done, because market-anarchy is 
preferred). Hare's 'utilitarian rules' of "law- 
abidingness" and "public spirit" (as he interprets these) 
have no obvious welfare-merit in these examples of his.
Equality
Hare offers "two important utilitarian grounds for a fairly 
high degree of equality of actual goods (tempered ... by 
various advantages that are secured by moderate 
inequalities)." Diminishing marginal utility means 
"approaches to equality will tend to increase total
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utility" and "inequalities tend to produce, at any rate in 
educated societies, envy, hatred, and malice." So 
utilitarians do not need to "fear the accusation that they 
could favour extreme inequalities of distribution in actual 
modern societies."58
This is a major point as regards the reconciliation of 
welfare and liberty (as defended in the next chapter) .
RQContra Hare, I would suggest that "extreme inequalities" 
(though usually with rapidly diminishing numbers towards 
the extremes) are defensible on several welfare-maximising 
grounds: 1) the necessity for some great incentives; 2) the 
fact that many wealth and income differences are due to 
past or continuing choice; 3) the fact that forcible 
transfers do not seem to reach the ostensible targets. I
shall expand briefly on these points in order to make them
a more plausible position— not in an attempt to provide a 
comprehensive refutation of Hare.
1) All income60-taxes effectively lower the pay for the job
fi 1taxed. If the highest paid jobs are more than
58 Hare 1982 p.27.
KQ
It is not clear what makes an inequality "extreme". If 
Hare means "extreme" in a pejorative sense, then I would 
deny that there are "extreme" inequalities with a free 
market.
60 I avoid a technical discussion on the income versus 
substitution effect here, but concede that it is necessary 
for a rigorous argument.
61 Charitable gifts are quite different from forcible 
transfers: they are a form of voluntary consumption and so 
do not affect incentives as forcible transfers do (in fact, 
preventing them would reduce incentives).
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proportionally taxed then this means that people will be 
that much less likely to do those jobs (though all taxes on 
income will be likely to make working less attractive 
compared with leisure; I do not mean to imply that the only 
objection to progressive taxes is their progressiveness).
If equality is a supreme end then perhaps this does not 
matter much. But this means that jobs that create the most 
welfare are the most discouraged: for people are generally 
paid wages in direct proportion to how far others value 
their product. But it need not be the case that the drop 
in production and hence welfare will be bigger because 
higher-paid people are affected (though this does seem 
likely, especially given that they often organise the 
productive activities of many others or indirectly create 
many jobs) it is enough to defend their higher incomes that 
any money coercively denied them, or transferred from them, 
has no more-productive use. Another thing "diminishing 
marginal utility ... means"62 is that people that are 
already producing valuable products require a greater
• • fi Tincentive to get them to produce more.
62 Hare 1982 p.27.
/TO . ,
The general point can be put more precisely. The exact 
character and quality of what people do is just as
important as, or more so than, what they are paid. Since
taxes can never be neutral, taxation will cause high-income 
producers to shift from one activity to another— the actual 
drop in a given person's income might be slight, but the 
shift in activity might still be of consequence. This is 
true of any taxation but is likely to be true more often, 
or with more serious consequences, with progressive 
taxation, because this will mean a high marginal rate of 
taxation, which will tend to discourage the seizing of 
opportunities to move from a lower-valued activity to a
higher-valued activity. The key point is that taxes,
especially— but not only— heavy and progressive income 
taxes, will cause some activities to fail to be undertaken,
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Another aspect of the incentive-destruction is that 
information is destroyed: even if someone wants to produce 
what is most desired, regardless of the effects on his own 
income, he will not be able to find out what is best if the 
price-signals have been interfered with by taxation. The 
informational content of price signals is a particular 
theme of Hayek's.64
2) With many people the wealth and income differences 
between them is a hopelessly crude indication of how 
satisfying their lives are. Within any particular market- 
society people generally (as a rule of thumb) have the 
material standards that they choose to earn (state barriers 
to trade and migration lower welfare within societies while 
maintaining material differences between societies).
Almost anyone can choose to earn a relative fortune by hard 
work. Common observation shows that long hours in a 
business producing popular family-items is the most certain 
way of achieving material riches. The exceptions to this 
general rule within a society tend to be due to the state's 
aggressively initiating and maintaining material 
differences by enforcing restrictive practices or straight 
transfers to the wealthier.65
and these activities are, prima facie, welfare-increasing. 
(I thank David Ramsay Steele for clarifying this point.)
64 See, for instance, Hayek 1948.
65 For instance, both of these points are corroborated 
prima facie by the annual Sunday Times Magazine's list of 
Britain's wealthiest people.
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3) Redistribution from rich to poor is not practical in any 
case. The evidence suggests that the worse-educated poor 
are typically manipulated into a worse position by the 
better-educated rich.66 And coercive transfers from the
relatively few at the top could not, in any case, add much
• • , 7additional income per person if divided among the rest.
So there is at least a plausible case that the level of 
inequality has to be left to the market if welfare is not 
to be lowered.68
The "envy, hatred and malice" in the presence of 
inequality, that Hare writes of, is mainly due to lack of 
knowledge. Theories that hold the rich businessman to be 
rich at the expense (in some mysterious way) of the poor
are part of the problem. On the contrary, what seems to be
the case is the case: on the market there is a tendency for
people to earn money in direct proportion to how far they 
have made themselves useful to others. As those with 
incomes close to or lower than the mean income together 
spend more than the rich it is usual for the richest 
businessmen to serve them. The surest route to wealth 
seems to be selling in quantity (mass production) and that 
means catering to a market far larger than a rich elite.
see, for instance, LeGrand 1982.
67 See especially N. Barry's discussion and references on 
this in Barry 1981 chapter 3.
68 On the trade-off between total welfare and equality of 
welfare see Okun 1975.
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In a society where these basic economic facts were better 
understood there would be less resentment.
So the preference utilitarian need not "fear" that he will 
be accused of tolerating "extreme inequalities"— for he can 
boast that he does.69
69 Though the welfare-enhancing free market itself is only 
incompatible with equality in the same sense that it is 
incompatible with an infinity of inequal itarian outcomes: 
imposing a particular income distribution— of any kind— is 
inimical to the free market.
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Hare on Williams
Hare makes an interesting point about Bernard Williams' 
views from the viewpoint of this thesis. For criticising 
it brings out the unusual position taken here. Hare 
objects to Williams' persuasively defining "the self-
70centered pursuit of one's own projects as 'integrity'11. 
Hare seems to overlook the utilitarian personal and 
"invisible hand" reasons for respecting a person's 
integrity (or wholeness); for not interfering with 
someone's voluntaristic plans and projects in any coercive 
way, whether in isolated cases or institutionally. It 
would be better to object to Williams' inconsistency, for 
Williams advocates in practice the (welfare-destroying) 
disruption of innocent lives and voluntary associations 
('integrity') to the extent that he advocates any state 
interference that does more than defend people from the 
imposition of costs by others. Thus Williams' position is 
very similar to Rawls' own-goal attack on sacrificing the 
individual to others (discussed earlier).
Harsanyi on morality and rational behaviour
Much of what Harsanyi writes on morality and rational 
behaviour71 is very abstract, and he says little about the 
practical implications by way of elucidation. He seems to
70 Hare 1982 p.29.
71 Harsanyi 1982.
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confuse and conflate stipulative definitions, factual 
claims, and value judgements in an attempt to combine 
philosophy and mathematics rigorously. At points he 
becomes less abstract, and his meaning becomes a little 
clearer. Such points will be criticised.
"Preference autonomy"
Harsanyi claims to be a "preference utilitarian". He sees 
it as fundamental that this version of utilitarianism is 
the only one "consistent with the important philosophical 
principle of preference autonomy" whereby "in deciding what 
is good and bad for an individual, the ultimate criterion 
can only be his own wants and his own preferences." The 
only sense in which someone can want something that is bad 
for him is if "his own preferences at some deeper level are
7?inconsistent with what he is now trying to achieve."
This seems fair enough so far: we can imagine the simple 
case of someone who wants to drink water without realising 
that it is poisoned.
Harsanyi continues that "social utility" must be measured 
in terms of people's "true preferences" rather than their 
"manifest preferences". A person's "true preferences" are 
defined as:
the preferences he would have if he had all the 
relevant factual information, always reasoned with the
72 Ibid. p.55.
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greatest possible care, and were in a state of mind 
conducive to rational thought.
This notion of "true preferences" builds on the idea of the
possibility of persons' wanting what they would agree (in
ideal circumstances) is good for them.
Now the edifice begins to look a bit unstable. First, it 
looks like a (perhaps unintentional) persuasive definition 
to write of "true preferences" here. Even if something is 
what someone would truly prefer in certain ideal 
informational circumstances the fact is that he does not 
truly prefer it now. If we are using plain English then it 
is simply false to say that someone truly prefers what he 
does not prefer as a matter of fact. It would make more 
sense to refer to people's 'ideal preferences' or, more 
simply, 'general interests'.
Then, is Harsanyi intending to go very far beyond such 
examples as that of our poisoned water? In the water 
example the person only has to be told about the poison to 
not want to drink it, or the poison can be later tested for 
and he will thank us even if we forcibly prevented him from 
drinking it at the time. Does Harsanyi intend to include 
preventing people from smoking if they understand the 
likely damage and insist that they are willing to take the 
risk? If so then we do not seem to be dealing with the 
preferences of real people at all but rather the ideal 
people that Harsanyi wished existed instead.
Ibid. p.55.
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There are several other problems with Harsanyi's position. 
There is a problem about "all the relevant factual 
information": as we cannot know everything and cannot know 
what information might affect our preferences the critic or 
philosopher-ruler (for one of these seems implied by the 
notion of measuring "true preferences") of an actual 
preference is only trying to come up with a better guess.
He cannot be sure that he has "all the relevant factual 
information" either. Is he really likely to be better 
placed to guess than the individual whose life it is?
Reasoning "with the greatest possible care" we often still 
make mistakes. And it is often a mistake to invest "the 
greatest possible care" in a decision when there are other 
things to be done in one's own life. So how can any real 
critic hope to achieve this for others?
Is there much 'rationality' left to people in this view?
For if all wants are irrational unless they live up to the 
high standard of being Harsanyi's "true preferences", then 
perhaps most people are 'irrational' most of the time.
So if "social utility" is defined in terms of "true 
preferences" it becomes a highly subjective and impractical 
goal. "Preference autonomy" looks as though it would be a 
highly contentious idea and of little use as a criterion of 
what is happening to welfare. In fact, it does not look as 
though autonomy has any real force in Harsanyi's system, 
despite his praise of the idea. For Harsanyi seems to be 
advocating paternalism, and paternalism just means ignoring
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people's autonomy in order to rule them in their (supposed) 
interests. The idea of "true preferences" looks bound in 
practice to cause rule by a self-perceived (and probably 
self-serving) elite. Harsanyi later mentions the idea of 
voting in a favourable context, so perhaps he thinks that 
the elite should be elected, but he gives little explicit 
indication of "preference autonomy" in action for us to 
give a clearer judgement.
"Anti-social preferences"
Harsanyi goes on to say that he wants to exclude some 
"antisocial preferences" that even he concedes are "true" 
by his definition. These are "sadism, envy, hatred and 
malice." He argues that these things are inconsistent with 
the "general good will and human sympathy" which 
utilitarianism has as "the fundamental basis of all our 
mora1 commitments".7 4
It seems quite un-utilitarian to exclude these things from 
our calculations. We will surely not allow them to decide 
matters except where they give greater satisfaction than 
they cause dissatisfaction (and utilitarianism entails 
taking any long-run effects into consideration, of course). 
Where this is so there will be less welfare (from a 
utilitarian viewpoint) if they are ignored. How can 
utilitarianism sanction a lower amount of utility
74 Ibid. p.56.
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promotion? Harsanyi has no proper utilitarian reason for 
asserting that these emotions should count for nothing.
It should also be noted that there are many non-aggressive 
ways of catering to "sadism, envy, hatred and malice." 
Boxing, satirical magazines, and career success can be (but 
need not be) tools for some of these. In any case, how are 
we to know whether someone's motives for doing one of these 
are "antisocial" (so count for nothing according to 
Harsanyi) or 'social' (so add to welfare)?
Harsanyi holds that Rawls was right to point out that 
traditional utilitarianism is unreasonably strict in 
requiring us to choose every action to maximise social 
utility. This strictness might well be a 
misinterpretation. Harsanyi partly sees this when he 
acknowledges the great value that people put on having free 
personal choice rather than having "unreasonably strict 
moral standards." If this is so then the awfulness of 
being the servant of everyone else's desires always ought 
to have been included in the utilitarian calculation. The 
interpretation of utilitarianism was wrong rather than 
utilitarianism itself.
We can go much further than this and question how much good 
one could do with greater "general good will and human 
sympathy".75 Aggressing against others in their person and 
property is an incomparably great source of the destruction
75 Ibid. p.56.
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of people's welfare. If this alone stopped then the world 
would be a demi-paradise. Going beyond non-aggression to 
extremes of benevolence would have a relatively minute 
effect on the welfare of others. In fact it might often be 
less useful to be benevolent than to be a peaceful profit- 
seeker. In terms of welfare-creation Mother Teresa is a 
far less useful individual by comparison with Mick Jagger 
(the singer), or Edison. (This is, of course, the 
fundamental insight of Adam Smith and the early 
economists.)
Even if we suppose that we were to become hyper-benevolent
it is hard to think what we could do that would do that
much good to others. Give large sums of money to people in
one's own country regularly and you simply encourage them
not to work (as state unemployment benefit does). Send
regular food to people who are being starved by the
policies of their governments and it will undermine the
indigenous farms, or feed the government troops, or reduce
discontent at the policies of the government and thus
enable them to carry on in power a little longer and do
still more harm (Lord Bauer's writings, for instance, are
• 7 6full of evidence and arguments along these lines ) .
If the average person were to spend more than a small 
proportion (I am not claiming that charity does no good at 
all) of his income or time on general charities then there 
would be a very real loss of welfare felt by him and his
See, for instance, Bauer 1971.
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family and only a drop in the ocean to help some (possibly 
uncertain) cause such as cancer research.77
Charity that is not based on personal acquaintance is much 
overrated. It certainly does not provide significant 
welfare by comparison with the market. And the creation of 
a freer market (by scrapping aggressive immigration and 
import controls, and work regulation, and taxation, and the 
state monopoly of the money supply, ... ) would do more 
good than a thousandfold increase in the income of 
charities.
As in the reply to other critics throughout, none of this 
is intended to be a definitive exposition of this position. 
The economic theory and evidence in detail has to be found 
in the relevant books, only a few of which are indicated 
throughout the text and in the bibliography. The point is 
merely that there is a coherent and plausible position that 
utilitarianism is best served by liberty and the market. 
This is usually argued in this thesis in at least as much 
detail as the opposite is argued (or merely supposed) by 
those being criticised.
Mirlees on redistribution
An interesting question is how much income ought to be 
redistributed from those with high wages and salaries 
to those with low wages.78
77 Further utilitarian arguments for this general position 
can be found in the replies to Mirlees (next) and Ryan (in 
the next section).
78 Mirlees 1982 p.63.
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This is a question that Mirlees considers in his defence of 
the economic uses of utilitarianism. He obviously does not 
seriously consider the possibility that there ought to be 
no such redistribution— let alone the possibility that 
there ought to be a redistribution from the low-waged to 
the high-waged in order to reward productivity and punish 
lack of productivity (which may sound as plausible as its 
opposite).
Unlike Hare and Harsanyi, Mirlees seems to be a pristine 
hedonistic utilitarian for he says, "what is good for me 
can be analysed into experiences in different states ...
• • • 7Q . .tied to time and circumstance."7 If this is so then most 
would side against him in favour of having their values 
respected even when they range beyond experienceable time 
and circumstance.
Mirlees makes a plethora of points that are hard to 
evaluate as they stand. Then he suddenly puts his hand
into a footnote-hat and pulls out a state-rabbit: "I want
. . . . • • 8 0  government ministers to try to maximise utility". So he
is defending utilitarianism on the assumption that, if his
defence is successful, it is uncontentious that state
intervention follows (and that state actions will be
successful in their aims).
79 Ibid. p.66.
80 We should have noticed the rabbit's ears when, just 
before, he mentioned evaluating "public [a common 
euphemism for state] policy".
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Using a simplified model of society, Mirlees makes some
supposedly uncontentious assumptions that he argues lead to
radical conclusions for utilitarians. He assumes a society
of two (egoistic) individuals who get the same utility from
income and disutility from work. Incomes are spent on
output from their labour. One of the two can produce twice
as much in an hour as the other can. The law of
diminishing marginal utility is assumed, so:
more income makes extra income less valuable, and less 
work makes extra leisure less valuable. It is also 
reasonable— because apparently realistic— to assume 
that more income would make them more eager to 
substitute leisure for income.
Assuming utilitarianism, it supposedly follows that the 
more productive worker should work more than the other, be 
paid less, and get less utility. For the more productive 
worker can be more productive at less disutility in terms 
of work— but he needs a lower, per hour, income to tempt 
him to do more work, and must receive lower utility than 
the other or he would underproduce (relative to maximising 
overall utility). Mirlees sums this situation up as "from 
each according to his ability, to each according to his 
need."
Mirlees then introduces two factors that begin to make the 
account more realistic: the probability of dissembling by 
the more productive worker; the situation when the 
government can identify them only by the amounts they
Mirlees 1982 p.75.
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produce. He shows that these assumptions entail different
treatment. He concludes that the example "emphasises that
op
utilitarianism can lead to all kinds of inequality". *
First, some points about the basic model's assumptions.
Money is normally so useful (because of all the different 
things we can buy with it) that the diminishing marginal 
utility of it sets in relatively gradually (compared to 
most goods and services), and can be hard to detect over 
relatively long ranges.
Also, a low level of income can make it hardly worth 
working at all, while a high income can make one keen to 
work a great number of hours. Generally, high-income 
people are not noted for their short working hours. They 
certainly do not usually perceive each pay rise as a chance 
to take more time off. And given that leisure does become 
more attractive after a certain point it is usually 
necessary to pay them even more than normal to get them to 
continue to be productive.
So Mirlees' view that in the basic model the more 
productive worker should be paid less and get less utility 
is not as plausible as he asserts even before his 
additional realistic assumptions.
82 Ibid. p.76.
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What Mirlees' basic model comes down to saying is that if 
welfare is interpersonally comparable (as it is here 
accepted it is, in a rough and ready way) then from the 
viewpoint of an impartial welfarist there is no purely 
logical reason that more productive individuals should not 
be forced to share their good fortune with less productive 
ones.
I accept that there is no purely logical reason— but there 
are plenty of empirical reasons, and Mirlees mentions only 
two of them. Mirlees could continue adding realistic 
assumptions to his model until he reached reality, but this 
would probably be much more cumbersome than simply stating 
what policies the government could supposedly take that 
would increase welfare, and seeing whether they stand up to 
criticism. Until Mirlees does this there is no purely 
logical reason to think that utilitarianism does not lead 
to many more kinds of inequality than are dreamt of in his 
philosophy. In fact, there is no purely logical reason to 
think that state-coerced transfers are likely to increase 
welfare rather than lower it. (For more on whether the 
forcible redistribution of wealth is likely to increase 
welfare see the reply to Ryan.)
Mirlees is typical in thinking that if utilitarianism is 
accepted then radical state policies follow 
uncontentiously. The result of this mistake is that the 
work of many welfare economists is mostly mere 
scholasticism as far as libertarian utilitarians are 
concerned.
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Hahn on utilitarian economics
Hahn makes the general points that utility cannot yet be 
aggregated in any unique way (because of the problems of 
cardinalisation and interpersonal comparisons) and that it 
seems wrong to think that utility alone— and not, say, also 
liberty— is an intrinsic good.
Hahn considers three utilitarian problems for the "economic
theory of public policy":
(a) is it reasonable to insist that the utilities of 
agents depend only on the consequences of public 
actions? (b) how are we to evaluate actions designed 
to change the utility functions of agents? and (c) how 
are we to treat the fagt that the consequences of 
actions are uncertain?
In answer to (a) he holds that "my utility may not only 
depend on the consequences of policy but on the policy 
i t s e l f . " H e  supposes various voluntary acts becoming 
compulsory even though we had no intention of not doing 
them. He feels that we could lose utility merely by 
resenting their now being compulsory. He concludes that 
welfare economists have often overlooked the loss of 
utility due to people's attitudes to their rights being 
infringed.
On (b) Hahn asks:
83 Hahn 1982 p.187.
84 Ibid. p.188.
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Why should preferences over preferences be immune to 
changes through policies? ... There seems no 
compelling reason to suppose that there is a 'real' 
and ultimate preference system over a large enough 
domain which is immutable under economic (and social) 
change.
On (c) he discusses the problems of deciding between ex 
ante and ex post measures of utility; in particular, how 
much weight ought to be given to the beliefs of the 
possibly ignorant agents.
On Hahn's general points:
The lack of a unique aggregation thanks to the problems of 
cardinalisation and interpersonal comparisons is not such a 
big issue for the anarchistic approach to utilitarianism. 
These things are big problems only for the welfare 
economist who requires detailed information in order to 
construct a central plan for the economy. Here this 
possibility is rejected because of the economic calculation 
argument. Instead of this approach the free-market 
anarchist can give theoretical economic and empirical 
arguments as to why anarchy is likely to make a better job 
of welfare in its polycentric way. I cannot, of course, 
rehearse all the relevant economic literature here. As an 
introduction to this topic, the welfare superiority of the 
market is fairly comprehensively covered in David
O  £L
Friedman's The Machinery of Freedom.
85 Ibid. p.192.
86 Friedman, D. 1989.
162
On the issue of whether utility alone is a unique good see 
the earlier section on Rawls.
Criticisms of Hahn's answers:
(a) One of the consequences of a policy is how people feel 
about it— as Hahn acknowledges himself. So this ought to 
be included in utilitarian evaluations of policies, as he 
suggests. This solves the problem.
(b) The idea that Hahn apparently has here is that the 
malleability of people's preferences means that there is no 
reason to be limited by any chimerical "'real' or ultimate 
preference system." He seems to be implying that we could 
have more coercive state manipulation ("changes through 
policies") to 'improve' preferences.
But the limits on what is practicable, with even hedonistic 
utilitarianism, is considerably restricted by the fact 
that, contingently, state coercion seems to have malignant 
effects on welfare (the more extreme, the worse the 
effects: the USSR, China, Cambodia). However, non-coercive 
methods of seeking more welfare-enhancing goals means that 
we can use the efficiency of market competition to help us 
make individual choices.
And the preference utilitarian position of this thesis goes 
beyond this and rejects interference in spontaneous 
preferences even if more preferences could thereby be 
satisfied. People would not want to be forced to have non-
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spontaneous preferences just because they are easier to 
satisfy. They would see no good reason to prefer mere 
preference satisfaction (let alone mere psychological 
pleasure) to the satisfaction of their spontaneous 
preferences, so they would not accept that as increasing 
welfare.
(c) Here again, Hahn is supposing that it is a real 
possibility that the welfare economist can systematically 
be in a better position to judge than can autonomous 
individuals. This seems a mere logical possibility that is 
mistakenly held out as real.
2.9 Welfare and individual property rights
This section defends, from explicit attack, the idea that 
individual property rights are compatible with welfare in 
practice. Hammond argues that individual property rights 
and the "right to take risks" constrain welfare 
maximisation. Raz argues that the existence of "inherent 
public goods" are incompatible with individual rights.
Ryan argues that utilitarianism provides a better account 
of property than individual rights can, that there is a 
presumption in favour of equality, and then examines four 
property problems concerning self-ownership, original 
acquisition, taxation, and slavery.
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I do not mean to defend the idea of rights morally, let 
alone the idea that there are natural rights. I am merely 
asserting that particular individual property rights (those 
compatible with liberty— as used in this thesis— and the 
free market) considered merely as social rules do not need 
to clash with preference utilitarianism (also considered as 
a general social rule: maximise the satisfaction of 
spontaneous preferences). This is done by responding to 
three writers who more explicitly deny this possibility 
(though the previous writers examined were also at least 
implicitly against this). Any moral slant that these 
writers exhibit in the guoted passages is ignored as 
irrelevant to the central issue.
Hammond on private risks versus welfare
Hammond is another "utilitarian" who is not interested in 
people's utility but, rather, in what people have "good 
self-interested reasons" for doing. On this basis he 
denies that utilitarianism conflicts with "rights" except
• • • R7when correcting for externalities. We are not given a
clear account of what a "right" is or where it comes from.
The example of an externality that he uses is that:
if everybody cuts down all their trees, this may 
create problems of soil erosion and landslides as well 
as having adverse effects on the local climate.
87 Hammond 1982 p.90.
88 Ibid. p.89.
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It does not occur to Hammond that, in reality, this problem
could be the result of state restrictions on the private
ownership of forests (which would allow the owners to
husband their resources). In fact he suggests that:
the ethical significance of generalised property 
rights has been greatly exaggerated ... with good 
governments ... insistence on [property] 'rights' may 
often be little more than a selfish ploy to influence 
the political process unduly.
"Good governments" and good fairies sound like wonderful 
things. If they exist then we are to be grateful. But do 
they (or could they) exist just because welfare economists 
and story tellers talk about them? Like many welfare 
economists and utilitarians, Hammond starts with a 
theoretical defence of his basic stance (which is not 
disputed at the moment) and then, before one can blink, 
concludes that some detailed aspect of state policy is 
thereby obviously desirable.
A welfarist who is more familiar with the economic 
literature accepted here might be inclined to paraphrase 
Hammond like this: 'The welfare efficiency of private 
property rights has been greatly neglected; with any 
government the insistence on the "public good" may often be 
little more than a ploy by vested-interests to interfere 
with private activity unduly.'
89 Ibid. p.90.
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Hammond suggests, disapprovingly, that Milton Friedman:
views the right to take risks as a kind of property 
right which acts as a constraint on maximising the 
expected value of the ex-post utility function.
There are two important things that Hammond overlooks here.
First, the "right to take risks" is not a kind of property 
right but part of any property right: one owns a thing to 
the extent that one has the right to use it without 
external constraint. If people have the right to dictate 
the level of risks that we take with a thing, then thus far 
they are the owners of it. To dictate any rules of usage 
about things in themselves (i.e. when they are not being 
used to affect the property of others) is to claim to have 
some ownership rights over the things in question. The 
people who think that you do not have a right to sell your 
kidneys must be claiming that you are infringing their 
rights by so doing (or they would not have the right to 
stop you) and so they are claiming a particular ownership 
right in your kidneys (they are not claiming a partial 
share in your kidneys, only a particular ownership right). 
This is ironic where the objection they give to someone's 
selling his kidneys is that it is immoral for anyone to 
have ownership in another's body.
Second, it must at least be logically possible that 
property rights do not act as constraints on welfare so 
much as promote welfare in the most efficient way possible. 
Hammond cannot rule out this possibility without argument.
90 Ibid. p.95.
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Hammond's claim sounds as peculiar to the libertarian 
welfarist as the following claim would to Hammond: 'Hammond 
views the right to do welfare economics as a kind of 
property right which acts as a constraint on maximising the 
expected value of the ex-post utility function.' And 
though I do not think that Hammond ought to be censored 
(for free speech seems the best long-term strategy for 
welfare) I do think that, overall, welfare economists have 
hitherto been a constraint on welfare. So as usual we 
cannot usefully do much more here than point out that he is 
mistaken in his background assumptions. But we can point 
out some of the more obvious flaws in those few areas where 
these background assumptions are occasionally thrust 
forward, as in the following example.
Hammond continues to mock the right to take risks on the
grounds of its entailing:
if one is to be consistent, that the failed capitalist 
has the duty to meet all the consequences of his 
failure, including discharging all his debts, if he 
can, and even selling himself and perhaps his heirs 
too into slavery if necessary.91
He notes that, in fact, the right to go bankrupt exists in
"modern capitalist societies" and that this undermines the
"supposed property rights of other capitalists".
It might have been mentioned on the previous point that 
risks as such are not really a right so much as an 
inevitability in this uncertain world. The only difference
91 Ibid. p.95.
92 Ibid. p.95.
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with the enterpriser is that he often takes risks with 
large amounts of money. Now, one can insure oneself 
against these risks— in a variety of ways— without 
violating the private property of anyone else. Limited 
liability, for instance, is for the most part a contractual 
and voluntary device (the state is involved, but only 
because of its monopoly of the legal system). So logical 
consistency does not require, as Hammond states, that the 
right to benefit from risks implies an enterpriser's duty 
to meet "all the consequences of his failure" (in the sense 
Hammond implies).
It is not a free-market phenomenon that businessmen can 
take risks at others' non-contractual expense. Bankruptcy 
law was brought about by pressure on the state by powerful
. Q 1vested interests: the rising business class. That UK 
travel agents can close down at any time without liability, 
is another non-contractual example. Such things are, for 
the most part, due to state intervention in the market. If 
an enterpriser has not insured himself by contractual and 
voluntary means, then it would seem a free-market outcome 
and prudent utilitarian rule to make everyone completely 
liable for his enterprise's losses.
Selling oneself into full slavery sounds unnecessary. But 
being obliged to become bonded labour for some period 
sounds a possibility. This would probably often involve
 ;  . .
It is not only the "other capitalists" who bear the cost
of bankruptcy: the price of bankruptcy has to be mostly 
passed on to the customers, in higher prices, or worse or 
fewer goods.
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the person's working in a similar occupation to before (if 
that would be legitimate and where his general expertise 
lies) and going home to his family at night. It is 
unlikely to involve working on a plantation and receiving 
regular whippings, or whatever fanciful notion Hammond 
might have in mind. Given the welfare loss that the 
destruction of vast wealth can cause this should not seem 
too terrible a penalty to a hard-headed utilitarian.
The idea that with extreme enough losses strict private 
property rules might entail that one's heirs should become 
slaves is absurd: the risk is the individual's not his 
offsprings'.
Hammond concludes by admitting that, apart from any other 
problems, there is little empirical evidence to help us 
make the interpersonal comparisons necessary to construct a 
social welfare function. That this can eventually be done 
in the detail required to have central planning seems to be 
a presupposition that the economic-calculation argument 
(discussed briefly at the end of the previous chapter) 
shows to be impossible. But we can look at economic 
theory, and the before-and-after welfare effects of 
different policies in a country, and the general welfare of 
societies that try different economic policies. And here 
the evidence (some of which is in the books in the 
bibliography) is that state interference is a spanner in 
the works.
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Raz on "inherent public goods" versus individual rights
Joseph Raz calls "inherent public goods 'collective
Q dg o o d s H e  argues that:
given the intrinsic desirability of some collective 
goods, it is reasonable to conclude that morality is 
not right-based. 5
An immediate reply is to note that even if (and it is a big 
'if') there are significant intrinsically public goods this 
does not automatically entail that a state is necessary to 
provide them (a private trust could be set up in some 
cases) or that they could be provided at all. A further 
reply is to point to the literature arguing that there are 
few if any significant public goods.96
Having, of necessity, referred away the details of that 
enormous economic topic we can look at some typical 
examples of illiberal assumptions in Raz that can be more 
easily dealt with.
Raz tells us:
It is a public good, and inherently one that this 
society is a tolerant society, that it is an educated 
society, that it is infused with a sense of respect 
for human beings, etc.
94 Raz 1985 p.47.
95 Ibid. p.53.
96 T. G. Palmer's A Student's Guide to Classical Liberal 
Scholarship has a useful list. (Published by The Institute 
for Human Studies, at George Mason University.)
97 Raz 1985 pp.46-7.
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When "society" is tolerant, educated, and has respect for 
human beings this only means that the individual members 
are generally this way. "Society" is not an individual 
moral agent or organic whole; some such view seems to be 
partly causing Raz's position. And 'public' goods are 
often considerd non-excludable when produced. But the 
individual members of any society are quite capable of 
withholding their personal tolerance, education and respect 
from those whom they do not wish to benefit from these. If 
these things are public goods in any significant sense then 
it is not obvious and Raz ought to argue the case.
Raz also holds the apparently oxymoronic view that "the
ideal of personal autonomy is incompatible with moral
individualism"98 This becomes explicable when we see that
for Raz "the ideal of personal autonomy . . . requires not
99merely the presence of options but of acceptable ones."
Raz obviously has some idea of autonomy as getting your own 
way in things that really matter (or ought to matter) to 
you. Such an approach is not unusual. But self-rule 
(autonomy) cannot sensibly entail "acceptable" options, 
especially where these mean the right to do things at the 
expense of others. If I am not being imposed on by anyone 
(and I am alive) then I must be ruling myself (however bad 
a ruler others may think I am) .
98 Ibid. p.52.
99 Ibid. p.51.
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A more sensible use of 'autonomy' would seem to make it 
synonymous with 'liberty' in the sense of this thesis 
(developed in the next chapter): of not having costs 
imposed on one. With his "autonomy" Raz is taking a term 
with a clear etymological meaning and twisting it to mean 
something that, in practice, will reguire coercive 
interference with people that are not imposing on anyone: 
his "autonomy" is really an attack on autonomy (not that 
Raz is alone in defining autonomy this way). He explicitly 
says that "it would be wrong to postulate a right against 
coercion, for example, as a right to autonomy ...".10°
Raz continues:
At least some of the social conditions that constitute 
such options are collective [inherently public] goods. 
The existence of a society with a legal profession or 
with recognised homosexual marriages is a collective 
good, for the distribution of its benefits is not 
voluntarily controlled by anyone other than the 
potential beneficiary.101
How is the legal profession a public good? How is it that
people cannot (admittedly with Legal Aid some do not) be
made to pay for the services of lawyers? It is
(unfortunately) true that we have state courts (if that is
what Raz has in mind), but there is nothing in principle to
stop their charging people individually. Perhaps he has in
mind the statist (Hobbesian) argument that the only way we
can enjoy the benefits of law and order is by subjection to
10?a coercive state. But Molinan, Rothbard and Friedman
100 Ibid. p.54.
101 Ibid. p.52.
102 Molinari 1977, Rothbard 1978, Friedman, D. 1989.
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(to name but three) have made out plausible cases that 
private provision is not only possible but far superior.
It is also true that a state monopoly of the law means that 
the state alone decides whether to institute homosexual 
marriages, but there is nothing about this that means that 
if instituted they must be provided free for to all who ask 
for them (as would definitionally be the case if they were 
really public goods).
Raz adds that "self-determination is not merely a public
i mgood but a collective one."A J
It is a statist assumption that "self-determination" is 
good at all. When statists use this term they, again, do 
not mean what the words seem to literally mean: 'the right 
of an individual to determine his life for himself'. They 
mean the right of a nationally defined state (rather than 
any foreign state) to impose its will on the population.
So this understanding of 'self-determination' (though 
popular) looks just as tendentious and perverse as Raz's 
view of 'autonomy'.
Ryan on ownership
Ryan argues for the superiority of utilitarianism over 
rights in defending property. He gives his general 
position and then analyses four hard cases.
103 Raz 1985 p.53.
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Ryan does not see how property rights can flow from the
nature of liberty. For him the law merely gives us legal
claims that can be removed without doing wrong provided
there is due compensation:
Suppose a mine owner buys his mine in good faith, and
some years later has to give it up upon
nationalisation. There is no injustice in this and no 
important loss of liberty .. . what the coal-mine owner 
cannot fall back on is any cry equivalent to 'it's my 
coal mine'.104
The general theory of liberty and how property is derived 
from liberty is best left to the next chapter where it is
explained in detail. But we can proceed on the assumption
that general account is not essential for applying the 
conception of liberty (as non-imposition of costs) to 
Ryan's more specific examples. On the coalmine example I 
merely observe here that Ryan may be presupposing that 
there is no great practical problem about nationalisation 
in terms of efficiently producing welfare— a view that has 
generally gone out of favour and would require considerable 
argument.
The immediate effects of equality
Ryan goes as far as holding it to be obvious that:
At any given moment, there would be an increase in 
welfare if we were to divide up everything equally; 
but to do it would set at risk the environment ... we 
rely on to create the wealth . ...105
104 Ryan 1985 p.182.
105 Ibid. p.183.
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It is good that Ryan's egalitarian preference is at least 
modified by some grasp of the wealth-creating aspects of 
the free market; but would equality even be immediately 
("at any given moment") welfare-enhancing? In what follows 
we examine this specific claim that equality could 
realistically increase welfare at least "at any give 
moment", as that seems to be the thin end of Ryan's 
egalitarian wedge.
Even if we suppose that the proportion of any given 
population with more than average wealth could be forced to 
accept such a redistribution without bloodshed (a 
considerable supposition), would the remaining people 
really be likely to gain as much as the losers lose?
Wealth transfers are not the same as utility transfers. 
Property is usually tied up in personal ways that are of 
particular value to the owner. It seems likely that 
thieves (plus their eventual customers, if any) usually 
gain a value smaller than the value of the object to the 
original owner. Theft would increase the 'national 
product' if this were the other way about. Overall wealth 
(in the general sense of what is of value to people) is 
usually destroyed by taking things by theft (but increased 
by trade, where both sides gain). So it is not at all 
obvious that there would be even an immediate gain in 
utility in the event of mandatory equalisation.
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Ryan might say that such forcible property redistribution
is unnecessary for money could be given to people in
proportion to their lack of wealth. This could not be
practical. If this were done by printing money this policy
would merely create a great price inflation. Those with 
above-average wealth would not sell their real assets to 
the new 'rich'. Prices would rise to take account of the 
inflated currency. (I assume that taxation of income would 
be impracticable as it could not be high enough to achieve 
the immediate equality Ryan has in mind.)
It is true that some would still be able to buy (for this 
immediate period at least) somewhat more than they would 
otherwise have had the money to do. They would enjoy some 
windfall gain. But what of the 'windfall loss' (which by 
definition cannot be anticipated) of the proportion who 
lose by this redistribution? Windfall gains are usually a 
small source of utility in anyone's normal lifestyle. A 
similar loss is usually a more than proportionate disaster. 
The things we normally budget for are threatened. We have 
to tighten our belts uncomfortably to cope with the loss.
If this were not so then we would expect people to 
regularly gamble large amounts when the odds were even.
For instance, the two of us (on equal incomes) would think 
it a good bet to allow the toss of a coin to decide who 
gets both monthly salaries. This is not normal behaviour.
Imagine a single fairly extreme example. Take a 
professional person undoubtedly above the average income 
for even the UK and imagine suddenly merely taking a
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month's salary from him and giving it to someone as poor as 
an alcoholic beggar sleeping rough.
All the wealthier person's normal financial arrangements 
will be in disarray. He will have to drastically juggle 
with his bills and go without many of the items he usually 
buys. Beggars often choose to live rough and look down on 
those who work all day to pay for a house to sleep in. The 
beggar could get a job day-labouring if he chose and sleep 
in a Salvation Army hostel (where there are usually empty 
beds) . He does not so choose and he is unlikely to change 
his ways. He will probably do with the windfall what he 
normally does when he collects his fortnightly Department 
of Social Security cheque (at least, the homeless used to 
be able to get this state benefit): he will spend it on 
expensive drink and not bother to return to begging until 
it is spent. He might drink more than usual and go without 
begging longer— that is all. Without this transfer the 
beggar would have continued drinking on the income from his 
begging that people give without resentment or feeling a 
great loss. It is hard to see any overall gain in utility 
in this forcible transfer. (I do not mean to sound 
censorious about begging and drinking away the money as 
such.)
What if we took half the wealthier man's property and gave 
it to the beggar? The beggar would stay drunk much longer. 
Meanwhile the poor devil who has lost half his house and 
possessions is having his normal life utterly disrupted.
Can an impartial utilitarian really see this as even an
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immediate increase in overall utility between the two? It 
is at least not obvious here that the immediate effects of 
equality must increase utility.
The beggar example was chosen because it seemed that if a 
forcible transfer of income were not utilitarian in such an 
extreme case, then the argument against milder cases must 
be stronger still. But perhaps the example of the beggar 
has peculiarities. Suppose, instead, one took a small 
proportion of the income of a very rich man and divided it 
among 50 factory workers. Would there be a likely increase 
in immediate utility? Perhaps. But on a society-wide 
scale (which is what Ryan is supposing) there are certainly 
not enough very rich men for every fifty workers to make 
this obviously the case.
It is not as obvious as Ryan supposes that more equal 
wealth on a society-wide scale would "at any given moment" 
increase welfare; in fact, it seems quite plausible that it 
would decrease welfare. Perhaps the largest factor 
preventing the increase is people's expectations. This was 
seen by David Hume.106 People are more upset by failing to 
receive that which they are expecting, relying on, and 
think is properly theirs, than the reverse. Of course, if 
people did not have such expectations, then total utility 
might go up initially (provided that the price of 
redistribution did not itself destroy too much wealth).
But in reality they do, and Ryan was writing of reality.
iu6 Hume 1968 Bk III p.219.
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So Ryan is not being cautious enough when he suggests that 
it is "wrong to attempt anything more than slowly operating
, , , i f)7 ,
methods of redistribution.1 If there is no good reason 
to think that equality at "any given moment" will raise 
welfare then Ryan has not given us a good reason that 
equality is any kind of ideal welfare goal to be cautiously
approached. In fact he has not given us any reason to
think that libertarian private property rights are 
incompatible with property based on the promotion of 
welfare.
Four property problems
Ryan goes on to look at four fundamental problem cases for
rights and utility (his order is changed in order to answer
them in a more convenient sequence, though there is still 
some unavoidable overlap in the topics) : 1) whether we own 
our own bodies; 2) original acquisition of property; 3) 
taxation; and 4) the legitimacy of slavery. All of these 
are dealt with generally in the following chapter, but here 
I deal with Ryan's specific points about why these are 
supposedly more of a problem for a rights theory than for 
utilitarianism.
1) Whether we own our own bodies
Rights over our own bodies come as close as anything 
can to being natural rights. Even to walk down the 
street presupposes that I have the right to move my
107 Ryan 1985 p.184.
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legs in the appropriate fashion. It's hard to see 
what rights would be like at all if they did not 
include rights over one's body— but it's not hard to 
see how there could be such rights and no property 
rights.108
How "rights over our own bodies" are derived from the 
principle of liberty is explained fully in the following 
chapter. Briefly: liberty is the absence of imposed costs, 
and people impose a cost on us if they try to control us 
without our consent. Here we focus on other points Ryan 
makes.
First we ought to note that moral rights do not need to be 
thought of as natural rights and so— unlike natural rights- 
-can easily be made sense of (not that we are here 
defending them as moral, of course): if I say someone has a 
right to use his own body as he sees fit I need only mean 
that it seems immoral to interfere with his body without 
his permission. This need be based on nothing more than a 
moral sentiment: such interference feels wrong; nobody 
should do that. Ryan implicitly believes in at least one 
moral individual right himself: the right to equal 
consideration in the production of welfare. This is 
ultimately based on a moral sentiment too. (And this moral 
right to equal consideration in the maximisation of want- 
satisfaction— irrespective of its content— looks like the 
sort of "abstract right" Ryan later dismisses in 2 
[below].)
108 Ibid. pp.192-193.
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Having property can just be having rights (whether legal or 
moral) of use and control over things. To the extent that 
we have the right to use and control we have property 
rights. So, contra Ryan, it is impossible to see how there 
could be such rights and not property rights. To the 
extent (I am not arguing here how far, if at all, that is) 
that I have the right to use and control 'my body'— the 
body that is me— it is also 'my body' in a propertarian 
sense. (Though property can also exist in the objective 
sense that someone has the use and control of something 
whether or not he has a legal or moral right to that use 
and control. See the next chapter on this point.)
We are then told that compulsory transplant surgery "treats 
people as a mere means to an end ... I do not think 
utilitarianism can do very much to accommodate the idea 
that this is intolerable [emphasis added]11 though it can 
"do a good deal to embrace the same conclusions as the 
theorist of the right to respect as a person would reach.
If people just do passionately mind .. that launches the 
utilitarian case ...".109
Here Ryan seems at odds with his general theme that 
utilitarianism is clearer than rights in the defence of the 
issues he focuses on (perhaps he thinks that utilitarianism 
goes at least some way to defend self-ownership while 
rights are really hopeless because 'mysterious' or
109 Ibid. p.193.
'irrational'). So perhaps we can also defend 
utilitarianism on this issue better than Ryan does.
The practical hazards of, and passionate objections to, 
making transplant surgery compulsory do seem to make it 
'intolerable' from a practical welfare viewpoint. Ryan 
more or less sees this but seems to be asserting merely 
that it is logically possible that utility could tolerate 
this compulsion. Even if compulsion really would help 
people live longer, they could still freely opt into a 
system of compulsion that, say, contractually bound them to 
the results of a spare-part lottery but guaranteed them a 
better statistical chance of a longer life. It would 
probably not be necessary, or utilitarianly possible, to 
include people that passionately wanted to take their own 
risks. Ryan certainly offers no practical conflict between 
utility and property rights derived from liberty here— so 
there is no challenge to the practical compatibility 
thesis.
2) Original acquisition of property
Ryan writes that with original acquisition there is a
temptation to think that the first user:
has mixed what was his with what was nobody's and 
thereby made it his too. It should not be a strong 
temptation, though, since the sense in which our 
actions are OUJTS is not much like the sense in which a 
car is ours.
110 Ibid. p.187.
By using unowned resources we use our actions to invest in 
them in a fairly plain sense of investment: we make an 
effort with the hope of reaping the rewards of that effort. 
The labour is obviously 'ours' in the attributive sense: we 
are labouring, not someone else. Ryan sees this sense.
But the labour is also 'ours' in a propertarian sense if we 
are self-owners and have not contracted to work for 
another. By contrast, the employee's actions are 'his' 
attributes though the investment made with them is no 
longer 'his' property. This ambiguity is not apparently 
seen by Ryan as he rejects (in the previous example and the 
one about slavery, later) any plain sense in which people 
can be seen as owning themselves (so this answer must be 
supplemented by the replies to those problems).
If we are self-owners then our actions are ours in the 
sense that we have a right to make them and no one else has 
a right to dictate them. From a liberal perspective, we do 
own the right to freedom of movement as part of owning 
ourselves in just the same way that we own the right to do 
what we like with our cars as part of owning our cars: we 
can do what we like with what is ours in so far as we do 
not impose undue costs on others.
Ryan writes that the other idea in this issue is seeing
that people intend to become owners and respecting this
intention. He thinks this approach is more or less based
on "respect for persons" which "is altogether too like the
illdoctrines of 'abstract right' that Mill deplored."
111 Ibid. p.187.
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"Respect for persons" is vague. The liberal idea is the 
more precise respect for their liberty. This is not vague 
in the account given in this thesis. Ryan is right to see 
that utilitarianism can also go a long way to defending 
original acquisition as a good property rule; he merely 
fails to see how this property rule is compatible with 
liberty as the non-imposition of costs (as defended in the 
next chapter).
3) Taxation
Ryan writes that "taxation is a forced contribution to 
social costs".112 It would be clearer to write that 
taxation is a forced contribution to the state. What the 
state spends the money on is immaterial to whether or not 
the forced contribution is taxation. The expression 
"social costs" (in Ryan's usage113) seems a collectivistic 
euphemism that is intended to imply that taxation benefits 
society.
We are 'reassured' by Ryan that:
viewed in the utilitarian framework, there is no 
particular anxiety about the status of taxation 
generally; it is not that we have a property right to 
our incomes and then reluctantly hand over some 
portion to the government. Morally, as opposed to 
legally, there is no reason to think that we have that 
sort of right to our pre-tax incomes; rather we are
112 Ibid. p.191.
113 In economics 'social costs' means the sum of all 
private costs.
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entitled to some share in the net proceeds of social 
collaboration ....114
We are again dealing with mere logical possibility. There 
is no logical inconsistency in being a utilitarian and 
advocating taxation, but the new laissez-faire economists 
provide plenty of practical reasons for thinking that 
taxation destroys welfare. And Ryan again fails to see 
that ownership is an aspect of liberty. So from practical 
utilitarian and libertarian positions we do have reasons 
"to think that we have that sort of [property] right to our 
pre-tax incomes".
Consider Ryan's collectivistic description of the sum of 
individual wealth in a society as "the proceeds of social 
collaboration". In one sense this is not nonsense: one can 
aggregate "the proceeds of social collaboration" if one 
wishes. But society is not the single enterprise that Ryan 
seems to be implying with this expression. It might seem 
to an alien from another planet that humans are like 
termites in their interactions, but this is not so. There 
is not a single goal but a different goal for every single 
interaction between people. If there are trades between 
persons A and B, B and C, and C and A they do not sum to a 
single arrangement. None of them ends up thinking of 
himself as having a share in the "proceeds of social 
collaboration" for at any stage each has the fruit of a 
trade between particular consenting individuals.
114 Ibid. p.191.
Ryan's implication— that anyone who ends up with less than 
anyone else might have been short-changed in a single 
process— might look more obviously questionable given a 
non-financial example. Suppose someone claims that 
sleeping with women is part of the "proceeds of social 
collaboration" and that he is not sleeping with his share. 
It is true that no one would have any profits or sexual 
intercourse without social interaction. This does not 
obviously imply that voluntary trade and voluntary sexual 
encounters should be supplemented by compulsory 
redistribution of money or sexual partners. It is, again, 
logically possible that utilitarianism might require both, 
but it seems to be prejudicing the issue in a strange (and 
horrible) way to describe such ultimately individualistic 
utility gains as the "proceeds of social collaboration".
Finally, Ryan rejects the position of the rights-theorist 
who asserts:
people just are originators of value, creators of 
moral worth in the world, and begetters of their own 
projects" though "this is what with luck and good 
social design they may become . ...1
As Ryan does not cite any specific opponents it seems best 
to try to make sense of what he says and give only a brief 
reply. He is apparently denying that people have any 
spontaneous values, and morals, and know what they want— so 
state-engineering ("good social design") should decide 
which values, morals, and projects to create in people.
115 Ibid. p.192.
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But let us take the extremest example of someone in the 
power of another: a slave. A slave is not the 
psychological puppet of his master: he cannot value, or 
moralise, or want to achieve something because his master 
tells him to; he can only make his actions conform with his 
master's demands. It seems a fact of human nature that 
people have to value, moralise and act for themselves— even 
when their options are severely limited by the threats and 
coercion of others.
And the history of this century is a testament to the 
unintended welfare-destruction that is caused by attempts 
at the state-engineering of these things.
4) The legitimacy of slavery
The defence of leaving people to do as they choose is 
not based on the thought that they 'own' themselves 
. . . There is no natural ownership, whether of 
ourselves or of others .... 16
Perhaps the only or best defence of "leaving people to do 
as they choose" is not that people think of themselves as 
self-owners. But the idea that people own themselves might 
well be what causes most people to think we should leave 
people alone, and Ryan seems to be denying this. A 
philosophy lecturer at the LSE once asserted that self­
ownership is a strange idea and no one thinks that he owns 
himself. I suggested that any student at the lecture who 
thought that he owned himself should raise his hand. As
116 Ibid. p.189.
far as I could see, every student raised his hand. I 
cannot be sure what arguments the students would have put 
for their self-ownership, but the following is a simple one 
that they might have assented to. Most would accept that 
slavery is where one person is owned by another. By 
natural extension, the abolition of slavery must result in 
the slave's coming to own himself— as all free persons do.
What people do not usually do— with adults at least— is a 
welfare calculation to defend their self-ownership.
(Though this presumption of self-ownership may well be the 
result of previous, socially absorbed and largely 
overlooked utilitarian effects. If we thought we would be 
happier as slaves then we might take this to be the most 
natural thing.117) Most philosophers are probably not that 
different from other people in this respect.
There may be no 'natural right' to self-ownership in any 
God-given or morally objective sense, but slavery is 
'unnatural' in the sense that it is statistically rare, 
usually takes a state to enforce it, and people usually see 
themselves and others as unquestionably self-owners.
Ryan then writes that a person "cannot be a real slave in 
the absence of a legal system that recognises the 
servitude".118
117 I thank Jon Le Cocq for this Hayekian idea.
118 Ryan 1985 p.189.
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In the news in the 1980s there were several accounts of men 
(usually in the backwoods of the USA) who had kidnapped 
women and made them completely subservient to them until 
detection by the police, or the death of the women. These 
women were de facto slaves. There seems no good reason to 
think that one need be a de jure slave to be "real slave".
A de jure slave may actually be living free despite his 
being legally owned and so he looks more like someone who 
is not a "real slave".
Ryan asserts that if someone contracts into slavery:
we ought not to side with his 'owner' if he [the 
slave] changes his mind ... it is not that we stop 
people doing what they naturally can, but that we 
decline to provide institutional sanctions . ...n<*
I shall not attempt to make out a comprehensive practical 
utilitarian case for respecting slave contracts. I would 
expect voluntary slavery to be entered into very rarely 
(the history of slavery is overwhelmingly one of non­
contractual coercion of even the poorest people) and very 
circumspectly (with legal limits on the treatment of the 
slave) . To disallow any such rare contracts would leave 
both parties worse off in their own opinions (or they would 
not seek to make the contract) . And to prevent the 
continuing enforcement of the contract would stop other 
welfare-enhancing slave contracts from being made. This 
argument might well not sound convincing to those not 
convinced of the general welfare effects of strict 
libertarian property rights. But I do not think slavery
119 Ibid. p.189.
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would be a big issue in practice and Ryan himself supplies 
no utilitarian argument for his view (that "we ought not to 
side with his 'owner'") for me to argue with.
Ryan also seems to be presupposing a monopolistic state 
legal system. If the state leaves people to themselves 
they will "naturally" (i.e. it is absurd to think they 
would usually behave in any other way) pay for the legal 
sanctions that are necessary to protect their property 
(including any slaves) on the free market. So what Ryan's 
state would do (or does do) is positively prohibit people 
from providing the private legal protection they would 
otherwise buy. The state does not merely "decline to 
provide institutional sanctions"; it aggressively disrupts 
the spontaneous market-provision of these sanctions.
Ryan concludes:
there may be some rights ... for which utilitarianism 
cannot offer a very compelling rationale. But such 
rights are not property rights. Of those rights that 
are genuinely property rights, utilitarianism gives 
the plainest and most compelling account we have.12
The above replies to Ryan should show that he has offered 
no rights (at least from a libertarian viewpoint) for which 
in practice "utilitarianism cannot offer a very compelling 
rationale", and that all rights logically must be property 
rights: all rights are (legal or moral) claims to certain 
uses of things— and to have such claims is to have 
property.
120 Ibid. p.193.
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Ryan's arguments have not shown that the abstract principle 
of maximising utility is (compared with the principle of 
respecting individual liberty) clearly the "plainest and 
most compelling account" of property rights. The 
literature discussed in this chapter and the next, shows 
that both utilitarian and libertarian arguments about 
property rights are complex and highly debatable, but that 
the conclusions may be the same in both cases.
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3. Voluntarist Social Liberty
3.1 Chapter thesis
The voluntarist conception of social liberty as the absence 
of costs imposed on people by people, and maximising 
overall liberty, withstands criticism and is in practice 
compatible with the conceptions of welfare and rationality 
used in this thesis. In practice, maximising voluntarist 
liberty entails side-constraint libertarianism, which the 
free market spontaneously provides.
3.2 Chapter introduction
This chapter will first give a brief account of the 
conception of voluntarist liberty. Then there is a 
discussion of two general criticisms of the idea of 
'imposed costs'. There follows an examination of some 
current basic unclarities in the libertarian camp as to the 
nature of liberty. Then the conception of liberty will be 
applied in a state-of-nature manner to show how property 
rights can be derived from liberty in a variety of 
situations. I regard this derivation as essentially 
Lockean1 but clearer and more explicitly about human 
liberty, with a clearer account of initial ownership than 
mixing labour, and shorn of any theological aspects.
1 Locke 1966.
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Much of this derivation is only intended to show that the 
conception of liberty makes sense and can give determinate 
solutions in principle to various problems. This is 
important because it shows that the sophisticated free 
market (with its fairly strict private property rights) is 
not inherently entailed by the definition of liberty and 
that extra conventions are not needed to arrive at 
determinate liberal solutions to problems.2 That this 
derivation may sometimes have the air of amateurish 
jurisprudence is to be expected, for this is an attempt to 
apply a controversial interpretation of the liberal 
principle instead of some well-established legal
, , “5  , , ,
principle. There is no attempt to build up to a realistic 
picture of society (and many state-of-nature problems will 
be left until they are posed by critics) though realistic 
analogies will sometimes be obvious or spelled out. Mainly 
where the situations have a more realistic aspect will the 
issue of the compatibility with welfare be raised.
After this the problems and criticisms of two writers will 
be used to further elucidate and test the strength of the 
conception of liberty. The compatibility with welfare will 
again arise but to a far lesser degree than in the previous 
chapter as the real issue here is making the theory (the
 :----Though conventions can arise liberally (such as eating a
restaurant meal without explicitly contracting to pay) and 
it can then become illiberal to flout them (say by eating 
and then not paying).
T . . .There are various difficult cases, and I am not at all 
convinced that I have always applied this liberal principle 
correctly.
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conception and applications) of liberty clear. The first 
writer is David Friedman who, though an anarcho-capitalist, 
cannot see how liberty itself can entail the solution to a 
list of problems in his book The Machinery of Freedom.4 
Then there is John Gray who seems to have been a classical 
liberal until he finally decided that various philosophical 
problems with liberty make this position untenable. His 
book, Liberalisms,5 provides a comprehensive list of 
philosophical problems about liberty that complements that 
of Friedman's.
No distinction is made between 'liberty' and 'freedom' and 
the various words having the same linguistic routes. And 
'liberal' and 'libertarian' are used synonymously (though 
historically many ideas associated with 'liberalism' do not 
fit the account of liberty in this thesis).
3.3 Voluntarist social liberty
The idea of social liberty that we want to capture is that 
people are free to the extent that they interact 
voluntarily: without the imposition of coercion, fraud, 
theft, and such like; without being interfered with or put 
upon by other people. This sense of liberty is supposed to 
be the opposite of tyranny or totalitarianism. This is 
supposed to be the liberty that libertarian ideology is
4 Friedman, D. 1989.
5 Gray 1989.
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concerned with.6 We want a clear way of expressing this 
idea that is capable of dealing with difficult cases. As 
far as I can tell, no one has hitherto provided an adequate 
account of liberty in this sense. This failure is 
particularly striking and ironic among those calling 
themselves 'libertarians'.
A contrast with this sense of social liberty as the 
opposite of tyranny is liberty as a mere zero-sum game 
whereby any loss in my social liberty must be exactly 
balanced by an increase in the social liberty of others: if 
I lose the liberty of free speech then this must mean that 
others gain the liberty to keep me quiet. This position is 
even reached by the libertarian philosopher Hillel 
Steiner.7 Such 'liberty' cannot be defended or promoted; 
it can only be only fought over. Unfortunately, many 
people unwittingly use 'liberty' in a way that entails this 
vacuous sense (the expression 'liberty to ... ' is often 
used this way) and as a result people's substantive liberty 
and welfare tend to suffer.
'Liberty' signifies the absence of some sort of constraint 
on something. The topic here is social liberty: the 
absence of constraints on people by other people. We are 
not interested in constraints that were accepted 
voluntarily. These have to be regarded as really being
As found, for instance, in the writings of Murray 
Rothbard, David Friedman, Thomas Szasz, the Libertarian 
Party in the USA, and the Libertarian Alliance in the UK.
7 Steiner 1983.
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self-constraints. We are only interested in constraints 
that were imposed without consent. There are many 
different types of constraint that people might impose on 
each other. We want to cover as many types as possible.
The economic use of subjective cost (as opposed to benefit)
• Q ,seems to catch this broad meaning. So we can define 
'liberty' as 'the absence of imposed costs'. The idea of 
costs is here relative to the person's spontaneous desires, 
and so this is linked with the conception and defence of 
welfare in the second chapter. This rules out conceptions 
of 'positive liberty' that involve 'paternalism'. The idea 
of not imposing costs is obviously something like J. S.
. . .  . QMill's principle of not causing others "harm". In what 
follows 'costs' should prove a clearer concept.
Such liberty admits of degrees: we can say that someone has 
liberty to the extent that costs are not imposed on him.
And the libertarian policy will be to minimise imposed 
costs. This may now sound rather obscure and unlike the 
common view of liberty we are attempting to capture. That 
should be due only to the language needed to make that 
common view more precise. The common view of liberty given 
above should be visible throughout the following chapter as 
this definition is applied and then defended in dealing 
with criticisms and alternative conceptions.
t;-------------- ;-----
Those economists steeped in the idea that 'cost' means 
'opportunity cost' may prefer to translate 'cost' as 
'burden' throughout.
9 Mill 1974.
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It should be noted that no particular system of property 
rights is necessarily entailed by this view of liberty. 
Neither is it logically necessary that voluntarist liberty 
maximises welfare (in the sense defended). However, this 
does not show that these things are purely 'empirical' 
matters, and so ought to be left entirely to the social 
scientists. We already have much of the requisite social 
scientific evidence. The task is to establish links 
between such evidence and the conceptions being defended. 
There are logical relations among these conceptions and the 
evidence that are not obvious and which need defending; and 
there are some putative logical relations which are 
mistaken and need attacking.
3.4 Two criticisms of minimising imposed costs
The idea that the libertarian policy is to minimise imposed 
costs may be unclear, so some further elaboration before 
applying this seems desirable. This will be done by 
looking at two important criticisms: that this notion is 
impractically unclear and value-laden; and that it could 
entail partial mob rule.
Impractically unclear and value-laden?
In many cases cost is ranked intrapersonally. The 
individual alone decides what he finds to be a greater or 
lesser cost to him. Only when there is a clash of
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interests with two persons being a cost to each other might 
interpersonal comparisons of cost be required. And should 
the people involved come to an agreement about a solution 
then there is no imposition in any case (see the later 
section on contracts) so, again, no problem of the 
objectivity of interpersonal comparisons arises.
But if the parties involved disagree about what is a 
satisfactory solution to a cost claim then there is a 
problem about assessing costs interpersonally. Arguments 
in favour of the sense of such comparisons are then 
required (and were given at the start of the chapter on 
welfare) though the aim with liberty is to do this in order 
to minimise imposed costs rather than, as with the theory 
of welfare, to maximise benefits.
The theory of liberty seems to require the notion of 
imposed cost in this subjective sense. In a similar way 
economics uses the notion of individual subjective values. 
But in neither case does this mean that they become 
hopelessly vague and relativistic. It is logically 
possible that they could do so but they do not seem to be 
so as a matter of fact. Arguments about whether one course 
of action imposes on people more than another course are 
likely to be more about the reality of the feelings of the 
people involved (and the history and validity of any 
agreements, and so forth) rather than any philosophical 
objection to the incommensurability of the feelings of 
different parties. Such philosophical criticisms are 
unlikely to be a practical problem.
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It should not be surprising or inherently objectionable 
that a theory about what it means for agents to be free 
with respect to each other must make some reference to the 
values of the agents. But this does not entail that the 
theory is value-laden in any moral sense. To think that 
person A is more of an imposed cost to person B than vice 
versa does not imply that anything ought to be done about 
it.
Is the definition of liberty (as the absence of costs 
imposed by others) to be interpreted to mean that people 
are to be counted as equal in comparisons of costs (the 
same intensity of cost to two people means they are equally 
imposed on)? Yes (other things being equal10). Again, 
does this not make it an inherently moral notion of 
liberty? No. This is an objective definition that anyone 
could use without thereby affirming the value of liberty as 
here defined, or even of thinking that liberty is correctly 
defined. This is analogous with welfare economics where 
the definition of welfare, once given, can be used by 
anyone regardless of whether he thinks that welfare ought 
to be promoted or whether he thinks the definition really 
captures the notion of welfare.
TTJ------------------ :---- ■ • •But see the discussion of 'utility monsters' from a 
libertarian viewpoint at the end of the next criticism.
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Partial mob rule?
Suppose that many people find one particular person a cost 
to them all by his very existence. There is something 
about that person which he cannot change but which others 
find objectionable in some way. Given our theory he seems 
to be infringing the liberty of others by his very 
existence. What is more, given enough people who find him 
objectionable enough it would seem to follow that the 
libertarian policy could be that they kill him to stop his 
nuisance value to them. Some might feel that this is 
obviously 'illiberal', so there must be something wrong 
with the theory of liberty.
To see what is wrong with this criticism we have to make it 
more specific. It should clarify matters to take two 
examples for examination: a typhoid carrier and an Islamic 
blasphemer.
A typhoid carrier is unaffected by the disease but cannot 
help giving it to others. It is obviously a great cost 
imposed on others if they die because of the proximity of 
this person. There is also a small cost imposed on him if 
he is forced not to use areas where he might infect people. 
That cost is not very great given that the real attraction 
is the people and their creations. He is not having a cost 
imposed on him by merely being denied the benefit of their 
company and artifacts. The cost imposed on him by keeping 
him away from people is only how much he would have enjoyed 
the uninhabited and uncultivated land. This is clearly
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trivial compared to the cost to others if he does not stay 
away. Requiring him to stay away from people must be the 
liberal solution. (So, at least in such an extreme 
example, "preventive restraint" does not, as Nozick argues 
on compensation, seem to libertarianly require a detention 
centre "luxurious enough to compensate someone for the 
disadvantages of being prohibited from living among others 
in the wider society."11)
Now assume (however unrealistic it may seem) that the 
carrier is so infectious that people could catch the 
disease from him wherever he might be. The carrier would 
then be bound to impose a cost on others so great that it 
would be liberal to kill him if that is the only way to 
stop his being the cause of others catching and dying from 
the disease. The cost imposed on the carrier is still but 
a minute fraction of that imposed on the others if he were 
to live. Though much more drastic and unfortunate, killing 
him must be the liberal solution. So this far-fetched case 
fits the vague account given above but should not 
intuitively seem merely intolerantly illiberal (nor does it 
seem very likely, and perhaps there are no realistic 
examples).
The Islamic blasphemer is quite a different type of case.
A popular novelist is supposed to have greatly offended 
many millions of Muslims by his blasphemy. Is his presence 
now so great a cost to so many Muslims that those offended
11 Nozick 1974 p.144.
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have a libertarian (imposed-cost-minimising) claim to take 
his life?
How much have the Muslims had a cost imposed on them? For 
one thing, they can always choose not to read and listen to 
views they dislike. If they do so choose then it looks as 
though they have chosen to take the risk of being offended 
and that they are not thereby directly imposed on.
Let us suppose that the novelist had hijacked a popular 
television show and broadcast his wicked ideas to people 
before they could switch of their televisions. He would 
certainly have imposed a cost on them but even then not 
that much, because people more or less chose their 
emotional responses to mere opinions— especially in the 
long term. The angry Muslims more or less chose to react 
angrily. What is more, it even looks as though they are 
enjoying their anger (righteous indignation can be great 
fun) for they show little sign of attempting to control it.
Liberals could similarly chose to work themselves up about
the illiberal intolerance of the leaders of Islam. And by 
the same argument they would then have a claim to the death 
of any Islamic leader they chose to get angry about. Such 
a practice must in the end impose greater costs on people 
than not having it, so it cannot be liberal.
It might still be felt that there is nothing good or bad
but thinking makes it so and that such peculiar 
consequences just do follow from this odd theory of liberty
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as minimising imposed costs. If we are to expect the 
Muslims to control their feelings about this cost then why 
not expect a raped woman to control her feelings as a 
solution to what has happened to her? Or a mutilated 
victim to feel indifferent about what others have done to 
him?
But we cannot choose to be so indifferent to such personal 
physical things. In such cases the imposed costs are 
palpable and effectively unignorable. The raped woman and 
mutilated victim have been physically abused. It is not at 
all the same with choosing to think about the possibility 
that someone somewhere is telling people things you 
disagree with, however strongly.
And, if generalised, this policy would mean that no one 
must express any opinion to anyone else at which too many 
others might choose to take great offence. No one would be 
able to speak his mind and be safe in such a world. This 
would be a tremendous cost to all from the point of view of 
personal safety, free speech, and the discovery of truth by 
open debate (as argued for, for instance, in J S Mill's On 
Liberty12) . But it should be noted that this is not to 
defend liberty on these grounds (as Mill did) but merely to 
show what this conception of liberty entails.
So in this blasphemy example it would be illiberal to even 
censor the person who is merely conveying his ideas to
12 Mill 1974.
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those willing to know them. The libertarian solution must 
be that those who choose to take offence must continue to 
suffer (or enjoy) their largely self-caused anger.
However, people who express their disapproval of a person 
or shun him for his views or behaviour are not thereby 
imposing a cost on him. They are merely denying him the 
benefits of their approval and society. So, by this 
conception of liberty, Mill was quite wrong to see such 
things as illiberal. The outspoken or unorthodox 
individual would be imposing a cost on others if he were to 
force his opinions or society upon them.
More generally, it might still be objected that people are 
not always equal in their passions. A 'utility monster' 
criticism is possible. By this conception of liberty 
people cannot impose costs on others (as they can, in 
principle, with utilitarianism). But the more passionate 
people can, apparently, still stop others doing what would 
otherwise be innocuous things, or possibly demand vast 
compensation if they do them. This sounds as though the 
passionate and uncivilised might thereby be restricting the 
'liberty' (in an intuitively valid sense of the word) of 
the stoical and civilised. So this seems to show that the 
theory of liberty is unacceptable.
First, there would not be any real incentive to want to be 
uncontrollably passionate as all that the theory of liberty 
entails is compensation (this is discussed in more detail 
later). So people would not be better off by really being
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more passionate. It would pay people to pretend to have 
had greater costs imposed on them by others than is really 
the case. That is often the case in the law courts now. A 
libertarian legal system could also take this possibility 
of fraud into account.
Second, a society of passionate brutes demanding great 
compensation or blocking normal activities would undermine 
the efficient long-run minimising of imposed costs. So 
there is a good libertarian reason not to give way to such 
people to the extent that they exist. As with preference 
utilitarianism, the idea of the reasonable man must limit 
such claimed impositions.
I suggest that all putative examples of the important 
general 'mob-rule' criticism under discussion fall into the 
same two categories on closer inspection: of being probably 
implausible but acceptable after all (as in the first 
case) , or of not being liberal at all (as in the second) .
3.5 Two basic unclarities in libertarian thought
This section examines two basic but muddled concepts in 
libertarian literature: coercion and liberty. Coercion is 
dealt with generally and swiftly comparing the common usage 
with that of some libertarians: Nozick, Narveson, David 
Friedman, and Rothbard. Then Rothbard's view of liberty is 
quickly dismissed and Friedman's approach to liberty 
discussed.
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Libertarians on coercion
'Coercion' is a term that is often used by libertarians in 
discussing and defining liberty. The Concise Oxford 
Dictionary tells us that 'coercion' means "controlling of 
voluntary agent or action by force". This meaning seems 
plain enough. But libertarians often employ Pickwickian 
definitions of 'coercion', and of 'liberty' as defined in 
terms of 'coercion'.
. i ^Nozick analyses 'coercion' in his paper of that name.
This paper shows the sort of unnecessary complications one
can get into if one diverges without good reason from the
plain usage of a word. There seems little point in going
through the details of the paper, but here is an obvious
example of improper usage on the first page:
You threaten to get me fired from my job if I do A, 
and I refrain from doing A because of this threat and 
am coerced into not doing A.
There is no mention of force here. Other philosophers use
coercion to include even such things as moral censure.
These are probably better described— following Kant— as
'influence'.
What seems to be happening here is that people are using 
the word 'coercion' in a loose, analogous, or metaphorical
13 Nozick 1969.
14 Nozick 1969.
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sense without fully realising it. One reason for objecting 
to this practice— apart from the fact that it is confusing- 
-is that it sometimes implicitly uses the undesirable 
aspect that real coercion often has to blacken the 
activities being mistakenly called 'coercive'. This seems 
to be an example of the fallacy of equivocation.
Narveson15 accepts that 'coercion' is "not necessarily
unjustified" but he claims that it is:
a matter of bringing it about that the coerced 
person's alternatives are considerably worse than in 
the status quo ante ....
Apart from anything else, this definition might apply to
competition between businessmen that results in one losing
heavily.
In The Machinery of Freedom,17 David Friedman defines
'coercion' relativistically as:
the violation of what people in a particular society 
believe to be the rights of individuals with respect 
to other individuals.18
Taken strictly, this entails that the Aztec citizen who
runs away from the Aztec priest who wants to cut out his
heart is thereby coercing the priest. And when the priest
catches him and cuts his heart out that is not coercion.
Earlier Friedman came closer to the idea of force when he
stated that:
15 Narveson 1988.
16 Ibid. p.34.
17 Friedman, D 1989.
18 Ibid. p.112.
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someone who forcibly prevents me from using my 
property as I want, when I am not using it to violate 
his right to use his property, is coercing me.19
But if the person had in self-defence forcibly prevented
Friedman's use of property that would still, in plain
English, be coercion. Coercion does not cease to be
coercion simply because it is used in self-defence.
• * 9 f)Throughout The Ethics of L i b e r t y Murray Rothbard uses 
'coercion' to mean any act that violates individual liberty 
(he identifies liberty with private property that has been 
"legitimately" acquired). There are two mistakes here. 
First, in the ordinary usage of the word, 'coercion' is not 
necessary for the violation of property rights: theft and 
fraud violate private property rights without being 
coercive because they do not use force against the 
individual himself. Second, plain coercion is not 
necessarily an invasion of liberty (in the libertarian 
sense): boxers give prior consent to the possibility of 
coercion in the ring; and coercion can be used to protect 
one's liberty rather than invade someone else's.
Rothbard wants an antonym for 'liberty', but 'coercion' is 
not a good choice. Attacks on individual liberty are 
better described as 'unlibertarian' or 'illiberal'— as 
opposed to 'liberal' in the classical sense. It is clearer 
and better English to stick to the sense of 'coercion' as 
"controlling of voluntary agent or action by force".
19 Ibid. p.XVIII.
20 Rothbard 1982.
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Rothbard on liberty
According to Rothbard:
freedom is a condition in which a person's ownership 
rights in his own body and his legitimate material 
property are not invaded, are not aggressed against.
... Freedom and unrestricted property right go hand in 
hand.21
The trouble with this typical libertarian definition of 
freedom is that it is not specific enough: what constitutes 
"legitimate" property's being "aggressed against" is quite 
unclear. It is not enough to insist that "freedom and 
unrestricted property go hand in hand" for this does not 
tell us which system of property ought to be unrestricted. 
We know that Rothbard intends to mean the system that 
arises from homesteading and free trade because he tells us 
this. But he has not given any clear conceptual account of 
freedom that shows how this system realises it. This is 
the great philosophical limitation of Rothbard's otherwise 
usually excellent economic and historical defences of the 
free market.
Friedman on liberty
David Friedman sees the philosophical problems of defining 
libertarianism in terms of property rights and gives a 
useful list of them in chapters 41 and 42 of his The
21 Rothbard 1978 p.41.
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Machinery of Freedom.22 In chapter 43 he gives an economic
approach to these problems and concludes:
economic analysis of law can answer questions about
what the law ought to be that I cannot answer— that I
believe cannot be answered— on the basis of 
libertarian principles.
There follows a list of some problems Friedman cites with 
some immediate responses as to where he might be going 
wrong. Only after the general development of the theory of 
liberty will we come back to the rest of his list and 
attempt to give the principled answers Friedman believes 
impossible. (The point made about the meaning of 
'coercion' will not be repeated though it occurs in some 
quoted passages— such as the next one.)
In order to define coercion, we need a concept of
property . . . some way of saying what is mine and what
is yours. The usual libertarian solution includes 
property rights in land. I have an absolute right to 
do what I want on my land, provided that I refrain 
from interfering with your similar right on your 
land.24
Friedman then points out that turning on a light or 
striking a match can send photons onto the property of 
others, so— given absolute property rights— one ought not 
to do even such trivial things without the permission of 
everyone affected. It is obvious that "under these 
circumstances, my 'ownership' of my property is not worth 
very much."25
22 Friedman, D 1989.
23 Ibid. p.199.
24 Ibid. p.168.
25 Ibid. p.168.
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This seems to be the wrong approach. As with Rothbard, 
libertarianism is being interpreted in terms of property 
without any clear account of why property is relevant to 
liberty. Surely the libertarian ought to give a more 
abstract conception of liberty first and then show how 
property is related to this notion. If this were done then 
it might well appear that the absolute control of property 
really conflicts with the goal of liberty. It might be 
true that my liberty is slightly lessened by the immediate 
effects of some actions on nearby property, but this might 
allow me to have more liberty overall if I have similar 
rights. The libertarian need not be advocating perfect 
liberty: it is consistent to demand as much liberty as is 
practically possible.
Friedman continues with a similar example:
Carbon dioxide is a pollutant. It is also the end 
product of human metabolism. If I have no right to 
impose a single molecule of pollution on anyone else's 
property, then I muf1 et the permission of all my
He rejects the obvious response that only significant
violations of property must count, because:
if I have an absolute property right then I am the one 
who decides what violations of my property matter. If 
someone is allowed to violate my property with 
impunity as long as he does no significant damage, we 
are back to judging legal rules by their 
consequences.27
26 Ibid. p.168.
27 Ibid. p.168.
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It is a good point that people should be allowed to decide 
for themselves what counts as violations of their property, 
but this is not followed up to see where it leads. Even 
with the definition of libertarianism that Friedman is 
examining it is clear that people would happily allow all 
sorts of things to affect their property if they could get 
similar agreements. It is true, though, that one person 
could, by this theory, have the property right to choose to 
stop the rest of us breathing (presumably if he were 
prepared to suffer retaliation) . Some attention ought to 
be paid to the individual owner's assessment of what is 
affecting his property, but Friedman seems right to suggest 
that, in the extreme, a non-absolute system of property is 
necessary to avoid such conclusions.
Friedman finally rejects the idea of ignoring violations 
that do "no significant damage" because it is "judging 
legal rules by their consequences." This is not a good 
reason: surely it is consistent with libertarianism to 
judge legal rules by their consequences to liberty.
Friedman must be thinking of consequences for matters other 
than liberty; looking at consequences as such cannot be the 
real objection; he obviously thinks of the consequences in 
only utilitarian terms. The problem is that he cannot look 
at the consequences for liberty expressed more generally as 
he has no explicit conception of liberty independent of 
absolute property rules.
We are then given an interesting variation on the above 
problem:
A similar problem arises if we consider effects that 
are small not in size but probability. ... If doing 
something to someone is coercive, then so is an action 
that has some probability of doing that something to 
him.28
Playing Russian roulette aiming at another person is 
"coercive":
But what if the revolver has not six chambers but a 
thousand or a million? The right not to be coerced, 
stated as an absolute moral principle, should still 
apply ... it seems to imply that I may never do 
anything which results in some probability of injuring 
another person without his consent.
So as flying a plane always involves some chance of
crashing:
It seems to follow from libertarian principles that 
before taking off I must get permission from everyone 
living within a thousand miles of my starting point.
... [The] point is that simple statements of 
libertarian rights taken literally lead to problems of 
this sort."3*
Here Friedman again claims that the idea of qualifying the
statements to speak of:
'significant' violations of my rights, or violations 
that 'really injure' me ... [mean that] . . . one can no 
longer use rights arguments to draw clear conclusions 
about what should or should not happen.3
Arguments about fundamental moral principles are held to:
not provide answers to enough important questions ... 
how, in principle, do you decide where along that 
continuum the rights of the property owner stop?32
28 Ibid. p.169.
29 Ibid. p.169.
30 Ibid. p.169.
31 Ibid. pp.169-170.
32 Ibid. p.170.
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These examples do show serious faults with the purely 
propertarian definition; they do not show that all "simple 
statements of libertarian rights" (by implication this 
includes non-moral definitions; so all discussions will be 
interpreted this way) are so thoroughly inadequate. That 
assertion is not a logical consequence of Friedman's 
arguments but a conjecture. I hope to show that it is a 
false one.
3.6 Property derived from liberty
This section develops the theory (conception and 
applications) of liberty with respect to the derivation of 
private property, various general issues (including 
contracts, compensation, and intellectual property), and 
paradoxical problem cases (answering some of Friedman's 
questions on the way).
Liberty is the absence of imposed costs. More precisely, 
social liberty is the absence of costs (in the subjective 
sense that is opposed to benefits) imposed on people by 
other people. This definition of liberty does not refer to 
property. In order to see how property rights are entailed 
by maximising liberty (or minimising imposed costs, which 
is the same thing) we need to start with the simplest of 
cases and then gradually build up to more difficult ones. 
The convention of starting in a 'state of nature' is used 
to do this. Analogously with the treatment of welfare in
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the previous chapter, the intention is only to show which 
property rights the maximising of liberty entails and that 
these are in practice compatible with maximising welfare.
It is not morally argued that liberty ought to be 
maximised.
If I am the only person in the universe then I am not 
having any effect on any other person. I cannot be 
imposing a cost on (or constraining) anyone except myself. 
If I jump into a deep pit that I cannot escape from I am 
certainly constrained but not by anyone else, so there is 
no loss of social freedom.
As soon as another person exists near me we will have 
effects on each other (if only in the sense that we change 
the gravitational field by being there and moving about).
If these effects are of no consequence to us then both of 
us are entirely at liberty socially (this does not entail 
that there is a society of any kind). If these effects 
leave us feeling less satisfied overall (the benefits could 
cancel out the costs) then the other person is a cost— we 
are no longer perfectly at liberty.
Libertarian genocide?
It might seem that perfect liberty is only certain to be 
achieved in a universe with at most one person in it. In 
fact the more people that there are the more that liberty 
will suffer as more costs are bound to be imposed. So if 
such liberty is seriously to be taken as a goal to be
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maximised we ought to aim at minimising the population. In 
fact this theory entails that genocide (if successful) 
would be a relatively small imposed cost compared to the 
costs that are bound to occur if the species continues 
indefinitely— even in terms of only the greater numbers of 
future murders that would otherwise have occurred. This 
makes this an implausible view of liberty and one that 
cannot be compatible with maximising welfare.
I think this fantasy criticism overlooks the fact that, as 
people would not agree to voluntary genocide and so would 
have reproduced indefinitely, such a policy would also 
impose a still greater cost on the people who would have 
existed but for the genocide. So genocide is not entailed 
and this criticism cannot undermine this as a plausible 
conception of liberty that is compatible with maximising 
welfare. But even if it could, that need not prevent this 
conception of liberty from being acceptable and welfare 
maximising for all practical purposes— which is what we are 
interested in.
The desert island
Suppose that we are both on an unowned desert island of 
frugal resources. We have both been washed up there. If I 
am a complete misanthropist I might detest the idea of 
sharing the island. I want you as far away as possible.
This criticism is similar to that often used against a 
strict interpretation of Popper's 'negative 
utilitarianism', which is another 'bad'-minimising theory.
217
You dislike me for disliking you and so would prefer to be 
alone as well. But if we both agree to respect each 
other's liberty as far as possible we shall attempt to keep 
out of each other's way. Each finds the other a cost but 
neither is deliberately imposing a cost on the other.34
Now suppose there is only one natural fresh water supply on 
the island. If neither of us likes having to share it then 
each of us is less free as a result of the other's 
existence: each is a cost to the other. But for either of 
us to deny the other use of the water would constitute a 
much greater imposed cost— death.
If, instead of being already available, the water had been 
found by digging a well, then whoever created the well 
could find the use of it without his permission to be a 
cost to him when he was not thereby causing a cost to 
anyone else— provided that the other person had other 
places where he could dig a well (this is Locke's idea of 
leaving "as much and as good") . Others benefits cost us 
nothing except insofar as we feel covetous, envious, or 
suchlike through no choice of our own. But people are 
usually largely responsible for such feelings themselves by 
choosing to inspect others' fortunes instead of going about 
their own business, and sometimes they deliberately 
cultivate such feelings. Of any minute residual amount of
34 And even if you wanted my company you would be
infringing my freedom (imposing a cost on me) by following 
me around merely because you wanted company. I do not 
impose a cost on you by merely existing and failing to 
benefit you with my delightful company.
218
such feelings that are unavoidable it would surely be more 
of an overall imposition of costs on those involved— at 
least in the long run— to forcibly transfer or destroy 
goods on the basis of them.
To the extent that I monopolise a natural resource which 
you would otherwise have had the use of I am constraining 
you without your permission (imposing a cost on you: you 
are worse off than you would have been thanks to me, and 
you did not agree to the change) and so I would be limiting 
your liberty. But (even if you lack the wit or the 
strength to dig your own well) you would be infringing my 
liberty (imposing a cost on me) if you were to use my well 
without permission (if I do object or would object). I do 
not impose a cost on you by creating the well and denying 
you access (you are not worse off than you would have been 
even though you did not agree to the change) , therefore I 
have not lessened your liberty.35
It might still seem unclear that this result follows 
without moral import simply from the application of the 
definition of liberty. This will be discussed further as 
some find this quite unconvincing,36 but it is crucial to
35 Though if I had explicitly given you, rather than lent 
you, some of the water, I would be lessening your liberty 
if I took it back without your consent. For I impose a 
cost on you by taking from you without your consent that 
which you have acquired without imposing a cost on me. 
Liberty entails that water is no longer mine.
36 In particular my supervisor, John Charvet, and possibly 
Cohen in Ryan 1979.
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the thesis that this is not a moral point and so cannot be 
rejected because one holds 'different' moral views.
Consider again, 1) my being forced to share a natural 
supply of water and 2) my being forced to share a supply I 
have made possible. If I think that enforcing liberty is 
incompatible with 2 am I not tacitly claiming a right to 
exclude you from the products of my labour? And does this 
not therefore fail to be an analysis of liberty without 
regard to morality?
First, recall the definition of social liberty: we have 
social liberty to the extent that other people are not 
imposing costs on us; that is, causing us to have less of 
what we value without our consent.
Another person cannot be a cost to us by simply denying us 
the benefits he is responsible for. Those benefits would 
not have existed but for him, and so they need cost us 
nothing. Though if we have a contract with him for such 
benefits then they have become our benefits and he would 
not be "simply denying us the benefits he is responsible 
for" if he reneged on that contract. (Contracts are given 
a libertarian analysis next.)
Now, with 1 you do lessen my liberty (impose a cost on me) 
to some degree (if I do not enjoy sharing the water) by 
turning up and forcing me to share the natural supply of 
water. But I would be lessening your liberty (imposing a 
cost on you) to a far greater degree (you will die) by
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denying you access to the sole supply of water that you 
could have had if I had merely not been there. In the 
normal case of 1, liberty will be maximised (the imposition 
of costs minimised) by sharing the natural supply of water.
With 2, I am doing nothing that takes benefits or imposes 
costs on you by creating and monopolising something of 
value that would not have existed but for me. But you are 
making me worse off if you force me to share my creation 
with you when I do not choose to. So 2 is incompatible 
with liberty in the sense used here (which seems to be 
merely a clearer and more comprehensive way of expressing 
the idea of social liberty as not being interfered with, 
put upon, or bothered by others).
It might well be entailed by some other definition of 
'liberty' that forcing the creator of the water supply to 
share does increase overall liberty. For instance,
'liberty' in the sense of 'the absence of any kind of 
constraints on people' might entail this (though this 
example seems to me to be confusing the notion of social 
liberty with individual power) . Or it might well be that 
there are good welfare or moral arguments for enforced 
sharing in the second case (this is not yet intended to be 
the realistic picture where welfare and liberty overlap). 
But that 1 is libertarian and 2 is not libertarian clearly 
follows from the definition of liberty used here without 
mention of rights or morals.
221
And this means that liberty (as defined) , if maximised in 
this situation (I do not say that it ought to be) , entails 
that in 2 the creator owns the water supply— liberty 
entails property— for to have use and control of something 
is to own it de facto.
It might be thought that ownership (or property) is either 
a legal or moral notion: that one can own something only to 
the extent that one either has a legal right or a moral 
right to the control of that thing. But legal and moral 
ownership are not exhaustive categories of ownership. One 
can simply say what the application of some rule for 
acquiring control entails without believing that there are 
real legal or moral claims to such a system. The 
application of the rule that liberty (as defined) be 
enforced (perhaps by chance or even due to some strange law 
of nature, it matters not how) will mean that the creator 
of the supply will own the water merely in the sense that 
it logically follows that he shall have control of it— or 
liberty could not be reigning as supposed. Law and morals 
do not need to be mentioned. (Or, to make the same point a 
different way, one can agree that such ownership would 
logically follow while knowing that such a system does not 
legally exist and believing it to be immoral.)
It might help to set out all the important parts of the 
above argument more simply:
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Social liberty exists to the extent that people do not 
impose costs on each other (which includes worsening 
people's conditions without permission).
I make object X without imposing a cost on you.
If you use X against my wishes you impose a cost on me.
If liberty exists (how, or whether it ought to, is
immaterial) then you cannot use X without my consent.
What you cannot use without my consent I have control over.
What I have control over I own in a de facto sense.
If liberty exists then I own X.
Therefore the existence of social liberty (without needing 
to invoke law or morality) logically entails the existence 
of libertarian property in certain circumstances.
The idea has been mentioned that contracts (if honest) are 
not imposed costs. As contracts will arise again in what 
follows it seems best to deal with them now. But this will 
be done by approaching them through the related (as we
shall see) but more basic topics of honesty and promises.
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Honesty
Is it illiberal (unlibertarian) to lie? It will be 
illiberal only if there is an imposed cost. An analogy 
might illuminate the problem.
If I give you a glass of water that you have asked for I do 
not impose a cost on you. If I deliberately put any extra 
substance into the water that you would object to then I am 
imposing a cost on you (if you would not object even if you 
knew then there is no imposition; for instance, if the 
substance is a water-purifying tablet where this is needed 
for safety) . If the water is impure unbeknown to me then 
that would be mere bad luck on your part; I would not have 
imposed by merely aiding you in your choice to drink.
By analogy, I do not impose a cost on you if I give you
information that you have asked for. If I deliberately put
any falsehoods (that you would object to) into the
information then I am imposing on you (if you would not
object then there is no imposition: for instance, if I lie 
in order to keep secret a surprise party that is planned 
for you). If the information that I give is false in any 
way that I do not know of then that is mere bad luck on 
your part; I do not impose on you by giving you my honest 
opinion (provided that you want to hear it) even if it is 
mistaken (unless it comes with a contractual guarantee of 
some sort).
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It would only be illiberal to give a gift that is known to 
be not what we represent it to be (whether that be pure 
water or pure truth) if this trick imposes a cost on the 
recipient: if he would be worse off (if he has less of what 
he values) as a result of that aspect of our unconsented-to 
behaviour towards him. (It cannot be liberal simply 
because he benefits overall by his association with us. 
Benefits freely given cannot be then set against costs.)
As we cannot always be sure of the reasons and values of 
other persons it is better to avoid such fraud if we wish 
to avoid being illiberal. As most people would rather be 
told nothing than convinced by a lie it is almost always at 
least slightly illiberal to successfully lie to people.
And if we deliberately tell someone that a particular 
fungus (that he would not otherwise have eaten) is edible 
when we know it to be deadly, and he consequently eats it, 
then we have obviously imposed an extreme cost on him.
This is murder and murder is quite illiberal by any 
standards.
So, to convince someone of a lie is usually to impose on 
him at least slightly, and to fail to convince is to fail 
in an attempted illiberal act (though a successful lie 
might be liberal if one does it in liberal self-defence— or 
other defence, for that matter). If such impositions are 
to be rectified we shall have to compensate (if possible) 
others for such costs imposed on them (this is not to 
suggest that it would be practical to enforce compensation 
in trivial cases). But others have no libertarian claim
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that we tell them anything, even on a matter where they 
find out we have previously lied to them (unless this is 
the only adequate compensation) . One does not impose a 
cost on others by merely not giving them the benefit of 
information.
Promises
Is it illiberal to break a promise?
If I promise to meet you somewhere or to give you something 
and you are inconvenienced by my (possibly deliberately) 
breaking my promise then I have imposed a cost on you. 
People often alter their plans in expectation of having 
promises kept that were made to them. If we break our word 
we impose a cost on them that they would not otherwise have 
had to bear. Even if someone has not altered his plans 
significantly he might feel let down and so would be worse 
off than if there had been no promise made to him. So 
breaking promises is almost always at least slightly 
illiberal. And if we promise to help someone learn to swim 
and when he is in deep water we deliberately leave him 
there to drown, then we have obviously imposed an extreme
•57
cost on him. This is, again, murder.
If we want to rectify the imposition, is it enough that we 
give someone compensation equal to what he has lost (if
^  This is therefore at odds with Rothbard's account of 
promises (in Rothbard 1982 p.134 ff.) where people rely on 
promises entirely at their own risks.
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possible), or does he have a libertarian claim to the thing 
promised (or its value to him)?
The promisee was not given the property claim to the thing 
promised. He was only promised (given an assurance) that 
he would be given it. We have let him down but he is only 
imposed on to the extent of the inconvenience.
This being understood it is sufficient, from a libertarian 
viewpoint, that such broken promises are compensated for 
(as with lies) to the extent of the imposed inconvenience 
we cause others by not keeping them. (Again, this is not 
to suggest that it would be usually practical to enforce 
compensation.)
It might seem that one could make a promise but stipulate, 
or imply, that the other person relied on it entirely at 
his own risk, and so there is no imposed cost if the 
promise is broken. I do not think that this really would 
be a promise as a promise seems to entail giving the other 
person some claim against us— if only a moral claim to an 
apology— if we let him down.
Gift-contracts & exchange-contracts
Only explicit gifts of a future property claim give others 
the claim to that property at some future time. Such gifts 
usually need to be recorded (possibly in formal 
circumstances and in front of reputable witnesses). It 
seems that this is understood because of the importance,
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and practical difficulty otherwise, of proving future-claim 
property transfers. And this understanding means that 
casual statements of such property transfer do not count.
But if we explicitly state and record that we give our 
future claim to X away, then the act of gift is thereby 
done. This is not merely promising at time TO that we will 
give someone X at time Tl; we actually give him the 
property right to X at Tl now (at TO) . Unless the other 
person imposes costs on us that require compensation, we 
must surrender X at Tl— for it will then no longer be ours.
The other person always has a libertarian claim to what we 
explicitly give him a future claim to or contract to give 
him (if he keeps his side of the contract and if we have 
acquired our property by libertarian means). We cannot 
libertarianly insist he accept compensation merely for any 
inconvenience instead. The thing in question is not ours. 
It counts for nothing that it might happen be in our 
possession.
Rothbard considers that specific performance and slavery 
cannot be libertarianly possible because he thinks this 
requires the person to alienate his will, and that is 
logically impossible. It does no such thing. The claim 
that we perform some action or be the property of another 
need make no reference to our will. (More argument on the 
libertarian nature of contractual slavery and why allowing
38 Rothbard 1982 p.135.
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the rare examples of such things might increase welfare was 
given in reply to Ryan in the previous chapter.)
And the contractual rule of entail is also quite 
libertarian39 provided that we specify to whom or how the 
property is to be dispersed in the event of the inheritor's 
breaking the conditions of accepting his inheritance. Not 
to allow this interferes with the 'liberty' of the dead 
person.40 Such 'liberty' can be understood in the way that 
preference utilitarianism can (as we saw in reply to Hare 
in the previous chapter) allow 'welfare' to extend beyond 
one's bodily spatial and temporal limits.
So forcing someone to stick to a contract or to buy his way 
out at our price (either will do) is not imposing a cost on 
him at all. It might look like the imposition of a cost, 
but so might (if you do not understand the circumstances) 
the recovery of any debt from a complaining debtor. From a 
libertarian viewpoint (provided that they do not clash with 
the liberty of a third party in some way) explicit and 
honest contracts are absolutely binding.
j9 Contra Rothbard 1982 p.144.
40 This might sound more acceptable with other examples 
such as the dead's property claims (obviously to be made on 
their behalves, as the claims of unconscious living persons 
must be) to be buried in the way they have contracted for 
when alive.
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Back on the island
You build a hut in a clearing. What follows as regards 
liberty? It always depends on the background 
circumstances. Locke's position is about right. If the 
trees you felled were plentiful and the clearing you choose 
as good as many others then you would probably not have 
imposed a significant cost on me and so not lessened my 
liberty. But you would now have a continuing strong 
interest (we may reasonably suppose) in the hut that you 
have constructed. Therefore I would be significantly 
lessening your liberty (imposing a large cost on you) if I 
were to now take the wood you have used in your hut, or 
create a footpath through the area that entails knocking 
down your hut. By so doing I would be interfering with 
your valuable creation and thereby simply lessening your 
liberty rather than defending my own liberty. Under the 
circumstances, you own the hut and the site it is on.
If there were very limited wood available and you had 
chosen the only suitable site for the hut (assuming that I 
wanted to build on that site) then you would be imposing 
significant costs on me (I would be much worse off thanks 
to you, and without my having consented to the change). I 
would have a libertarian claim to a share of the hut 
myself, though we might negotiate some other arrangement. 
The imposition of costs is not all one way here and some 
compromise is needed to maximise liberty. (It might be 
wondered in what way side-constraints are being respected 
if there is to be a trade off in such clashes. The answer
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is that minimising the imposition of costs in a clash is 
not violating side-constraint libertarianism at all, it is 
respecting it as far as possible.)
The island floods and your hut is on the highest and only 
dry ground. Would I be infringing your liberty by 
occupying it against your will? Again, this depends on our 
values and the history of our interactions. If I had 
merely ignored your hut in the past then, come the flood, I 
would be imposed on greatly if I were denied the high 
ground that I would have gone to anyway if no hut had been 
built. You would be constraining me greatly by denying me 
access to the only dry area when I had never agreed with 
you not to go there. I would be imposing a relatively 
trivial cost on you by using the high ground to save
myself. But if I had agreed (perhaps in return for some
similar undertaking by you) to never enter the hut without 
your permission, then I would have bound myself voluntarily 
and you would not be imposing a cost on me by denying me 
access.
Compensation
Suppose that we agree to live on separate halves of the
island. Is any action I take on my half to be disallowed
if it effects you on your half in a way you dislike? It 
may be that what I do to some extent imposes a cost on you 
but that to prevent me from doing it would be an even 
greater cost to me. If we are interested in avoiding 
imposing costs on each other as far as possible (that is,
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respecting each other's social freedom as far as possible) 
then the person who is imposed on least must (if liberty is 
to be observed) give way to the activity, but the person 
doing it must (if liberty is to be observed) pay 
compensation for the nuisance. Again, the notion of an 
imposed cost has an unavoidable subjective element that may 
make the calculation complicated but which seems to make 
theoretical sense.
For example, suppose that the smoke from my fires sometimes 
blows your way but your smoke never blows my way. It seems 
a greater imposition on me to prevent me from lighting 
fires for warmth and cooking than it would be an imposition 
on you for you to tolerate some occasional smoke drifting 
onto your land that you do not care to smell. In the 
interests of minimising our involuntary effects on each 
other you should allow the smoke provided that I pay 
compensation for the degree of cost to you. (So we can 
now see a relatively trivial example of the mistake of 
defining liberty as involving absolute property rights.)
Similarly, the idea that risks of invasion of property 
ought to be absolutely proscribed does not follow from the 
conception of liberty as minimising the imposition of 
costs. For we must not ignore the cost imposed on a person 
who is prevented from doing some activity he could have 
done but for our presence. In the interests of minimising 
interference with others' lives (imposed costs) risks must 
be allowed provided the potentially damaged party receives 
compensation proportional to the risk.
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But where the amount of risk multiplied by the full damages 
is a sum that would cost more to send out than the sum 
itself then it ought not to be compulsory to send it: that 
would be more of an imposition on the person engaging in 
the slightly risky activity than on the person minimally at 
risk.
This goes some way to solving Friedman's problem of how, in 
principle, the regulation of risks to others' property can 
follow from libertarianism. Nozick has a roughly similar, 
though more detailed, account but (as with his similar 
account of intellectual property, discussed later) it is 
based on rights rather than an explicit theory of 
liberty.41 One disagreement with his conclusions was 
mentioned in the section on the 'mob rule' criticism. I 
only further suggest here that Nozick needs the liberty 
principle for clarity of libertarian solution and sometimes 
goes wrong because of the lack of it, as in his calculation 
of compensation based on "the normal situation".42 (For 
more on this general area see the section on Restitution in 
reply to Friedman.)
New arrivals
It is possible to generate some interesting but unrealistic 
problems that show that the liberty principle can give
41 Nozick 1974 chapter 4.
42 Ibid. p.82.
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determinate solutions that are sometimes quite at odds with 
the fairly strict private property rights that liberty 
would entail in more normal situations.
If I had been washed ashore on the small and poorly 
resourced island before you then this should not much alter 
the situation. I would be using things that I did not 
create and which would have been there for you to use had I 
not been there. When you arrive we are a cost to each 
other in terms of scant natural resources (however they are 
shared) and enforcing liberty entails that such costs be 
minimised.
Because of the diminishing marginal utility of goods, and 
as we had no prior contract, I should have to allow you 
about half of all the natural resources if I were to avoid 
imposing costs on you in excess of the rule of liberty. 
There is certainly no libertarian claim to equal shares as 
such— it just works out that way in this strange context 
(sparse natural resources, equally valued by people without 
prior agreements) . Of course if you were to take more than 
this you would also be imposing costs on me in excess of 
what minimising cost-imposition (maximising liberty) 
entails. Again, none of this is due to defining liberty in 
terms of moral rights, or to asserting the equal moral 
right to liberty.
If a third person is washed ashore we must similarly share 
what natural resources are available if we are interested 
in respecting liberty. The fact that the original two
234
occupants have an agreement as to the division of the 
island cannot be binding on those who are not part of the 
agreement. The third person, who is there through no fault 
of his own, would have had the island to himself had the 
first two not been there. Their presence is an 
uncontracted cost to him (at least as regards the scant 
natural resources) which therefore lessens his social 
liberty. He similarly lessens the liberty of the original 
two, of course, so all must share if they are to minimise 
the social imposition.
What if a third person were saved from drowning by one of 
the original two? Would the saved person have the same 
libertarian property claims? It might seem that because he 
could no longer truly state that he would have had the 
island to himself but for the original two persons, he 
would have no libertarian claim to any part of the island 
unless it is freely given to him. But this does not 
follow. If I save a man's life without first making a 
contract then I have given him a free gift. I might be 
worse off in the long run as a result of my charity (if I 
save someone's life in a city he would not be infringing my 
liberty by then going on to out-bid me in the purchase of a 
house). Charity gives us no libertarian claim over the 
people we benefit. If we have made no prior agreement with 
the third man it would still be imposing a cost on him to 
deny him a share of the island.
It might seem a mistake that my saving someone should 
result in the other person's losing a third of his share of
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the island. It might be thought that here I impose on him 
and that only I, the person doing the saving, should (from 
a libertarian viewpoint) give up my land. But until we 
know who there is and their history of associations we 
cannot know who has a libertarian claim to what. Suppose I 
save a man off the coast of the UK and he turns out to be 
your long-lost brother; as a result you lose half your 
inheritance. You have no libertarian claim to created 
wealth that you did not produce except on the conditions 
that it is given to you. You might be worse off as a 
result of the rescue (if you do not value your brother 
highly) but you have not had a cost imposed on you. You 
have merely been denied a benefit you now have no 
libertarian claim to.
A bizarre but libertarian contract is possible: I could 
agree to save the drowning man on condition that he gives 
me his share of the island (i.e. what liberty logically 
entails in the circumstances is his share, not mentioning 
what he is morally or legally entitled to) . This would 
mean that he ends up with nothing while I both keep the 
third of my half of the island— that I would otherwise have 
had to give to him— and gain a third of the other half that 
the other person has. This should sound more plausibly the 
correct libertarian solution if we again analogously 
suppose the saving of the long-lost brother but add that I 
make it a condition that he gives me his fortune, so that 
his brother will thereby lose half of his inheritance to 
me.
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Woman and children
Suppose that the third person is a woman whom we both 
desire, but she prefers you as a lover. If it were not for 
you I would have more of what I value, so does it follow 
from the definition of liberty (as people not imposing 
costs on each other) that you interfere with my liberty?
No. It was never open to me to have this woman as a lover 
if she did not wish it, as that would be imposing a cost on 
her. Therefore it is no imposed cost at all to me (loss of 
what I owned, or could own, without imposing a cost on 
another) to fail to win her. And if she changes her mind 
and leaves you then I have imposed no cost on you either. 
She cannot become your property (without her consent at 
least) however much you invest in her or rely on her, for. 
that would impose a cost on her, and that is not compatible 
with liberty. Unowned resources can become yours because 
you impose no significant cost on anyone by controlling 
them, unless you are monopolising a uniquely valuable 
natural resource. So monopolising the sole water supply by 
obstructing my access does impose a cost on me. But 
'monopolising' the sole woman by being chosen by her cannot 
impose a cost.
There might still be a feeling that because I am so 
obviously worse off as a result of your having the sole 
woman that there must be an imposed cost here. Let me give 
two further, analogous, cases. I am worse off as a result 
of your presence but only in the same way that I would also
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be worse off if you murdered a friend of mine. The 
benefits that accrue to me as a result of his existence 
would then stop (just as they would have if he and I had 
fallen out over something). But nothing that I 
libertarianly owned (controlled without imposing costs on 
others) would have been taken from me. The murdered person 
would have his life taken from him and that is the only 
imposed cost in the libertarian sense. Similarly, a 
business competitor does not impose a cost on us by winning
away our all our customers. We could never (non­
contractual ly) own custom without imposing a cost on the 
customers and so we merely lose a benefit of their custom 
rather than have a cost imposed on us.
Suppose that you have a child by this woman. Is the child
in a position analogous with someone who is washed ashore 
or charitably saved and so has a libertarian claim to a 
share of the island's natural resources?
First, what does a child have a libertarian claim to with 
respect to his parents? Normally, only what his parents 
give him. There was no prior contract. Everything that a 
parent gives a child is a gift that social liberty does not 
entail. This means that a parent does not impose on the 
child by neglecting him unless the neglect is such that it 
would have been better for the child not to have been born 
(for that would be an imposed cost on the child) . But as 
respecting the liberty of persons implies that the child 
(if a person) is not a mere chattel of the parents, it 
would usually be an infraction of the child's liberty if
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the parents were to abuse him and prevent him from leaving 
them (to find better care elsewhere) .
On the island the child who is no longer in need of support 
from his parents has the same libertarian claim to natural 
resources as the saved man (while he was being supported he 
was more or less ipso facto not being prevented from using 
natural resources but simply failing to use them). The 
parents did not create the island and they would be 
imposing a cost on anyone if they denied him access to a 
share.
More paradoxes
This gives rise to a strange 'paradox' . If the parents 
have irreplaceably destroyed many natural resources by 
their carelessness (and not created new resources of at 
least equal value) then they can be said to have imposed a 
cost on whoever would have later used those resources: this 
is to constrain others by imposing costs on them without 
their permission, which is to lessen their social liberty. 
But the others may include their own children. The 
children might have a libertarian claim for damages against 
the parents. The children's lives were gifts but being 
alive they now have a claim to as much and as good natural 
resources (or created resources of equal value)— if social 
liberty is to be respected. The 'paradox' is that 
(assuming the parents now are on their own on the island) 
the parents are only guilty of an illiberal destruction of 
what they did not create if they have children. The
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parents' gift of life is necessary to make their previous 
waste illiberal.
One possible solution is to say that the parents always 
were illiberal in their destruction because one of the 
resources they inherited, and are libertarianly bound to 
leave as much and as good of, is their own lives. In other 
words there is a duty to reproduce. For it looks somewhat 
inconsistent that it is illiberal to unnecessarily waste 
all natural resources except the natural resource of one's 
life as a person. But this solution is at least as 
troublesome as the problem that it seeks to solve. For the 
idea of a duty to reproduce must be counter-intuitive to 
those who normally value liberty in the sense of the 
opposite of totalitarianism. I do not think this is the 
correct solution.
The correct answer must be to accept the 'paradox' and 
explain it like this: the parents are in a situation 
analogous with my saving a long-lost brother who then is in 
a position to sue me (despite my good deed) if I have 
squandered his share of his inheritance. And that does not 
sound so inconsistent (though it does sound just as 
ungrateful). So the parents are only illiberal if they 
needlessly destroy the island's resources (without creating 
equal wealth) and then have children who cannot enjoy them.
In practical terms this seems to imply that we must not so 
destroy the world's resources that future people are left
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with a lower standard of living than nature could have 
provided (and I do not think that this is happening) .
Therefore, it also seems that respecting liberty implies 
that the family can gradually take over the island by 
reproducing. The single man will slowly lose libertarian 
claims to his land. (It would be different if he had, say, 
saved the land from complete erosion: the land would not 
then have been there for the new people to claim and they 
would be imposing on him if they took it.)
Again I would hold that this 'paradox' is, strictly 
speaking, the correct libertarian solution. It might look 
at odds with welfare, but I am not defending liberty as 
desirable and compatible with welfare in all logically 
possible circumstances. By looking at such cases we see 
that the conception of liberty is fairly comprehensive (it 
makes sense in extreme cases outside modern industrial 
society) and precise (it does not have to rely on legal, 
moral, or social conventions to come up with tolerably 
clear answers). And this general state-of-nature account 
can throw light on the correct application of the 
libertarian principle in more sophisticated circumstances 
to be dealt with later.
Relevance
It ought to be emphasised just how disanalogous these 
circumstances are from normal ones. Usually there are 
plenty of natural resources (in fact they are increasing
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and becoming cheaper43) but some have been worked on to 
produce wealth at little expense to anyone else— and 
usually greatly to their benefit in terms of the goods they 
can now trade for. Land, in particular, is not especially 
scarce— only land worked on, or land near valuable markets. 
Newcomers seek the fruits of industry and civilisation not 
mere space; the world is full of uninhabited areas they 
could have gone to instead.
On the island the situation is reversed so that there is a 
profound shortage of land and natural resources and no 
significant working of them. Thus no simple radical 
conclusions about redistribution of the world's natural 
resources or land follows from the idea of respecting 
liberty. In practice the libertarian solution with land 
and resources is almost always to respect priority and buy 
out the existing owner provided that his property was 
libertarianly acquired. How do we know that people have 
acquired their possessions in a libertarian manner? In the 
absence of evidence to the contrary people have to be 
presumed to have done so. 'Innocent until proved guilty' 
is libertarian given that any other policy is likely to 
result in insecurity and violence that would be disastrous 
to liberty (and, of course, welfare).
43 Simon 1981.
Intellectual Property
Intellectual property is an important general issue for the 
theory of liberty and ought not to be neglected. There has 
been no mention of it on our desert island examples, but 
that is not because this topic is a mere matter of social 
convention. The maximisation of liberty has fairly clear 
implications as regards intellectual property without 
reference to the laws or customs of any particular society. 
However it seems easier to discuss this issue without using 
the desert island. This is a vast and complicated area 
that poses novel problems. All that will be attempted here 
is to show very briefly and approximately that the theory 
of liberty (as the absence of imposed costs) can come up 
with general answers and that these are likely to increase 
welfare.
Copyrights and patents appear to be similar in that they 
are designed to protect the expression of ideas from common 
ownership. It is debated by libertarians whether one 
should protect neither, one, or both of these. Rothbard 
accepts copyrights in perpetuity, but then rejects 
patents.44 I argue very generally here that both should be 
protected from a libertarian and welfarist viewpoint. We 
first tackle copyright and the general argument for 
intellectual property. (Nozick has a similar position in 
his Anarchy, State, and Utopia, though not flowing 
explicitly from a theory of liberty but of rights.45)
44 Rothbard 1977 p.71.
45 Nozick 1974 p.182.
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Copyright
The creators of the ideas in a book, music score, and so 
forth, have produced a resource that would not otherwise 
have existed, and they would thereby be regarded, by people 
who respect liberty, as having automatic ownership of that 
resource: they have imposed no cost on others by their 
creation but would themselves be imposed on (as their 
objections would show) if their creation were used without 
their consent. And they impose no cost on others by 
passing their product on to their descendants (or anyone 
else). If someone builds a stately home and that passes 
down to his descendents it would be an imposed cost to 
force the owners to hand it over to the National Trust 
after any time period. An intellectual edifice seems to be 
in an analogous position.
It is a good thing from a welfarist viewpoint that such 
creations would be protected for otherwise we should have a 
case of the tragedy of the commons in the realm of ideas.
If people could not own the physical expressions of the 
intellectual products that they took some time and energy 
to come by, create, or cultivate (without imposing costs on 
others) then the incentive to produce new intellectual 
products would be destroyed to a considerable extent.
Many people choose to give their ideas freely: perhaps they 
do so because they enjoy discussing ideas; or they are
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altruistic; or they value status or popularity more then 
cash; or they need the idea to catch on if it is to be 
valuable at all. But if people had no chance to sell the 
fruits of their efforts in the intellectual realm, then 
many efforts would surely not be made.
In the interests of overall welfare could there be a limit 
on copyrights to increase production? There might be a 
fear that some dynastic drones could live off the 
intellectual output of some ancestor without at least the 
UK's fifty-years-after-death limit on copyright. But the 
fact that his work could make for some security for his 
children and grandchildren might well be part of the work 
motivation of the original copyrighter.
And if works are compulsorily allocated to the public 
domain then the incentive to revive some copyrighted piece 
might well be destroyed (thus has much great music been 
neglected for centuries) . If others might step in as soon 
as one had paid for the revival of a piece, it might be 
uneconomic to initiate the revival in the first place. As 
long as there is some owner it would be possible to buy it 
from him in order to exploit it. If there is no traceable 
owner, and no act of donation to the public domain, then 
the property might libertarianly be held to be owned by 
whoever first claims it or invests in it by using it (as it 
would be imposing a cost on him for others to reap the 
rewards of his investment) .
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Patents
Similar libertarian and welfare arguments support the 
existence of patents. Patents present extra problems, but 
these are soluble in a non-arbitrary fashion that is 
compatible with liberty and welfare.
Nobody re-invents so much as a poem or a song, let alone an 
entire book or symphony. The main problem with technical 
innovations and full inventions is that, unlike almost all 
copyrightable material, if one person did not come up with 
them then others might very likely have done so eventually. 
Does the first group have the libertarian property right to 
the patent in perpetuity as with copyright?
In almost all cases, no. If someone arrives at an idea 
that would probably have been arrived at by another in 
about a year then he ought only to have a full patent for 
about a year. This is based on the idea that we want to 
follow the general libertarian (and welfarist) rule of 
internalising externalities as far as possible. To allow 
the individual to keep a longer patent would clearly be to 
allow him to receive more value from his creation than he 
is responsible for. His monopoly would then impose costs 
on others: on those who would have come up with the same 
idea and on consumers who are denied the lower prices that 
competition would have brought. At the end of a full 
patent the idea should gradually enter the public domain 
(in proportion to the likely speed— determined by
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professional experts— of independent invention and 
competition by others).
There are bound to be hard cases when it comes to deciding 
the length that a full patent ought to run (and its period 
of decline), but approximations are far better than 
nothing; they are also better than some fixed patent. This 
is bound to give certain inventions undeservedly long 
patents, and others undeservedly short ones: the time 
period might not be enough to encourage some of the 
potential research where more is required to make it pay; 
as long the fixed period for a relatively unimaginative 
item or for one likely to be soon independently invented 
keeps the price up for no libertarian or welfare reason.
Patent decisions need not be final: any judgement could be 
challenged in the courts at any future time if new evidence 
came to light.
247
3.7 Friedman's problems
This section tackles the rest of the list of Friedman's 
problems for a theory of liberty, and includes the 
following topics: land acquisition, rectifying illiberal 
acts, libertarian consequentialism, and the relation of 
economics to libertarianism.
Some idea has already been given of what liberty entails 
where others' property effects our property, whether the 
effects be certain or merely probable. Next some more 
needs to be said about the libertarian acquisition of land 
that Friedman thinks is unclear in Locke.
Land acquisition
Friedman spies a problem in Locke's account of acquisition:
If we knew how I acquired ownership of land, we might 
also know what that ownership consists of. 
Unfortunately, we do not know . . . John Locke . . . 
suggested that we acquire land by mixing our labor 
with it, but he did not explain how, when I clear a 
piece of forest, I acquire not only the increased 
value due to my efforts but complete ownership over 
the land. How, in particular, do I acquire the right 
to forbid you from walking across the land— something 
you could have done even if I had never cleared it?46
Friedman then writes of another libertarian idea, that of
claiming land or marking its boundaries:
no one, so far as I know, has presented any convincing 
reason why, if land starts out belonging equally to 
everyone, I somehow lose my right to walk on it as a 
result of your loudly announcing it is yours.
46 Friedman, D. 1989 p.170.
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It is easy enough to show why the conversion of 
common property into private property is a good thing- 
-why it makes us better off— but it is very much 
harder to derive property rights in land from some a 
priori theory of natural rights.4
First, from a libertarian viewpoint land must start out 
belonging to no one in particular given that it is not 
invested in or relied on, rather than "equally to everyone" 
(or we should be able to do nothing liberally without the 
consent of everyone) . If liberty is to be maximised, then 
the reason that initial labouring on virgin land should 
entail that the labourer must have control over its use (or 
why the land must be his property, which is the same thing) 
is that any attempt to take it from him when there is "as 
much and as good" would clearly be imposing a cost on him 
by interfering with his voluntary projects, and so limiting 
his freedom. (There is, of course, no cost imposed on 
others by denying them use of the labourer's products as 
they are no worse off as a result of their creation.)
The libertarian reasons that allow me to exclude others 
entirely from the land I occupy include avoidance of the 
following imposed costs: it is an imposed cost to be 
interrupted, dogged, spied on, and pestered when not in 
public places where this is explicitly allowed; trespassers 
are likely to have no particular reason to wander around 
our used land unless they are up to no good— they put 
people in fear whatever their intentions; they may well do 
some damage, if only by wear and tear, to what we have
47 Ibid. pp.170-171.
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invested in; they would probably have little reason to walk 
there unless we had produced something of interest (if they 
are enjoying our gardens they are gaining from our labour 
without our agreement and, as this is not a public place, 
are stealing a free show); the trespasser usually wants his 
own privacy respected despite not respecting ours and we 
are usually happy to reciprocate such respect if that is 
the price for our own privacy.
All these facts are contingent on the nature of the world 
and man. In a small world of natural nomads a handful of 
'perverted' settlers could be as great (or greater) an 
imposition on the nomads by blocking their travels. In 
such a world it might be a lesser imposition to require 
people not to settle than to require the nomads to avoid 
their settlements forever. In our world the lesser 
imposition is to require the wanderers to respect private 
property. It is a loss of freedom (an imposed cost that 
people cause each other) that we cannot just walk where we 
like, but it would be a greater imposed cost if we had to 
allow everyone to walk into our homes whenever they chose 
to do so.
Claims to property that are based on liberty are not 
absolute, for the same principle sometimes implies that 
such claims be set aside. The case of the hut on the hill 
during the flood (discussed earlier) was one such example, 
but a classic libertarian problem should make the case 
clearer. The problem assumes the right to trespass is 
absolutely proscribed on libertarian grounds. It then
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assumes that someone buys up all the property surrounding 
some innocent person. That person can now be a held as a 
prisoner by a purely libertarian principle. Surely there 
is something wrong with the 'libertarian' principle if such 
an illiberal consequence is derivable.
There is something wrong with this principle: it is not 
inherently libertarian. Where maximising liberty clashes 
with private property rights, there private property rights 
must be set aside in the interests of liberty. It is 
obviously a terrible imposition on someone to imprison him 
when he has done no particular wrong. And relative to this 
it is a small imposition to walk across someone's land 
though the owner would rather people did not. Liberty 
entails reasonable rights of access. When liberties clash 
(when we get in the way of each other's voluntary projects) 
the lesser imposition has to be preferred on the grounds of 
liberty (though, as in the smoke-pollution example, some 
compensation might be obligatory).
What if someone— for whatever unlikely reason— makes 
explicit and witting agreements to be imprisoned? This 
someone would then have bound himself voluntarily and could 
not be freed without violating the liberty of those with 
whom he had contracted. Respecting social liberty must 
usually include the respecting of contracts be they never 
so onerous. The observation of contracts is always prima 
facie liberty-maximising because you impose a cost on me if 
you try to deny me what you have already ceded ownership
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of, but I impose no cost on you by merely keeping what you 
freely contractually gave me.
But suppose a world drought. And that the last natural 
water supply in the world would have been there whether or 
not the current 'owner' controlled it. Probably few people 
(no one?) would have contracted with him to allow his 
exclusive use (and contracts may have implicit ceteris 
paribus clauses to cover such things anyway) , so he has no 
absolute right to the water. He would be imposing costs on 
others (denying their liberty) if he were to keep from them 
this uniquely valuable natural resource that they would 
have had access to without him. Only if he really had 
explicitly contracted for his absolute ownership with 
everyone would they have voluntarily constrained themselves 
and so have no libertarian claim to the water. (Again, this 
interpretation of the Lockean proviso is more or less in 
accord with Nozick's. ° But here we use an explicit theory 
of liberty that is supposed to be clearer than Nozick's 
theory of rights.)
This example is logically possible but quite unlikely.
Some might reply that the extraction of fossil fuels really 
are an imposition on a continuum with monopolising a 
uniquely valuable natural resource. To the extent that a 
state monopolises them by force this may be so. But 
otherwise they are worthless underground and anyone can go 
prospecting and labouring for them if he wishes. As
48 Ibid. pp.178-182.
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technology advances it is often effectively increasing the 
supply of these things faster than they are being used.
And some of them are already becoming redundant due to new 
sources of power and new technology (for some empirical
, , , A Q  ,
data see Julian Simon's The Ultimate Resource ). There is 
no strong libertarian reason that those who produce these 
things should share the fruits of their labours except 
voluntarily.
We do not necessarily need to "mix labour" with unowned 
land in order to have some libertarian property claim to 
it. We can use land without investing labour in it (and 
water too, see the later reply to Gray's "fisher folk" 
problem). If it is already right for our purposes as it 
is, then it would be perverse to say that we have to change 
it to make it ours. If (in a state of nature) we want 
pasture for a cow (to take Hume's example of the problem 
when he criticises Locke50) then we might need do no more 
than have the cow in a suitable spot on a long lead. If 
others do not then keep away they will be imposing more of 
a cost on us than we do on them by requiring them to go 
elsewhere. (But if our use is not frequent and obvious 
others might come to establish stronger libertarian 
property claims by their greater use and reliance on the 
resource.)
49 Simon 1981.
50 Hume 1968 Bk III p. 234.
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50 the idea of liberty as not imposing costs on others is 
the principle that can tell us what constitutes libertarian 
acquisition of property and what does not. We have derived 
property in land from a coherent and consistent meaning of 
(social) liberty (which was the gist of Friedman's 
challenge) but this is not to claim that there is a natural 
right to liberty (which Friedman thought would be the type 
of principle to which those advocating liberty must 
adhere).
Rectifying illiberal acts
Next, Friedman poses questions about rectifying illiberal 
acts. How "do libertarian moral principles tell you what 
degree of proof should be necessary for conviction and 
punishment?"51 And "in order to prevent theft, you must be 
able to take back more than was stolen. But how much 
more?"52
The brief answer in each case is that, first, any honest 
contractual arrangements would be automatically libertarian 
and, second, in the absence of contractual arrangements the 
correct method is to implement whatever system minimises 
the imposition of costs. The application of libertarian 
theory does require much clarification and elaboration 
which I can only begin to give in outline here. I use this 
opportunity for a general discussion of the correct way, in
51 Friedman, D. 1989 p.171.
52 Ibid. p.171.
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libertarian principle, to calculate restitution, and then 
look at the libertarian implications for punishment and 
proof.
Restitution
I do not impose a cost on you by merely taking restitution 
for your imposition on me. For instance, if you steal what 
I have created and I take it back I am merely undoing an 
imposed cost and not imposing a cost myself. If I take 
damages as well then you will certainly be worse off than 
before your theft but the damages have to be seen as part 
of the cost of what you freely chose to do. I am merely 
not allowing you to pass that cost on to me.
A simple case is dealt with first. On our desert island we 
do not discover each other until after you pick and consume 
fruit from a tree I have grown. You have unwittingly 
stolen the literal fruits of my labours. Those fruits 
would not have been there without my growing them. You 
have interfered with my personal projects in a way I object 
to. That is a constraint on my freedom. Had I not cared 
about the fruit or been happy for you to have it then you 
would not have imposed on me. As it is I do care. Can 
this imposition be rectified?
The imposition would normally be made roughly good if you 
were to give me something of equal worth to the value (to 
me) of the fruit. But damages ought to be limited by the 
fact that my presence on the island partly imposes a cost
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on you and caused you to impose on me by mistake. We have 
both slightly interfered with the other's projects by being 
there. We can only minimise the imposition by the one who 
has been more imposed on being compensated with the 
difference by the other.
Individual values are relevant here. Assuming I wanted 
only to eat the apple for its food value, compensation 
might be easy. You could either give me a replacement or 
something of equal worth to me. As I was imposing on you—  
also unwittingly— by putting you in the situation of having 
eaten another's apple, a replacement would normally seem to 
be a maximum.
But as our values determine the extent of the imposition 
unusual values could alter the situation. If you had a 
religious aversion to eating fruit grown by infidels (such 
as I am) then you might well feel that you had been more 
imposed on and seek some compensation from me. (There are 
obvious practical problems with these subjective 
assessments but these do not concern us here where we are 
looking at the possibility of solutions in principle.) Let 
us take three similar examples to clarify the situation.
You have an item with a sentimental value of about a 
thousand pounds to you (you recently offered a reward of 
that much when you lost it, and would do so again) : a lock 
of your dead wife's hair which you keep in your hat band 
(the old hat is worth only a few pounds) . This item has 
negative market value for anyone but you (as you are part
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of the market the market value including you is a thousand 
pounds; a point usually overlooked in compulsory purchases 
of property by the state).
First, suppose you are walking in the park one day when a 
spiteful acquaintance, aware of the value of the contents, 
takes the hat and throws it onto a bonfire where it is 
immediately consumed. Second, suppose a youth takes your 
hat— innocent of its valuable contents— and throws it onto 
the fire as an illiberal jest. Third, suppose someone 
accidentally knocks your hat into the fire while pointing 
his walking stick. What is the correct libertarian 
restitution in each case?
In the first case someone knowingly does at least a 
thousand pounds worth of damage. This would seem a minimum 
sum for which he should be liable in order to rectify the 
imposition.
In the second case someone does you much more damage than 
he intends to. It can be argued that if someone treats 
property as though it were his then he should suffer for 
the damage as he would do if he had damaged his own 
property. I disagree. It seems more plausible to me that 
as this damage was not reasonably foreseeable you would be 
imposing on the youth by putting him 'at risk' of such 
damage and then taking a thousand pounds from him. He 
intended to see you lose something worth a few pounds; he 
might never have destroyed something that plausibly might 
be worth a thousand pounds. He would have been more
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culpable had he broken into your house; you had clearly 
taken a risk by taking such a valuable good to a public 
place where some such incident is more likely. Under the 
circumstances the youth ought to be treated as having 
destroyed only the hat.
A fortiori, the stick-pointer can only be held responsible 
for the price of the hat at most— for you choose to put
yourself at risk of such innocent accidents by being in a
public place. Suppose someone with bones as brittle as 
glass went out and were deliberately knocked over. Unless 
the ensuing broken bones were reasonably foreseeable, by 
the person who knocked him over, the risk of venturing out 
would have to be largely that of the delicate person. Any 
restitution should be proportionate to knocking over a 
person of more ordinary health.
If the costs associated with risks are not the 
responsibility of those most in control of them then people 
are tempted to take more and greater risks knowing that
others will have to bear the costs. For instance, making
health care free at the point of consumption is a way of 
allowing people to pass the costs of their health risks 
onto others. Standard economic analysis predicts that this 
must increase the number and severity of risks that people 
take with their health.
What if people benefit you by a thousand pounds in 
analogous circumstances? By attempting to damage you by a 
thousand pounds someone saves you a thousand pounds. Such
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a person would not have imposed on you and you could not 
therefore claim restitution. But it may seem that it must 
still be libertarianly permissible to punish the attempted 
imposition of costs to some degree, or there will be more 
impositions due to lack of deterrence. We deal with 
punishment next.
Is punishment necessary?
From a libertarian viewpoint, punishment has to be 
calculated to result in minimising the imposition on, or 
expense to, everyone without their consent. If the parties 
to any dispute are contractually bound then that would 
sanction as liberal any contractual procedure and forfeit 
due to a breach; that this is libertarian should follow 
fairly clearly from the earlier discussion of contract (but 
see the later point on contractual judicial procedures that 
punish the wrong man). This means that after restitution 
(including damages) has been effected any punishment of the 
criminals must aim at minimising the imposed costs that 
comprise the criminal activities plus any impositions on 
the criminals themselves. Unless we allow punishment of 
the criminal that is greater than the imposed costs caused 
by the crime it seems that there will sometimes be more 
overall imposition than need be tolerated. But anything 
done to the criminal that is a greater imposition on him 
than restitution demands can only be liberally sanctioned 
on the consequential grounds of maximising liberty by 
deterrence.
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Could the liberal nature of contract enforcement include 
the idea of the criminal's tacitly contracting into any 
punishment his victim demands and so possibly avoid such 
consequentialism? The argument is that the criminal is in 
a position analogous to the diner in a restaurant who by 
convention has a tacit contract to pay the bill. In the 
same way that any intention not to pay from the outset does 
not invalidate his obligation to pay, the criminal's 
intention to get away with his crime does not invalidate 
the penalty that is the price set by the victim.
I think that this is a bad analogy. The restaurant owner 
is trying to sell his meals so will, more or less, set a 
price at a level limited by this goal. He is imposed on to 
roughly the price of the meal if the customer leaves 
without paying. A vindictive victim is tempted to set his 
'price' as high as he can to completely deter criminal 
'customers'. But too high a price might not only exceed 
restitution but can even result in a greater imposition on 
the criminal than imposed-cost-minimising deterrence can 
sanction (for instance, as it would to hang people for 
petty theft).
And yet— the fact that a criminal undertakes a crime 
knowing the punishment if caught does seem to put him in a 
guasi-tacit-contractual position. He does not have a 
proper tacit contract to be punished (as the diner has to 
pay the bill) , but if he is punished beyond the level of 
restitution (for deterrence purposes) he cannot claim that 
he is simply an innocent person being used illiberally for
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others' purposes (though if consequentialism is compatible 
with libertarianism— as argued in more detail later— use of 
the innocent cannot be absolutely ruled illiberal in any 
case). So we might say that the illiberal criminal has a 
quasi-tacit-contract to be punished and that this puts him 
in quite a different position from an entirely innocent 
person.
However, if the degree of restitution are high enough then 
that will act as a deterrent without having to resort to 
the consequentialist argument. Once the proportion of the 
costs of insurance, security devices, policing and judicial 
procedure (that the criminal makes necessary) are included 
in the restitution (for these will all be private) it may 
well be that there is no need to resort to liberal 
consequentialism. And there are also punishments that are 
quite liberal such as giving the criminal unwelcome 
publicity and the discrimination against him that may then 
ensue. Private policing should also make for a much 
greater chance of being caught. If this is correct then 
side-constraint libertarianism need not be abandoned here. 
But the literature on libertarian punishment in theory and 
practice is as yet too thin for even a libertarian to be 
sure.
Proof
The degree of proof that should be necessary to convict in 
principle is also that which minimises the infractions of 
freedom. Technology will constantly alter the
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circumstances but in the absence of infallibility the 
important point is that an imperfect system must allow the 
chance of the punishment of the innocent in order to deter 
even greater imposition by criminals. The degree of proof 
that minimises the imposition of costs on people, by 
whichever source, is to be preferred.
But, again, the degree of proof necessary for conviction 
need not necessarily be defended only in this libertarian 
consequentialist way. There might be real contracts 
involved. If this is so then any outcome will be 
ultimately libertarian in the sense that the criminal had 
voluntarily accepted the system in the first place and 
thereby bound himself. In particular, anyone freely 
contracting to abide by a particular judicial procedure in 
the event of, or during, criminal charges will not be 
having costs imposed on him to the extent that the 
procedure takes place as agreed.
This might sound wrong. Of course the accused person might 
suffer a great personal loss if he, for instance, suffers 
the death penalty, but this would be like flying with an 
airline when the plane crashes: in both cases someone is 
dead as a result of a fault in the system he contracted 
into, but the airline does not impose a cost (though he 
suffers a cost) by mistakenly killing him (unless it was 
negligent in contractual terms) and neither does the 
judicial system impose a cost by mistakenly killing the 
wrong man. This might seem more like an imposed cost only 
because in one sense they deliberately kill him, but that
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cannot follow from the definition of liberty and the 
analysis of contracts (if correct).
Those who are tried without their agreement (they are 
arrested and taken to a court they have no contract to 
recognise) would clearly be having a cost imposed on them 
if the judgement were wrong (and against them), and thereby 
entitled to restitution on libertarian grounds (though, to 
please its customers, any private system is bound in 
practice to offer compensation if it discovers an error in 
sentencing). The 'entitlement' is, of course, merely 
hypothetical— if liberty is to be the rule observed— and 
not a moral claim that it ought to be the rule observed.
So, to the extent that there is punishment to deter the 
illiberal criminal (and others) from similar offences, and 
to the extent that non-contracting persons are wrongly 
convicted, there are costs imposed on people in excess of 
any cost they imposed on others. This can only be 
libertarianly defended consequentially as minimising the 
impositions of costs across society (anything beyond 
overall deterrence of illiberal acts would be illiberal). 
This is a very important point for it seems (to me) to be 
the only area where libertarianism might in practice be 
applied 'consequentially' (albeit only to deter illiberal 
crime) to maximise liberty instead of as a side-constraint 
(it is taken as obvious that deterrence is also necessary 
to maximise welfare) . Such libertarian consequentialism is 
discussed in the reply to Friedman next.
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Liberty, utility and consequentialism
Instead of offering more problems for which the "natural 
rights approach" offers no solution, David Friedman then 
offers the criticism that "the usual statements of 
libertarian principles imply conclusions that almost
II C O
nobody, libertarian or otherwise, believes in.
A madman is about to shoot at a crowd. The owner of the 
only rifle available for shooting the madman (which is all 
that could stop him) would not allow us to borrow it. 
Libertarian rights theory, as Friedman understands it, 
implies that people have no right to take the rifle, even 
for this purpose. Is it desirable to take the rifle and 
shoot the madman? Friedman say it is desirable.
He suggests:
One solution to the problem is to reject the idea that 
natural rights are absolute; potential victims have 
the right to commit a minor rights violation ... iQr] 
... natural rights are convenient rules of thumb.
And he later suggests that a better principle than
inviolable private property might be something like:
do whatever minimises the total amount of coercion ... 
both seizing the rifle and imposing a draft ... [can 
be] ... not only consistent with libertarian principle 
but required by it. 5
He then gives what he feels to be a counterexample: it
seems wrong to steal a hundred-dollar rifle to prevent only
53 Ibid. pp.171-172.
54 Ibid. p.172.
55 Ibid. p.175.
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two hundred dollars from being stolen from me (assuming 
that "coercion"— illiberalism— is measured by the amount of 
value of what is stolen).56
Friedman's suggestion that liberty might be interpreted 
consequentially fits with the position that has been 
outlined so far; unfortunately he conflates this insight 
into the logical implications of respecting liberty with 
his
moral reactions to some examples.
His intuition that it would be wrong to steal a hundred 
dollar rifle to prevent the theft of a mere two hundred 
dollars in cash can be answered along the lines of one of 
Hare's defences of utilitarianism. We are tacitly aware of 
the impracticality of a rule's allowing such small 
differences to justify the supposed consequential 
justification of theft. Friedman is supposed to be 
accepting that the dollar values are the only measures of 
"coercion" and that no other factors are involved. But 
perhaps he has a strong suspicion that such a rule would, 
in reality, be open to abuse and have all kinds of side- 
effects apart from the dollar value of the possible thefts. 
And having this thought in the back of his mind might be 
affecting his intuition.
If we are to implement the rule of liberty as much as 
possible then we must prefer a situation where there is
56 Ibid. p.175.
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less overall imposition on individuals, whatever else 
thereby occurs. In other words, respect for liberty as 
such (just like the respect for utility as such) must 
ultimately be consequentialist. Any limit on the 
consequential promotion of liberty shows that there must be 
another principle in operation.
It could be that Friedman has conflicting non-libertarian 
principles here (as he does in the next example) but he 
does not call on any alternative principle. So it seems he 
must be using his practical intuition as to how liberty is 
normally best respected to misjudge an artificial thought- 
experiment. This is just the sort of thing that Hare feels 
that people often do when criticising utilitarian 
consequentialism (if that is not a pleonasm).
Friedman later makes an interesting remark about
libertarian consequentialism compared with utilitarianism:
One would face very similar problems in defining and 
measuring the amount of coercion [illiberalism] and in 
judging the trade off between increased coercion for 
one person and decreased coercion for another.
This seems to indicate that he does not consider the
possibility that there can be convincing arguments that
side-constraint libertarianism can maximise liberty in
practice.
57 Ibid. p.180.
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Friedman continues:
A second problem with this approach is that it is of 
no help when we must choose between a small cost in 
coercion and an enormous cost in something else.
He feels that it is right to steal a hundred dollars worth
of equipment if by so doing he can save the world from a
natural catastrophe, but this cannot be justified as
minimising total "coercion". So "our response to such
questions demonstrates that we do not really believe in
RQ . . . .single simple values." The "claim that we put individual
• • • finrights above everything else is, for most of us, false."
The example of saving the world by stealing some cheap 
equipment is different because Friedman offers a genuinely 
powerful competing principle: choosing "between a small 
cost in coercion and an enormous cost in something else."61 
In the example of saving the world by a small theft 
Friedman does demonstrate that liberty is not plausibly 
always the supreme value even to 'libertarians'. Moral 
pluralism is psychologically unavoidable for almost 
everyone. Almost every general moral principle (as opposed 
to a specific moral response to particular circumstances) 
is held ceteris paribus so that we could think of extreme 
or unusual circumstances where we would prefer another 
principle. This thesis does not need to deny this. What 
is being attempted here is a philosophical reconciliation
58 Ibid. p.175.
59 Ibid. p.176.
60 Ibid. p.176.
61 Ibid. p.175.
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of liberty and welfare in practice. It is admitted that 
they both can diverge in theory. As long as one is happy 
with the principle of liberty in practice one can concede 
Friedman's point and still sensibly call oneself a 
'libertarian'. Again, this practical possibility seems to 
have been overlooked.
We are then given an example that is particularly 
interesting as regards the reconciliation of liberty and 
welfare. Friedman wants to give some weight to happiness 
(rather than preference satisfaction) but rejects 
utilitarianism because he can also construct situations 
where he feels strongly that the utilitarian solution is 
the wrong one. He cites the example of the sheriff in the 
small town being able to prevent a riot in which three or 
four are going to be lynched if he frames and hangs an 
innocent person. Utilitarianism is supposed to entail 
framing the innocent man, but Friedman thinks this wrong.
The interesting point here is that not only utilitarianism 
but also libertarianism— interpreted consequentially—  
entails that it is better to hang the innocent man. For 
four lynchings are (other things being equal) four times 
the imposed cost of one hanging. Again, Hare's analysis of 
this type of situation as applying practical intuitions to 
a highly artificial case might explain Friedman's response. 
Friedman seems to corroborate this analysis when he admits 
that he might frame the man to save a million lives, but 
not to save one or two. But if we seek to respect liberty 
or utility then it must be better that only one is forcibly
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hanged rather than two. In the absence of a competing 
moral principle Friedman can only be influenced by strong 
intuitions that have there basis in the practical dangers 
of such a policy.
Nozick does not seem to extricate himself from the 
irrationality charge of absolute side-constraints. He 
ultimately concludes that absolute "side constraints upon 
action reflect the underlying Kantian principle that 
individuals are ends and not merely means"62 But if we 
want to respect people as ends as far as possible then 
surely it is better that fewer are used as means (or that 
people are used to a lesser degree) . This Kantian approach 
still does not seem to rule out libertarian 
consequentialism in principle.
Thus we see that (analogously with utilitarianism) what we 
might call act- and rule-libertarianism also collapse under 
analysis (though showing that it first makes sense to 
separate them is more of a problem for most libertarians) . 
But this does not prevent its being the best libertarian 
(consequentialist) rule to practice side-constraint 
libertarianism (for similar economising and moral-hazard 
reasons to those that apply to its utilitarian defence).
62 Nozick 1974 pp.30-31.
Libertarianism and economics
It seems desirable to criticise Friedman's loose account of
libertarianism and the role of economics with respect to
it. He concludes:
libertarianism is not a collection of straightforward 
and unambiguous arguments establishing with certainty 
a set of unquestionable propositions. It is rather 
the attempt to apply certain economic and ethical 
insights to a very complicated world.63
Libertarianism is not even "the attempt to apply certain 
economic and ethical insights to a very complicated world." 
It is clearer to say that libertarianism is the view that 
people should have liberty (one could even think this for 
misanthropic reasons). Economic, ethical, philosophical, 
and any other types of insights can only be used to
explicate and defend this view.
Friedman later asserts that the superior development of
economics to moral philosophy means that "economics is not
only a better way of persuading others. It is also a
6 Abetter way of finding out what I myself am in favor of."
And he holds that (as quoted at the start) "economic 
analysis of law can answer questions about what the law 
ought to be that I cannot answer— that I believe cannot be 
answered— on the basis of libertarian principles."
63 Ibid. p.176.
64 Ibid. p.182.
65 Ibid. p.199.
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Important though economics is, it should now be clear that 
economics cannot be an alternative to the libertarian 
principle but can only be one tool for examining it. 
Philosophy is necessary to show what liberty is and what it 
generally entails (in all areas, including that of law) . 
Economics can only then fill in the details and show the 
utilitarian advantages of liberty. I am sure that the 
theory of liberty requires more defence, correction and 
elaboration. But without the libertarian principle and its 
philosophical elaboration there can be no general 
libertarian framework at all for economics to work on.
There can only be a utilitarian defence of the free market. 
This only escapes taking liberty as a moral principle by 
taking utility as a moral principle (as Friedman implicitly 
does). So that is what (apart from his criticisms, 
discussed here, of the clarity of the principle of liberty) 
Friedman's book must be about despite his claim to be a 
'libertarian'.
3.8 Gray's criticisms
This section criticises Gray's views on a variety of 
liberal issues focusing on liberal democracy, restrictivist 
theories of liberty, the free-slave paradox, whether there 
is a single libertarian principle, Locke's principle of 
acquisition, the liberal problem, and the future for 
liberalism.
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John Gray is currently one of the main philosophical
critics of liberty. His academic background is in
political philosophy. Gray has analysed various
conceptions and defences of liberty and liberalism and
found them all wanting; as he puts it in the preface to his
Liberalisms: Essays in Political Theory :
The upshot of the arguments developed in these essays 
is that the political morality that is constitutive of 
liberalism cannot be given any statement that is 
determinate or coherent and it has no claim on 
reason.67
Many of Gray's arguments seem sound; here we criticise 
mainly those of his arguments that are incompatible with 
this thesis which have not been dealt with in the reply to 
Friedman or elsewhere (there will be some repetition where 
clarification seems desirable). It is convenient to take 
them in the order in which they appear in Liberalisms.
Many of Gray's points include or have in the background 
many of the other points he raises. In replying it is 
necessary to focus on one at a time but the result is that 
this section needs to be read as a whole to get a 
comprehensive answer to any apparently single issue Gray 
raises— in fact the thesis as a whole is needed to fill in 
further details.
66 Gray 1989.
67 Ibid. p.vii.
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Liberal democracy
Of Popper's defence of liberal democracy Gray writes:
So far as I know, there is no plausible counter­
example to Popper's conjecture that the conditions of 
scientific criticism (and so of successful problem­
solving) are most closely approximated in liberal 
democracies, and are inescapably disrupted by 
revolutionary upheavals in which a non-violent 
adversarial exchange of ideas is no longer a real 
option. Until Popper's theory is decisively 
falsified, and a better one is forthcoming, we are 
entitled to conclude that Popper's theory of piecemeal 
social engineering has resisted the attacks of its 
critics.68
Gray apparently approves of the "non-violent adversarial 
exchange of ideas". But this is not quite what happens in 
a liberal democracy. A liberal democracy is a sort of 
substitute for all-out civil war. The winning side imposes 
its rules on the others by force and the threat of force. 
The taxation and regulation of people who are not imposing 
on anyone is itself a form of aggressive coercion rather 
than peaceful persuasion.
. . . fiQWhen Popper was writing The Open Society and its Enemies 
he was contrasting the workings of democracies with 
totalitarian regimes of the kind with which the allies were 
at war. He considered the book to be his war effort. By 
such a contrast, democracies are certainly more conducive 
to individual freedom and welfare, and I do not intend to 
contradict the general thesis for which Popper was arguing. 
I am happy to agree with Winston Churchill that democracy
Ibid. p.22.
69 Popper 1945.
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is the worst form of government— apart from any other, I
should merely wish to add that anarchy is not as bad as 
7 ndemocracy.'u
A far better analogy with the conditions of scientific 
criticism is the anarchistic working of the free market. 
Here people have to be persuaded to buy a good or service, 
or try a different religion or lifestyle. When they do so 
it is done only at their own expense. It is a similar 
individual approach that works in science. Liberal 
democracies coercively ban and enforce various practices in 
a way that tends not to happen in science— unless the state 
intervenes.
In the free market new goods and services offered by the 
individual enterpriser are analogous with the bold new 
theories of the individual scientist. Analogous with 
having scientific theories aimed at truth these consumer 
goods are aimed to satisfy demand. So such things as state 
subsidies to failing businesses and imposing import 
restrictions to protect 'domestic' production, are 
analogous with ad hoc defences of a theory (here in the 
form of a product) instead of accepting the 'falsification' 
that is the absence of consumer demand.
70 Mises and Ricardo have argued that the market can itself 
been seen as a sophisticated and fair form of democracy 
(rule by the people) , but that cannot be literally true as 
there is no rule in the market, only voluntary cooperation. 
The consumer is sovereign over only himself and his 
purchases.
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Social planning that is imposed by force has the 
objectionable character of a revolution even if it is writ 
small because done piecemeal. Genuinely peaceful 
persuasion along libertarian lines completely avoids the 
problems of "social planning".71
This is but a sketch of the similarities between a free 
scientific community and a genuinely free society. Between 
a free scientific community and the coercive impositions of 
a "liberal democracy" the disanalogies are glaring. The 
trouble is that a 'liberal democracy' is more or less a 
contradiction in terms (at least, to the extent that 
'liberal' means having respect for individual's liberty): 
the more liberty individuals have the less they can be 
ruled by the 'people' (or anyone else). The scientific 
community is more or less a liberal anarchy in that anyone 
can form a theory, test it, and offer the evidence to 
anyone interested.
My conjecture is that if the scientific community were 
democratically run it would be as great a disaster for the 
discovery of truth as democracy is a disaster for the 
promotion of liberty and welfare.
Restrictivism
In arguments about liberty Gray objects to what he calls 
the "restrictivists": those who think that "disputes about
71 Ibid. p.22.
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the nature of freedom may be resolved conclusively and to 
the satisfaction of all reasonable students of the 
subject." Various approaches include the "stipulative 
definition of freedom backed up by weighty arguments about 
its operational utility", and an appeal to ordinary usage 
or that of classic texts. In all cases "what 
restrictivists have in common ... is a rejection of the 
claim that freedom is what has been called an essentially 
contested concept."7 2
Gray tells us of typical secondary positions: viewing 
freedom as "a descriptive concept" without evaluative 
aspects; tending to "affirm that a rational consensus on 
the proper uses of the concept of freedom can be reached in 
the absence of any prior agreement on broader issues in 
social and political theory"73; and being "disposed to 
reject the claim that metaphysical views about the self and 
its powers are germane to disputes about the nature of 
social freedom".74
Gray concludes:
restrictivist theses about freedom demonstrably 
endorse naive and superseded positions in the 
philosophy of mind and action and in the theory of our 
knowledge of the social world.
72 Gray 1989 p.45.
73 Ibid. p.45.
74 Ibid. p.46.
75 Ibid. p.46.
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The view of liberty in this thesis is undoubtedly what Gray 
would label "restrictivist". Gray offers a more or less 
dissuasive definition of "restrictivism". His position is 
hard to criticise on the basis of this definition alone and 
the full criticism must include all the other replies to 
Gray in this section. But it seems necessary to criticise 
this definition to some extent or it will seem to have some
of the dissuasive force that is intended for it.
Though this thesis offers an account of freedom intended to
be the correct one it is not held that the account is
obvious or without problems in practical applications.
Also, to aim at resolving a debate conclusively and 
thinking that others ought to agree is quite consistent 
with the idea that one might be wrong and being certain 
that the debate will continue indefinitely. Gray seems to 
be unfairly implying that people that offer bold sweeping 
solutions are automatically dogmatic and naive.
In this thesis there has indeed been an attempt to refine 
ordinary usage to make it consistent and clear so that 
problem cases can be dealt with decisively. But even if 
what is called 'liberty' in this thesis is not, as 
intended, a refinement of ordinary usage but something 
quite new, the claim that it solves the problems it is 
applied to is a separate issue, compared with which the 
'essence' of common usage is quite trivial.
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In some sense all concepts are open to being contested 
because everything is conjectural (as Popper has 
conjectured without refutation, as far as I can see). But 
concepts such as truth and freedom are here conjectured to 
be less contestable than moral concepts. It is at least 
partly because Gray thinks that freedom presupposes a moral 
position that he thinks it is "essentially contestable".
If this thesis shows (as is intended) this not to be the 
case, then the contestability is much weaker.
This will mean that freedom can be a descriptive concept.
In which case "agreement on broader issues in social and 
political theory" is not obviously necessary. And to think 
that "views about the self and its powers" (in any detail, 
at least) are relevant to an understanding of freedom of 
the self is as mistaken as thinking that problems in 
epistemology affect the metaphysical concept of truth (as 
in the idea that unless you can give an account of how to 
discover truth you cannot make sense of the notion of 
truth) .
Gray partly thinks that the restrictivist position is naive 
because he is himself conflating what it means for a person 
to be free with what it means to be a person. In fact his 
final statement above (that "restrictivist theses about 
freedom demonstrably endorse naive and superseded positions 
in the philosophy of mind and action and in the theory of 
our knowledge of the social world") seems to show that he 
may be conflating a variety of metaphysical,
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epistemological and sociological issues (but we cannot 
profitable guess at what these all are) .
The free-slave paradox
Gray first explains the free-slave paradox (as I call it) 
as it is to be found in Isaiah Berlin's Two Concepts of 
Liberty76:
Since the degree of a man's negative freedom is the 
extent to which his desires are not frustrated by the 
interferences of others, he may always increase his 
freedom by trimming his desires. As he recognises, 
Berlin's original account has the consequence . . . that 
it precludes our characterising as unfree a wholly 
contented slave.7
Berlin's new account of freedom (Gray quotes):
ultimately depends not on whether I wish to walk at 
all, or how far, but on how many doors are open, upon 
their relative importance in my life . .. . The extent 
of my social or political freedom consists in the 
absence of obstacles not merely to my actual, but to 
my potential choices, to my acting in this or that way 
if I choose to do so. Similarly, absence of such 
freedom is due to the closing of such doors or failure 
to open them, as a result, intended or unintended, of 
alterable human practices, of the operation of human 
agencies. . . .  8
After examining various criticisms of this position Gray
suggests that:
the problem of the contented slave can be resolved by 
supplementing the bare notion of autonomy with an 
account of human nature that is bound to have a 
disputable character, but which is in no way beyond 
criticism or rational support. 9
76 Berlin 1984.
77 Gray 1989 p.69.
78 Ibid. pp.69-70.
79 Ibid. p.83.
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Accordingly Gray holds that:
confronted with a man who cared nothing for natural 
beauty, parental affection or sexual love, who sought 
no satisfactions in the life of the mind, in the 
development of his bodily powers, or in religious 
devotion, we would be disinclined to qualify him as 
autonomous and the source of our disinclination is not 
any logical property of the bare formal notion of 
autonomy, but rather our invocation of the concept of 
a human life.80
He concludes that:
such considerations deriving from the notion of a 
happy human life frame boundary conditions within 
which the concept of autonomy is at home ... the 
concept of human life enters into any judgement we 
make about the autonomy of human beings ... It is by 
invoking those considerations ... that we override the 
avowals of the slave that he is content with his lot, 
and dismiss the claim that there could be a 'truly 
contented' slave. 1
It will help to separate two issues here: What is the
correct solution to the paradox? What is wrong with 
Berlin's and Gray's accounts? The answers will develop 
during an analysis of the above accounts.
The theory of liberty here defended is a version of 
Berlin's original conception of negative liberty as (as 
Gray expresses it) existing to the extent that one's 
"desires are [not] frustrated by the interferences of
o  o  , ,
others". An "interference" is here glossed as imposing 
costs on people. So if you were not to mind the thing they
80 Ibid. p. 84.
81 Ibid. p. 84.
82 Ibid. p. 69.
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are doing (do not to lose value from your own point of
view) then there would be no imposition and so no loss of
freedom. If there is an original imposition and you later 
find you feel no resentment that does not alter the fact 
that you did lose some freedom. If you freely forgive them
this merely means that no compensation is necessary to
rectify the imposition. (It is, of course, logically 
possible that depriving someone of liberty can increase his 
welfare in the long term.)
But there are two difficulties with the idea that you can 
simply choose not to mind an imposition. First, people do 
not seem psychologically capable of simply choosing their 
desires (though they can have desires about their desires, 
as discussed in the first chapter). If I don't like 
parsnips and do like potatoes then I cannot simply choose 
to reverse my tastes. Some tastes can be cultivated but it 
usually takes time and effort. And fundamental values are 
much harder to alter.
Second, suppose I could choose not to mind your causing me 
a loss of liberty (by expropriating the fruits of my 
labours or physically assaulting me) by my taking an apathy 
pill. Even if I judge it best to take an apathy pill after 
the imposition, that does not alter the fact that you have 
imposed on me without giving me restitution. You have 
imposed on me (for I would rather not have needed to take 
the apathy pill) and by the principle of liberty as 
minimising impositions, you have to compensate me to negate 
the imposition. If the mere absence of a continuing
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objection by the person imposed on is sufficient to show 
that there is no longer a loss of freedom then we have an 
even more absurd paradox than that of the 'free slave': we 
have to say that a murdered man was not imposed on (made 
less free) given that he does not now (for he cannot) 
resent his being murdered.
So impositions that frustrate a man's desires must be 
looked at in the context of the continuing individual. A 
change or loss of desire does not mean that a past loss of 
freedom ceases to be a loss or need not be rectified (if 
liberty is to be respected).
The above account explains part of the confusion in Berlin 
and Gray but it does not get to their central error. The 
contented-slave paradox is really due to Berlin's and 
Gray's conflation of two different (but equally 
unobjectionable) senses of freedom.
A slave is owned by someone else even if he does not at all 
mind being owned (perhaps because his master lets him do 
what he likes). In the same way a prisoner is a captive 
even if he does not mind being a captive. A slave and a 
prisoner are not 'free men' (whatever their feelings on the 
matter) in one clear and common usage of the term 'free'. 
But if we define 'social freedom' in another sense as 'not 
being imposed on' then people who have contracted into 
slavery or imprisonment have not lost any of this kind of 
social freedom even if they do later object to what they 
have got themselves into.
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The idea that a slave or a prisoner need not have lost his 
freedom only looks paradoxical until one realises that 
"freedom" is being implicitly used in two quite distinct 
senses: 1) not being captive or owned; 2) not having costs 
imposed on one. If I wittingly sell my car or my living 
body and later regret it, I cannot truly state that others 
impose costs on me by not returning what is no longer mine. 
The situation is partly obscured by the improbability of 
supposing someone's choosing slavery or imprisonment. But 
once these two perfectly acceptable senses of 'freedom' are 
clearly distinguished the paradox is seen to be based on an 
equivocation.
This is the central solution to Berlin's paradox of 
freedom. However, it is as well to go on to criticise 
Berlin's and Gray's putative solutions as they are mistaken 
in ways that are not unusual and which cloud the nature of 
liberty.
Berlin's new account of freedom is roughly one equating it 
with valuable opportunities (though he does include the 
freedom to make wrong choices) whether or not these are 
eventually taken. Presumably Berlin would see a society as 
more free to the extent that people have more of such 
opportunities.
Berlin is now in a somewhat ironic position. In his 
original essay he told us, quoting Bishop Butler, that "a
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• • . • , QOthing is what it is and not some other thing" and that we 
cannot expect all valuable things to overlap. With this 
new definition of liberty Berlin has apparently abandoned 
the value-free problem of finding what liberty is in favour 
of an axiological definition that makes liberty very broad 
and inherently valuable to the individual: each individual 
is more or less bound to like the idea of his having as 
many valuable opportunities as possible.
Admittedly, 'liberty' as used in this thesis is also 
desirable by definition, but reasons were given that it 
captures the common intuition, and it is not as hopelessly 
broad as Berlin's idea of liberty as the degree of valuable 
opportunities due to other people. It is part of this 
thesis that maximum opportunity and maximum liberty are 
contingently highly congruent, but it is logically allowed 
that liberty could have disastrous effects for opportunity, 
and vice versa. Berlin has now so linked these concepts 
that he cannot make sense of such possibilities. He has 
not given us a good reason for regarding opportunities (due 
to others) and liberty as the same thing. So that linkage 
seems arbitrary or tendentious in just the way that Berlin 
had previously objected to.
Gray has praised Berlin for his view that we should not 
expect all desirable things to be co-possible. But in his 
attempt to solve the free-slave paradox Gray seems to 
ignore this advice as much as does Berlin: it looks no
83 Butler 1736.
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better than merely defining the problem away by giving an 
account of autonomy that excludes certain 'inhuman' ways of 
living. Gray's account is only a sketch and so hard to 
tackle comprehensively and precisely. Here only a few 
points from his sketch are dealt with briefly.
Gray's solution is to deny that a slave can be truly 
contented or happy. Even if this were so, why should 
autonomy be necessary for contentment? Why should certain 
human norms be necessary for the possibility of 
contentment? Gray is trying to tie together contentment, 
autonomy and proper human nature such that contentment is 
only possible in a range of autonomous human norms.
To deny that someone is autonomous because he does not fit 
into our list of approved lifestyles is little more than an 
arbitrary insult. How can the notion of autonomy be tied 
to the notion of any concept of human nature? What Gray 
calls the "bare notion of autonomy"84 is just what autonomy 
is (lexicographically) and he is trying to adulterate it 
(but things are what they are and not some other thing).
It seems merely by fiat and an appeal to popular opinion 
that Gray attempts to exclude certain ways of living from 
human autonomy. There need be nothing more peculiarly 
'human' about "human autonomy" than there is something 
peculiarly 'human' about 'human death'.
84 Gray 1989 p.83.
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It is revealing that Gray includes, as a happy form of 
autonomous life, religious devotion while excluding (on the 
same page) the cocaine addict. It is at least possible 
that some religious devotees are vacant, miserable, life- 
denying people while some cocaine addicts are getting at 
least a little contentment from their drug. Even if the 
religiously devoted are content it might be argued that at 
least some of them are so only by slavishly following the 
teachings of a charlatan and so hardly autonomous by 
critical standards. By similar standards, cocaine addicts 
who continue their addiction in the knowledge of what else 
they might be doing are not obviously without autonomy. So 
to include the religiously devoted whilst excluding cocaine 
addicts seems based more on Gray's conventional views 
rather than any sophisticated view of human nature.
In a biological sense, a human life must include any type 
of life a human being happens to lead. Gray seems to be 
trying to use human nature to argue from an 'is' to an 
'ought'. The reason he gets to the 'ought' is that his 
conception of a human life is already value-laden.
Gray claims that in the uses of autonomy in moral and 
political contexts there is always some account of human
op: , . . .
nature. J That is not the case in this thesis. Here one 
is autonomous to the extent that one is not ruled by 
others. Slaves are ruled by others and so not autonomous 
(but that does not entail that their autonomy was
85 Ibid. pp.83-84.
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illiberally interfered with if we allow for the possibility 
of contractual slavery). So none of this is to argue that 
a slave can be autonomous (or that he is likely to be 
contented with his lot).
The single libertarian principle
The boldest among the rights theorists aim ... at a 
structure in which all rights are derivations from a 
single aboriginal right ... but there are serious 
obstacles facing such a project. Consider in this 
connection how obscure are the relations between a 
liberal right of initial self-ownership (as postulated 
by Nozick) and the right of initial acquisition.
There appears to be no relationship of derivability 
between the latter and the former ... Even in the 
Lockean and Nozickian frameworks, then, it appears 
there may be two basic rights, not one, and insofar as 
they have independent justifications, a competition 
among their demands cannot be ruled out.
It seems worthwhile to reply to Gray by giving a brief 
recapitulation of the account of the position developed in 
some detail in the response to Friedman. This thesis does 
not take a rights-theoretical approach to liberty but, 
nevertheless, the principle of liberty is a single one that 
gives answers without ancillary principles.
Initial self-ownership follows quite easily from the idea 
of individual liberty as not imposing costs on individuals. 
If I use (only) myself I do not thereby impose a cost on 
anyone, but if someone else were to use me without my 
permission he would (usually) be imposing a cost on me. So 
liberty entails that I ought to have the use of myself— and 
that just is self-ownership. So self-ownership is not
86 Ibid. pp.147-148.
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itself part of the principle of individual liberty for it 
flows from it (in normal circumstances).
Though if I were to freely contract into slavery then the 
principle of liberty entails that I would be doing the 
imposing by, say, running away from my owner. And there 
are cases where it would be libertarian (at least, 
consequentially so) to non-contractually deprive an 
individual of his self-ownership. For instance, where 
killing someone (for surely that is one way of depriving 
someone of self-ownership) is necessary to stop his killing 
others. These show that self-ownership is neither a 
separate libertarian principle nor necessarily entailed by 
(or part of) the libertarian principle (of minimising the 
costs individuals impose on each other) in the sense of 
being one of its theorems.
Initial acquisition then follows from self-ownership 
because to deprive a self-owner of the (previously unowned) 
resources he is using (given that these are not uniquely 
valuable natural resources) is to impose a cost on him, 
which just is to infringe his social liberty.
So here there is only one basic principle: individual 
(social) liberty. Only from this is initial self-ownership 
derived, and only given self-ownership (and the use of 
previously unowned resources) is initial acquisition 
derived.
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Locke seems to have a single principle as well in his 
Second Treatise, and it more or less amounts to the same 
account. Locke first argues that no one has any right to 
set themselves above others (for God has given no sign that 
anyone has such rights). He then attempts to show the 
consequences of this equality of men in terms of what 
social interactions are allowable. In effect he has 
roughly the same theory of liberty as non-imposition of 
costs (though with a theological backing). Everything 
about self-ownership and property acquisition (including 
Locke's famous 'proviso') follows from this idea of men's
07
not setting themselves above each other.
Locke also argues, as is done in this thesis, for the happy 
coincidence that respect for liberty is conducive to human 
welfare. For Locke this is not a matter of mere 
coincidence but the design of a benevolent Christian God.
In this thesis it is no mere coincidence either, for 
philosophy and economics can explain the systematic 
connection.
Thus the theory of liberty in this thesis is more or less 
Lockean but stripped of its theological underpinning, made 
more consistent, and extended to new areas. (Nozick's
87 Strictly speaking, we are owned by God (perhaps because 
he created us and the labour theory of property acquisition 
also applies to him) and this is one reason that we are not 
allowed to commit suicide: this would be damaging another's 
(in this case, God's) property. But because God has set no 
one above anyone else we are effectively self-owners with 
respect to each other.
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theory, however, is less explicit and not so easily 
defended as flowing from a single principle.)
Fisher folk
Gray continues:
The point is that we have no theory of acquisition 
which contains definite criteria for adjudicating the 
scope of apparently conflicting property rights. 
Consider the following example. A family of fisher 
folk has since time immemorial trawled a given strip 
of coast. Now, because of industrial activity further 
along the coast, the catch which it had always brought 
in falls substantially. What are the fisher folk 
entitled to demand according to the Lockean theory?
May they veto the industrial activity as a direct 
invasion of their property rights, demand compensation 
for loss suffered, or are they without property rights 
of any sort in their customary catch? ... taken by 
itself, the Lockean theory has no definite answer to 
these questions. ... It is not just that there are 
hard cases for Lockean principles, but rather that in 
their applications in the state of nature they contain 
vast indeterminacies. The guidance they appear to 
offer in civil society is, for this reason, delusive, 
and we rely in reality on convention to settle 
boundary problems of the sort I have mentioned.88
Again, a general theory of libertarian acquisition was 
given in reply to Friedman, but it should be illuminating 
to tackle the specific problem that Gray poses.
The general liberal approach is to determine how much each 
party is imposing a cost on the other so that the one 
imposing the greater cost can compensate the other or cease 
the activity— whichever minimises the costs people cause 
each other. To get a grip on Gray's example it should help 
to start with a simpler case.
88 Ibid. p.148.
The fisher folk are clearly using the fish for their 
livelihood. First, suppose another group of fishermen were 
to come into the area and fish to the extent that the catch 
of the indigenous group fell substantially. For the new 
fishermen to take a resource that the others were already 
relying on would normally be a great cost to the original 
group. It would normally be a small cost to the new group 
to require that they find some other way of making a living 
(or pay the first group to allow them to fish). Only if 
this is impossible— perhaps due to some unusual 
circumstance such as a famine on the land— would the new 
group have a claim to share the fish (because there would 
not be any alternative way of making a living and they 
would have been able to fish had the original group not 
been there).
The case is the same with the new industrial activity. The 
fisher folk should be paid roughly the cash value of their 
losses or the industrial activity should cease. This 
compensation could either continue for the duration of the 
effects of industrial activity or be settled by a lump sum.
The fisher folk should not have an absolute power of veto 
if full compensation is possible for it would be a great 
imposition on people not to allow them to carry on their 
projects, whatever they are, provided they can fully 
compensate others for any external cost caused thereby.
But it would be libertarian for the fisher folk to have the 
power of veto up to the point that full compensation is
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possible. If their power of veto were absolute they could 
impose illiberal costs on the other group if only by using 
it to bid up the compensation beyond the level of any real 
cost to themselves (any disputes about the correct level 
would best be tried by disinterested arbitration agencies; 
that is not a theoretical but a practical problem).
If the fisher folk were itinerant and living in caravans 
which they could easily move to other sites then little or 
no compensation would be due. That they probably have 
substantial buildings and a love of the general area means 
that it would be a great imposition to allow the damage to 
go uncompensated.
If the fisher folk were new and the industrial complex were 
traditional then the situation would be more or less 
reversed. The new fishermen should put up with the smaller 
catch or pay the industrialists to stop their pollution.
So the general solution is that the fisherfolk do have 
libertarian property rights in the fish, though the law may 
not reflect this. From a libertarian point of view it 
would be better if the law explicitly recognised these 
libertarian property rights in order to facilitate 
compensation or trade and to help to avoid unnecessary 
disputes or unintentional imposition. But if liberty is to 
be respected the claim to the fish is valid whether or not 
the law recognises this. If any convention is used which 
has a result that is different, and not freely agreed to by 
the parties involved, then the outcome is illiberal.
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This does not look like a Lockean position because the 
fisher folk do not do anything to the fish or the sea apart 
from rely on them (and they are different individual fish 
each time). But the fisher folk are clearly using the fish 
considered as a whole and the industrial activity clearly 
interferes with their use at a great cost to them. The 
fisher folk's use of the fish imposes on no one 
significantly (given that there are other places to fish 
and other ways to make a living), and the new 
industrialists are causing them a serious cost just as 
surely as they would if they were to try to claim the land 
on which the fisher folk had built their houses. This 
solution to the problem is within Locke's general theory of 
liberty and Locke was merely mistaken to think that labour- 
mixing could catch all the property acquisition that his 
theory of human equality required.
Granted this thesis' interpretation of the spirit of the 
Lockean theory, this answers Gray's questions and so 
refutes his claim that Lockean theory has no definite 
answers to the questions he asks. He has not shown that 
Locke's theory of property acquisition contains "vast 
indeterminacies" in a state of nature.
"The liberal problem"
Despite criticising various conceptions of liberty and 
concluding that they are all to be rejected, Gray does not 
think that developing a robust theory of liberty as such is
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the fundamental liberal problem. He calls "the liberal 
problem— the problem of finding fair terms of peaceful 
coexistence among persons with different conceptions of the
Q Q  , , ,
good."°^ Perhaps this is the 'modern liberal' problem. It 
has nothing in particular to do with liberty (liberty is 
not even mentioned). This modern view of liberalism 
matters for it would seem to indicate that even if 
confronted with a coherent account of a society that is 
based on liberty Gray (and modern 'liberals') might deny 
that it is liberal on the basis that it is not a "fair" 
system. Liberalism apparently has fairness built into it—  
again, in just the way that Berlin objects to.
So it is somewhat disingenuous of Gray to write:
For Hayek, then, liberty is a moral notion. Nor is 
there anything objectionable to that: for, despite 
great and subtle efforts, no convincing conception of 
freedom that is value-neutral has yet been 
articulated.90
For even if a value-neutral account is possible Gray is
going to reject it as solving the liberal problem unless
the consequences are "fair".
Gray later gives an alternative account of the nature of 
liberalism:
in his conception of civil association Oakeshott has 
isolated and identified the very kernel of 
'liberalism', which is a mode of associations 
constituted by adherence to rules that are as non­
instrumental— that is to say, as little substantive 
and as much procedural— as is attainable.91
S9 Ibid. p.166.
90 Ibid. p.97.
91 Ibid. p.199.
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First, there is not even any obvious connection between 
this understanding of 'liberalism' and the previous account 
of "the liberal problem". Second, is this account even 
coherent? The notion of non-instrumentality looks similar 
to the notion of pure impartiality (dealt with in the first 
chapter). The kindest thing that can be said is that there 
seems to be some idea here that people should be allowed to 
carry on their lives with as little interference by others 
as possible; and this meaning is compatible with the theory 
of liberty in this thesis. But if that is a false 
interpretation then it can only be said that as it stands 
Gray's form of words is too obscure to be criticised 
rigorously.
It is later stated:
liberalism as a doctrine implicitly presupposed, what 
contemporary cultural pluralism destroys or 
diminishes, a single cultural tradition as 
undergirding the institutions of civil society."
It is hard to know what Gray's 'liberalism' presupposes 
given the obscurity of his account of it; but it is clear 
that liberalism as used in this thesis does not presuppose 
"a single cultural tradition". Liberalism is compatible 
with any number of different cultures provided only that 
they are voluntary affairs that do not impose costs on 
others. Given the fairly uncontentious character of the 
definition (that it ought to be fully implemented is 
contentious) of liberalism just mentioned (that 'people
92 Ibid. p.214.
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should be allowed to carry on their lives with as little 
interference by others as possible') it seems utterly 
mistaken to claim that cultural pluralism as such, or as 
found in the UK, is incompatible with liberalism.
"After liberalism"
Gray reviews his objections to liberalism and looks to the 
future in the book's "Postscript: after liberalism". The 
postscript is particularly marked by a new approach whereby 
Gray has abandoned critical rationalism and consequently 
demands new and impossible demonstrations of the value of 
liberalism. This new approach is focused on here, but a 
few additional points are also tackled.
Liberalism, which in its application to personal 
conduct aims for toleration and even pluralism, is in 
its political demands an expression of intolerance, 
since it denies the evident truth that many very 
different forms of government may, each in its own 
way, contribute to an authentic mode of well-being ... 
No liberal can accept (without thereby ceasing to be a 
liberal) that liberal practice expresses and embodies 
only one among many ranges of often conflicting and 
sometimes incommensurable varieties of human 
flourishing.
The only thing which liberalism demands is freedom; the 
only thing it is intolerant of is tyranny. Liberalism does 
not call for mere 'toleration'. Mere 'toleration' cannot 
be practised; one needs to specify what is to be tolerated. 
What liberalism demands is toleration of the individual's 
doing what he likes (however much that seems disgusting or
93 Ibid. p.239.
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useless) provided he is not interfering with (imposing 
costs on) others: toleration of individual liberty.
Liberals should be intolerant of politics because the state 
is (empirically) the greatest enemy of liberty. So there 
is no strange inconsistency in liberal toleration here.
It is certainly true that different forms of government are 
compatible with some types of well-being. The state does 
not destroy all wealth and welfare (especially for those 
who know how to use the state to their own advantage). If 
Gray is making the serious claim that political systems are 
often at least as good as libertarian systems he ought to 
give an example rather than rely on the apparent 
implication that liberals are merely dogmatic or naive. If 
his gun is loaded why does he not fire it? He pleads 
"incommensurability" as though it is an excuse, but if he 
gave an example it would be possible to test this.
Gray claims that he has:
examined and found wanting all the major justificatory 
strategies in the project of constructing a liberal 
ideology. 4
Gray no longer accepts Popper's epistemological theory of 
falsificationism; if he did he would see that the liberal 
idea that it is desirable to respect individual liberty 
does not need to, and logically cannot, be justified. This 
idea does not require any theoretical underpinning. It can 
be a bold conjecture that remains plausible until it is
^4 Ibid. p.240.
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destroyed by criticism. Gray is right to think that he has 
deflated many attempts to justify liberalism; he is wrong 
to think that this means that liberalism has to be 
abandoned. (It is true that it cannot operate if no theory 
of liberty is coherent, but the quasi-Lockean theory in 
this thesis remains unrefuted by any of Gray's criticisms.)
Later Gray writes, of Mill's and Popper's accounts:
If it is unclear that scientific knowledge grows best 
in a scientific community devoted to unencumbered 
criticism and self-criticism, it is just as doubtful 
that the progress of science depends upon the 
institutions of a liberal society.
But doubts are not criticisms. And even if Gray had 
criticisms and these were refuted he would now still want 
an impossible justification of liberalism while 
inconsistently resting his own position on nothing.
Gray writes of Mill's experiments in living:
We do not know what is to count as a criterion of 
success in an experiment in living ... how are we to 
know when the relevant evidence is before us? How are 
we to know when the experiment has been completed?
Liberally, the individual is to decide, and he is bound to 
use tentative conjecture to guide him. So any "criterion 
of success" will be personal and conjectural. It would be 
illiberal to impose someone else's criterion.
Falsificationism shows us that it is impossible to 
guarantee any criterion.
95 Ibid. p.243.
96 Ibid. p.243.
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Gray continues:
What reason is there for according further freedom of 
action in a respect of a form of life which 
experimentation has shown to be disastrous? There is 
here an irresolvable conflict between the claim of 
individuals to live as they please and the defence of 
that freedom in terms of cumulative moral knowledge of 
the conditions of human well-being.
Who knows that some form of life is disastrous? Who can 
best judge but each individual for himself? Gray surely 
wants to decide for himself, as do I. If he has a reason 
to deny others the same liberty he ought to state it for 
criticism. It is logically possible that there is a 
conflict between individuals' living as they please and 
their failing to learn from their own mistakes and others' 
mistakes concerning what increases welfare. Is there a 
real conflict? We are not told so. Apparently it is 
enough for Gray that there is no guarantee of harmony. He 
has no real evidence of conflict to offer. (If Gray 
thinks, as seems plausible, that Popper's falsificationism 
is refuted by Feyerabend's arguments, then that explains 
his position, but that epistemological debate is too far 
off the subject for explicit discussion here.)
Gray repeats his justificationist mistake by asserting:
the fundamental insight that there is no pre-ordained 
harmony and no inevitable connection between human 
well-being and the promotion of truth.
97 Ibid. p.244.
98 Ibid. p.248.
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The conjecture that there is a connection between human 
well-being and the promotion of truth (and that liberty 
allows for both) is but one bold conjecture that can be 
defended (and thereby give a defence to liberty). It does 
not and cannot be given unshakeable support and it cannot 
and should not be offered as support (especially the main 
support) for liberty.
So Gray is completely correct in his claim that "the 
epistemological route to the justification [emphasis added]
• . • QQ •of liberalism is a failure." He merely fails to see that 
the epistemological route can nevertheless be held out as 
but one among many defences of liberalism.
Gray links his criticism of the growth of knowledge with 
his earlier point about competing forms of life when he 
writes:
the epistemological strategy neglects the real 
possibility that the growth of knowledge (even if it 
does proceed fastest in liberal orders) is only one 
human good and may come into conflict with others that 
are sometimes weightier.
He gives the example of "the interest we have in
• • ■ 1 0 1  reproducing our cultural traditions."
Again, as one defence among others, the epistemological 
strategy does not need to come into conflict with other 
goods than knowledge. It might just be that one can have
99 Ibid. p.248.
100 Ibid. pp.248-249.
101 Ibid. p.248.
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more of many valuable things in a free society. It might 
be that there is no significant clash between knowledge and 
other desirable values (that is, values that are morally 
defensible). Gray specifically suggests a clash between 
knowledge and cultural traditions. Unfortunately he does 
not indicate the form such a clash might take; we can only 
guess. The growth of knowledge might well undermine such 
things as traditional religion, opinions and authority when 
these are based on error. I see no good reason to think 
these mistaken things are worth preserving. But it would 
probably be fruitless to argue on the basis of what Gray 
might think. If Gray had real criticisms instead of 
logically possibilities it might be that he could make a 
powerful point here. Without these we can attack only 
straw men of our own devising, so we had better move on.
Finally Gray gives us some substantial examples to 
criticise:
It is obvious ... that many virtues and excellencies 
are weak or absent from liberal societies. The 
virtues of a courtier, of a warrior, or of a pious 
peasant, presuppose a social order which cannot 
coexist with a liberal society. We may go further.
It may well be ... that a liberal order undermines 
important virtues, including virtues upon which that 
order itself depends. The hedonism characteristic of 
market societies may threaten the martial virtues that 
are indispensable to it, and individualism may weaken 
the familial virtues on which an individualist order 
rests. The connection between liberal freedom and the 
virtues is a contingent and sometimes delusive one
Let us grant that the occupations listed have their 
particular 'virtues' (and so do those of a customs officer
102 Ibid. pp.260-261.
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and a torturer, no doubt). The question is: Are they
worth the loss of freedom that makes them possible? Either 
Gray thinks that a society with such things is genuinely 
preferable or at least as good (in which case he ought to 
tell us why we are mistaken to prefer liberty) or (more 
plausibly) he is merely complaining that a liberal society 
is not better in every imaginable way. But obviously this 
point can be conceded without impugning the general 
superiority of liberalism. This is another indication that 
Gray has turned from being quite a good critic of 
liberalism into a rather feeble one.
It logically might be that the liberal order undermines the 
virtues on which it rests, but Gray's brief examples are 
not very convincing. Even if we grant that hedonism is 
characteristic of market societies it can be replied that 
good wages might motivate some poorer hedonists to go into 
the army and other richer hedonists to pay to protect their 
continuing hedonism. Gray is supposing that free market 
defence is impractical without argument (admittedly there 
is not much literature on this103). But the state is both 
a machine for initiating wars and is itself a vulnerable 
target of control for other states. Statesmen are 
responsible for war and they are relatively safe in the 
current system of state military machines, so they are not 
adequately deterred. Why would it be worse, for instance, 
for public subscriptions to pay for spies, assassins, or
i n i -----------------------------  ,
Though Rothbard 1978 makes some good points.
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mercenaries to deal with (or merely threaten to deal with) 
any dangerous foreign statesmen?
How may individualism weaken family virtues? It is 
difficult to be sure what Gray might mean. Is 
individualism supposed to be inherently egoistic? That 
might cause trouble for families (and hence welfare). But 
respect for individual liberty has no such implication and 
that is the only kind of individualism being discussed 
here. That an individual should not simply be forced to do 
things for the good of others does not entail that 
individuals will be selfish or that they cannot bind 
themselves contractually in marriage. More detailed 
responses to Gray are difficult without more sophisticated 
accounts of what seem, in any case, mere logical 
possibilities.
What is wrong with a "contingent" connection between 
liberty and the virtues? Gray again wants a logical 
guarantee that liberalism is the best system. This is too 
demanding. And he has not, in any case, given a good 
example of the "delusive" nature of the connection between 
liberty and the virtues.
Gray continues:
The spurious universality of liberal principles is a 
consequence of the self-deception of liberal 
philosophy, which is bound to deny the particularistic 
character of all genuine moral and political 
reasoning.104
104 Gray 1989 p.262.
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Of course people will tend to have different moral and 
political views in non-liberal societies. The liberal 
merely thinks these other societies would be better if they 
liberalised. Which illiberal practices does Gray support 
in such societies but declines to state for criticism? We
cannot answer his criticisms more thoroughly unless he 
makes them more specific. There is a moral clash with 
illiberal aspects of other societies but it is not a 'moral 
imperialism' to want to change them. That is to think 
collectivistically. The liberal wants the liberty of each 
individual respected.
Gray denies that there is "anywhere a compelling 
demonstration of the priority of liberty over other 
political values."105 Again, he wants a justification and
a guarantee (a "compelling demonstration"). But he also 
holds out the 'insight' that "philosophy as a search for 
foundations" ought to be abandoned106, so why is the lack 
of a compelling demonstration a failing for liberalism? It 
looks as though Gray must return to bold conjectural 
epistemology in political philosophy.
Instead he thinks philosophy ought to be abandoned in
.favour of "theorizing":
In the wake of philosophy, the object of theorizing is 
the attainment of self-understanding as practitioners
105 Ibid. p.262.
106 Ibid. p.263.
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of the historically contingent and specific forms of 
life we inherit or adopt.
It is as though Gray is bored with philosophy and so he 
declares it to be a Philistine activity when used in the 
realm of politics. "Theorizing" seems to be inherently 
conservative and require a grasp of cultural matters rather 
than deeper philosophical issues. If Gray thinks he can 
maintain a comfortable conservative and cultural approach 
to politics that rules out of court troublesome philosophy, 
then he is wrong. He can only turn a blind eye to the 
philosophy that is bound to change the world in ways that 
those that decline (or cease) to study it will fail have an 
influence on.
Gray concludes:
For the political Pyrrhonist, by contrast with the 
liberal, there are few universal political dilemmas 
and no universal solutions. ... Whatever he does, he 
will not engage in the vain project of constructing a 
liberal doctrine. Indeed, if his enquiries have any 
practical aim (and they need not), it will be to 
protect the historical inheritance of liberal practice 
from the excesses of an inordinate liberal 
ideology.
Gray's new cultural relativism, skepticism and pragmatism 
are implied to be examples of hard-won wisdom. But given 
the failure and degeneration of his criticism this looks 
more like an old soldier who has become too tired for 
philosophical battles so is making excuses in order to 
retire and tend a quiet cultural garden.
107 Ibid. p.263.
108 Ibid. p.264.
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4. A Coda on Anarchy, Liberty and Pluralism
This section analyses the relationships between pluralism, 
liberty and anarchy as misunderstood in a typical but 
sophisticated way in some recent writings of one prominent 
political philosopher, John Rawls.
'Anarchy' means 'no rule' (its literal etymology) in the 
sense of 'no rule of persons by the state or other 
institutions or persons'. In a society where people 
interact without imposing on each other no one is ruling. 
Anarchy is thus linked to liberty as voluntarism in an a 
priori way: to the extent that we have liberty we approach 
anarchy; to the extent that we lack liberty we approach 
totalitarianism.
I generally agree with the free-market anarchist economic 
arguments of Murray Rothbard and David Friedman. I have 
nothing in particular to add here to their practical 
economic arguments except what qualifications are explicit 
or implicit in the foregoing chapters.
Nozick is not an anarchist but does not dismiss anarchy out 
of hand in his Anarchy State and Utopia. I more or less 
agree with Rothbard's criticisms of Nozick's argument for 
the minimal state.109 I will not repeat those here. Nor
109 Rothbard 1982.
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will I tackle David Miller's rejection of free-market
.  . 1 1 0  anarchy at the end of his book on anarchism. I do not
think he seriously considers the market-anarchy
explanations of public goods, policing, and nationalism to
be found in Rothbard and Friedman (though he cites them in
his bibliography), but there would be no point in merely
repeating their general economic or moral arguments, and
this is not the place to elaborate on them. What I am
interested in here is the merely presuppositional dismissal
of the anarchistic route to maximising liberty and welfare
and allowing for pluralism. We look at some recent
writings of one erudite but politically moderate
philosopher, John Rawls. He is chosen because his
presuppositions are so typical, and his writings
influential.
Rawls against anarchy
In some recent writings by Rawls that are intended to
clarify his position in A Theory of Justice we can see his
presuppositions against anarchism brought out clearly. We
here cite and respond to several examples. First we look
at "Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical".111
In this article Rawls is trying to show that:
in a constitutional democracy the public conception of 
justice should be, as far as possible, independent of 
controversial philosophical and religious 
doctrines.112
110 Miller 1984.
111 Rawls 1985.
112 Ibid. p.223.
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What Rawls is really looking for is a clear and robust 
moral system of basic social rules that support 
constitutional democracy. To be the more clear and robust 
these rules are to avoid controversy in philosophical and 
religious doctrines.
Even if we grant that Rawls can achieve this goal it is 
clear that he has merely side-stepped the clash of some 
political possibilities by simply refusing to consider 
anything outside some form of constitutional democracy. If 
there are no proper arguments against alternatives, and he 
is really only trying to preach a clearer understanding to 
the converted, then why should this thesis criticise his 
writings? Because he muddies the water (albeit 
unintentionally) on the natures of liberalism, liberty, 
democracy, society and justice in ways that are quite 
typical and which help to sustain popular views against 
anarchy.
Rawls states:
A deep disagreement exists as to how the values of 
liberty and equality are best realised in the basic 
structure of society. To simplify we may think of 
this disagreement as a conflict within the tradition 
of democratic thought itself, between the tradition 
associated with Locke, which gives greater weight to 
what Constant called the liberties of the moderns," 
freedom of thought and conscience, certain basic 
rights of the person and of property, and the rule of 
law, and the tradition associated with Rousseau which 
gives greater weight to what Constant called the 
"liberties of the ancients", the equal political 
liberties and the values of public life. ... Justice
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as fairness tries to adjudicate between these 
traditions ....
The "liberties of the moderns" as listed do seem to refer 
to people being free from interferences by others (with the 
possible exception of "the rule of law", which seems to 
merely amount to the state's interfering without any 
exceptions). The "liberties of the ancients", on the 
contrary, seem to be the right to have a hand in 
interfering with the individual freedoms of others. For 
politics always practically entails imposing costs on 
people. Democracy is a political process that interferes 
with liberty. It is confusing to place liberty within the 
tradition with which it must be at odds (it is merely 
logically possible that democracy might increase overall 
liberty despite the initial curtailment). So "justice as 
fairness" seems to be more about striking a balance between 
individual liberty and democracy rather than adjudicating 
competing claims within democracy, as Rawls states.
Rawls drops into holistic views of society and justice
without argument:
A society is viewed as a more or less complete and 
self-sufficient scheme of cooperation .... A sense of 
justice is the capacity to understand, to apply, and 
to act from the public conception of justice which 
characterises the fair terms of social cooperation.114
Society is not a "scheme" in the sense that it is a 
systematic arrangement or single plan. One of Hayek's most
113 Ibid. p.227.
114 Ibid. p.233.
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important ideas is that what might look like the product of 
a systematic plan is often really a "spontaneous order" 
that has arisen polycentrically (or anarchistically). And 
to the extent that we try to impose a systematic plan on 
such things the result can be chaos. A society is more 
like the outcome of individual interactions in some 
geographical region. To view this outcome of individual 
interactions as a "scheme" might tempt one to feel that one 
can be justified in imposing a 'better scheme' despite the 
real schemes or plans of the many individuals that this 
might override.115
The same holism is assumed in defining a sense of "justice" 
as something that must be derived from the "public 
conception". But there is no agent who is the public; 
there are only individuals with their own views on the 
matter. Perhaps Rawls is referring to the majority. But 
it is not clear why the majority's view ought to be 
regarded as the correct view by definition.
"Social cooperation" is also an expression that seems 
designed to lump together what are really quite distinct 
acts of cooperation. This suspicion is confirmed by what 
Rawls writes about "the fruits of social cooperation." 
(Ryan's similar misleading expression, "proceeds of social 
collaboration", was analysed in the previous chapter).
-1 T g----- ;------;--------------- . . .  . .
This mistaken collectivist view of society is 
epitomised by the story of the young boy who saw a large 
gentleman walk by and asked his mother: "What's that man 
for?"
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We are told that:
one of the deepest distinctions between political 
conceptions of justice is between those that allow for 
a plurality of opposing and even incommensurable 
conceptions of the good and those that hold that there 
is but one conception of the good which is to be 
recognised by all persons, so far as they are fully 
rational.116
Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas and Classical 
Utilitarianism are said to be in the singular category. 
Liberalism is in the plural category. This is supposed to 
be because in liberalism:
the concept of justice is independent from and prior 
to the conception of goodness in the sense that its 
principles limit the conceptions of the good which are 
permissible.117
In fact, all systems of basic social rules (systems of 
"justice") set limits on the conceptions of the good but 
also allow some leeway for individualism. Constitutional 
democracy might allow for more diversity than most 
religions but this seems to be a contingent difference and 
a matter of degree: within most religions many kinds of 
lifestyle are possible as long as they don't flout the 
religion; within a constitutional democracy many kinds of 
lifestyle are possible as long as they don't flout 
constitutional democracy itself— but that is just what I 
want to do. And the reason is that I believe that market 
anarchy would be more liberal in the sense that more 
activities and ways of living would be possible and 
tolerated as long as they do not impose costs on others. 
People would not have the state to use as a tool of
116 Rawls 1985 p.248.
117 Ibid. p.249.
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repression at the taxpayers' expense. Rawls seems to feel 
it axiomatic that there would be the maximum tolerance of 
different lifestyles under some form of constitutional 
democracy. It is not, as Friedman and Rothbard show.
The piece concludes on a similar note:
in a society marked by deep divisions between opposing 
and incommensurable conceptions of the good, justice 
as fairness enables us at least to conceive how social 
unity can be both possible and stable.
Again, Rawls is overlooking the economic anarchist's 
arguments that the state is a cause of strife by creating 
the conditions for predation by a host of vested interests; 
that constitutional democracy is a way of setting people 
against one another in a negative-sum game. Intolerance 
and the destruction lk wealth are the effects of this 
system. Social unity could be better achieved by (as far 
as possible) respecting everyone's rights to do what he 
wishes as long as he does not impose on others (and paying 
compensation for any imposed costs). This anarchistic 
possibility is left unconsidered, and positively obscured 
by Rawls' account of the relevant concepts.
• 1 1 Q •In "The idea of an overlapping consensus"1 Rawls combines
a tacit dismissal of anarchy (among other possibilities)
with several of the moral and social ideas that are
fundamental to defending it; instead he claims these ideas
118 Ibid. p.249.
119 Rawls 1986.
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for liberal democracy. I shall criticise several such 
examples.
Rawls holds that within a constitutional democracy a
"political conception of justice" that rests on self- or
group-interests will be a mere modus vivendi and hence
unstable. Stability comes with:
a regulative political conception of justice that can 
articulate and order in a principled way the political 
ideals and values of a democratic regime, thereby 
specifying the aims the constitution is to achieve and 
the limits it is to respect. In addition, this 
political conception needs to be such that there is 
some hope of its gaining the support of an overlapping 
consensus, that is, a consensus in which it is 
affirmed by the opposing religious, philosophical and 
moral doctrines likely to thrive over generations in a 
more or less just constitutional democracy, where the 
criterion of justice is that political conception 
itself.120
The anarchist can agree that a conception of basic social 
rules will not be as stable if it is based on pure self- or 
group-interests. There is nothing about this idea that is 
peculiar to democracy rather than any other basic rules of 
social interaction, whether another kind of archy or even 
anarchy. Both extreme authoritarian regimes and extreme 
voluntaristic regimes will only tend to persist in so far 
as the general populace feels moral approval of them or 
loyalty towards them.
While authoritarianism obviously limits the pluralism that 
Rawls feels unavoidable, it is not clear how democracy 
defends it better than anarchy. Rawls writes of having
120 Ibid. p.l.
313
clear aims and limits to a constitution, as though this is 
some guarantee of their being respected. But in the USA 
the constitution has been eroded from the time of its 
inception. The very democratic mechanism has enabled 
interest groups to subvert rights that might have been more 
stable left to unregulated, polycentric support.
The liberalisms of Kant and Mill are rejected:
their doctrines of free institutions rest in large 
part on ideals and values that are not generally, or 
perhaps even widely, shared in a democratic society. 
They are not a practical public basis of a political 
conception of justice, and [Rawls suspects] the same 
is true of many liberalisms besides those of Mill and 
Kant.1 1
They are held to be too comprehensive to be practical for
Rawls' purpose. What is needed is "implicitly shared
fundamental ideas and principles.11122 He recognises that
it might not be possible to avoid comprehensive doctrines
entirely but sees the question as:
what is the least that must be asserted; and if it 
must be asserted what is its least controversial 
form?1
The fact of pluralism makes this necessary if we are to 
reach a consensus.
Here Rawls is not merely rejecting "many liberalisms" that 
do not fit his purposes; he is rejecting extreme liberalism 
because he sees it as conflicting with other ideals, 
including that of democracy. From the anarchistic point of
121 Ibid. p.6.
122 Ibid. p.6.
123 Ibid. p.8.
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view Rawls is really wanting to limit pluralism here with 
his own comprehensive view of how society should be 
organised. Pluralism does make it desirable that we reach 
a consensus on liberal social rules. But the anarchistic 
answer to Rawls' question of the least that must be 
asserted, and in its least controversial form, might well 
be 'Live and let live' i.e. 'You let me live without 
interference and I shall not interfere with you.'
This would seem to be far more pluralistic than Rawls' 
implicit answer which to the anarchist looks rather like 
'Regulate and let regulate' i.e. 'Let us share in the 
regulation of everyone'— a Rousseauian travesty of 
individual freedom. Of course, most people do currently 
see democracy as desirable and so, strictly speaking, 'Live 
and let live' is controversial. But this is because people 
do not see, or do not mind, that democracy is the enemy of 
liberal tolerance and wealth creation. Were Rawls to see 
this (in his "original position"?) he would surely agree 
that we should not pander to the prevailing conception of 
"justice" but, instead, argue for the anarchistic 
liberalism that is a better option.
Rawls deals with the criticism that an overlapping 
consensus is itself a mere modus vivendi. In the example 
of states he says that any two of them with a treaty "are 
ready to pursue their goals at the expense of the other,
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and should conditions change they may do so." Hence the
situation is unstable. He claims:
a similar background is present when we think of 
social consensus founded on self- or group-interests, 
or on the outcome of political bargaining: social 
unity is only apparent as its stability is contingent 
on circumstances remaining such as not to upset the 
fortunate convergence of interests.
But with an overlapping consensus "the political conception
of justice, is itself a moral conception. And ... it is
affirmed on moral grounds ... ».126 Only where people are
prepared to continue to give support to the system despite
changes in the balance of power is there stability due to
an overlapping consensus rather than a mere modus vivendi.
Here it seems quite right to see that moral support is 
different from, and more stable than, a mere modus vivendi. 
But this would apply equally to an anarchistic society. 
Surely I can morally affirm voluntary association at least 
as sincerely as Rawls can morally affirm state 
intervention. And it can be the very existence of a 
democratic system that constantly tempts and makes possible 
political actions at the expense of others— which must 
undermine social unity.
The "method of avoidance" is Rawls expression for 
attempting to come up with a view that is maximally 
acceptable to all citizens from "religious, philosophical
124 Ibid. pp.10-11.
125 Ibid. p.11.
126 Ibid. p.11.
127 Ibid. p.12.
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or moral" points of view. He thinks of "basic rights and 
liberties as taking certain questions off the political
1 J O
agenda. »-L^ 0 Because:
Faced with the fact of pluralism, a liberal view 
removes from the political agenda the most divisive 
issues .... 129
Rawls is logically bound to be doing the opposite of what 
he claims here. Politics is about what states do. To use 
the state to enforce certain so-called "basic rights and 
liberties" come what may is precisely to attempt to 
permanently politicise them. Rawls is really trying to 
rule other social systems out of (the state) court. One of 
the systems is anarchy with its greater tolerance of 
pluralism— the very thing he claims to be wanting to 
preserve.
It might still be asked whether there is any difference in 
terms of pluralism between a privatised system of enforcing 
libertarian rules and a state system which enforces the 
same rules. But this presupposes that the state can 
tolerate the liberty which seems to naturally result in 
pluralism. States usually do two main things: they tax and 
they forcibly monopolise the legal system. Vested 
interests then compete to milk the state of tax money and 
to universally regulate others in various ways (in business 
and private life). This is bound in practice to destroy 
voluntary pluralistic alternatives. It would not be
128 Ibid. p.14.
129 Ibid. p.17.
317
appropriate to go into detailed theoretical and empirical 
economic evidence here. I can only refer again to the 
libertarian economic literature especially the writings of 
Rothbard and David Friedman.
We are told that citizens may not be able to fully explain
their agreement with each other:
They view the political conception as itself normally 
sufficient and may not expect, or think they need, 
greater political understanding than that.
They may start out thinking of the system as a mere modus
vivendi but they can then come to affirm it for its own
sake, achieving the "overlapping consensus" that makes for
stability.
Again, this is just what the anarchist would expect to 
happen. Initially, people would probably accept anarchy on 
the prudential basis that it is safer to 'live and let 
live', for to interfere with others is to invite 
retaliation. Eventually, people are likely to become more 
tolerant of freely chosen lifestyles and feel that it is 
positively immoral to interfere with them. Such tolerance 
would seem to be a vain hope in any political system as 
this entails the initiation of impositions by a monopoly 
agency. And this, further, naturally invites involuntary 
exploitation, privilege, and retaliation instead of 
mutually beneficial co-operation.
Ibid. p. 16.
5. A Modest Conclusion
Is the supposed congruence of liberty and welfare too much 
of a coincidence to be true? Not when you examine the 
conceptual and practical relationships of plausible views 
of liberty, welfare, and rationality and remember that all 
the great classical economists implicitly testified to a 
considerable congruence and that many modern social 
scientists (especially economists) go still further (Mises, 
Rothbard, Hayek, Milton Friedman, David Friedman, Becker, 
Buchanan, etc.).
This thesis has covered a lot of ground. Each chapter, or 
even many of its parts, could have involved sufficient 
major literature to make for a separate thesis, and, 
consequently, there is not the exhaustive approach that 
leaves me feeling all the important problems have been 
dealt with. But to have taken a smaller area would have 
been to abandon the overall theory (and perhaps I would 
still have felt that I had missed much out), and this 
theory is the way that I believe that the social scientific 
work in question must be defended if its full significance 
is to be seen.
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